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# Near East/North Africa Report

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## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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PROJECTED SARKIS-ASAD SUMMIT DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 7 Feb 81 p 23

[Article by George Bashir: "Sarkis-al-Assad Summit: Accord, Agreement and Mutual Understanding; Lebanon Anticipates Israeli Military Venture Aimed at South, Palestinians and Syria; Begin Uses It In His Interest in Elections"]

[Text] Will the Lebanese-Syrian summit expected in the next few days or weeks turn into a tripartite summit including, in addition to President Ilyas Sarkis and Hafiz al-Assad, Yasir 'Arafat?

This question was raised in political and diplomatic circles immediately after the end of the Islamic Arab Summit in al-Ta'if last week. Some circles expected the Lebanese-Syrian summit to be held on the sidelines of the al-Ta'if Summit between Presidents Sarkis and al-Assad. Other circles thought it likely that Abu 'Ammar would join this summit in the Saudi city personally before the al-Ta'if Summit, but after the "protocol" meeting between President Sarkis and al-Assad on the first day of the al-Ta'if Summit, everyone was surprised that no communique or press statement was released to reveal the results of this meeting, especially those results which the Lebanese side desired and still desires.

A short time after this meeting, observers noted that both the Lebanese and Syrians seemed pleased, but they did not reveal the content of their talks. They also noted that Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam opened his notebook to his Lebanese colleague Fu'ad Butrus after the end of the meeting of the two presidents and asked him to choose a suitable date for a meeting between the two foreign ministers. That date was set for last Monday in Damascus. It was also agreed that Minister Butrus would spend a day and a night in the Syrian capital during which he would hold intensive meetings with the Syrian leaders to review details of the situation in Lebanon and the region, for the purpose of reaching agreement on an agenda for the Lebanese-Syrian summit meeting which soon will bring together presidents Sarkis and al-Assad and their top aides. (It is most likely that the meeting will take place on 15 February).

Those who knew the details of the meeting between Presidents Sarkis and al-Assad in al-Ta'if confirmed that the meeting, in spite of its "protocol," was characterized by complete understanding and absolute candor about the facts of the situation in Lebanon. President al-Assad told President Sarkis that Syria knows more than others the problems from which Lebanon is suffering, and consequently

President al-Asad knows better than other Arab kings and presidents what President Sarkis and his government want, or rather, what Lebanon needs. Therefore, he put his arm around the Lebanese president when they were outside of the protocol meeting and said to him: "Let us hope for the best from our upcoming meeting. We will not let anyone come between us."

"Security, accord, and sovereignty": These are the major headings which will be incorporated into the agenda of the desired summit meeting between the Lebanese and Syrian presidents in the coming days. President Sarkis no longer can stand idly by watching the dangers and mistakes which occur and are perpetrated in Lebanon and beyond, because the Israeli elections are imminent and Menachem Begin is willing to pursue more than one hazardous undertaking to create the climate necessary to return him and his bloc to power in Israel next July. The administration of the new American President, Ronald Reagan, in a struggle with the Soviet Union in the area, has announced the broad lines of its policy, whether with regard to the Middle East crisis, the Palestinian military presence in Lebanon (which American Secretary of State Gen Alexander Haig described as "international terrorism nurtured and supported by Moscow" as justification for operations to stop it), or with regard to the security of the Gulf and the international struggle over oil routes and sources in the region, not to mention reactions to the Iraqi-Iranian war and the Jordanian-Syrian Struggle.

All of these topics have effects and reactions in Lebanon. There is no doubt that if any tremor over any of these subjects emanates from Lebanon, Syria will be first to be affected, if it was not the primary target. President Sarkis' regime can no longer sustain any delay in treating the problems from which it suffers, whether it is due to the absence of internal and external security or to the absence of reasons which would lead to achieving a minimum of national accord and security balance.

"It is important that a summit meeting between the two presidents occur first." This is what Lebanese officials wanted before the al-Ta'if Summit. However, some senior politicians who want the meeting to take place say that the two presidents want it to be preceded by exact and careful preparation through an agenda defining those points which are agreed upon and those which must be agreed upon, so that the summit meeting would sanctify this agreement rather than be a mere political and media event whose results quickly dissolve and never bring any political reaction.

Thus President Sarkis and President al-Asad wanted their meeting at the al-Ta'if Summit to be routine. No joint statement was issued from it, and the two agreed to authorize their foreign ministers to prepare the summit meeting so that both sides could direct their hopes toward its results.

The Syrians announced more than once before and after the operation to extend the mission of the Deterrent Forces in Lebanon that they have no ambitions in Lebanon, that they reject intervention in Lebanese internal affairs, that they are willing to support any step to achieve national accord, and that the atmosphere is suitable for the legitimate Lebanese forces to undertake the mission of preserving security in all Lebanese areas and to relieve Syrian forces of this mission.

The Syrians have told the Lebanese more than once that those who benefit from the Syrian military and political presence in Lebanon are those who participate in creating a gulf between the regimes in Damascus and Beirut for political, ideological or personal reasons.

On the other hand, the Lebanese did not say what was said at the al-Ta'if Summit through President Sarkis' speech until after "the cup was running over," as the saying goes.

Also, Syria complains that some Arab parties have not paid it for the expenses of the Deterrent Forces, while Lebanon in turn complains that these parties have not yet paid any of the sums they have pledged to Lebanon, whether at the Resistance and Defiance summit in Baghdad, the Tunis Summit, or at the recent al-Ta'if Summit. Add to that what the Lebanese President said before the Arab and Muslim leaders at the al-Ta'if Summit, which he would not have said if he did not clearly feel that Lebanon has been left to "pluck out its thorn with its own hands." The Lebanese are fed up with promises, because they all come to nothing in the absence of a "comprehensive common Arab strategy."

What will follow President Sarkis' speech at the al-Ta'if Summit? The experts say that the authority will take positions from which it cannot retreat, in a race with the date of the Israeli elections. Between the date of the Lebanese-Syrian summit and the Israeli elections, Begin's radical wing will employ an Israeli plan to undertake a military venture against Syria and the Palestinians, emanating from Lebanon. Southern Lebanon will be its arena and its field, and the results of this venture will be used in the interest of the Israeli elections. This is the information of the Lebanese, which is acknowledged in more than one Arab capital. Starting from these facts, the summit between Presidents Sarkis and al-Asad could include Abu 'Ammar, because security and accord in Lebanon cannot be achieved unless preceded by accord and security among the three parties of Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinians, which are the triad of war, peace, defiance, and resistance in the Middle East region.

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## EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE RELAUNCHED

London 8 DAYS in English 21 Mar 81 p 15

### [Text]

THE LONG and often painful process of preparing the first-ever European and Arab foreign minister's meeting (scheduled to be held in London in July) has got under way via a series of low-key diplomatic encounters in The Hague, Tunis and Brussels.

The first of such preparatory meetings was organised in The Hague on 24 February. Meeting for the first time since the formal decision to revive the moribund Euro-Arab dialogue was taken at a high-level meeting last November, European ambassadors from Holland, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, and Arab representatives from the PLO, Oman and Qatar, took a preliminary look at the different political and economic issues which are likely to be submitted for ministerial approval.

While both sides agree that the renewed dialogue should be a more 'balanced' one, including both economic and political issues, the European Community representatives have made it clear that the ministerial meeting should not be turned into a forum for political negotiations. In addition to discussions on the Middle East and the status of the PLO, the Europeans would like to widen the discussions to embrace other political issues, including Afghanistan and Poland. For the Arabs, the overriding question remains European recognition of the PLO, so they would like political discussions to be limited to 'areas of common interest' such as security problems in the Mediterranean and the Gulf region.

European assessment of the dialogue's long-term political potential seems, however, to have changed considerably in the past few months. The EEC now sees the dialogue — once rejected as only of minor interest to overall Euro-Arab relations because of the absence of any discussions on

energy questions — as being closely linked to its wider-ranging plans for resolving Arab-Israeli conflict. Several EEC experts have expressed hopes that the creation of a 'climate of confidence' within the dialogue could at a future date smooth contacts between the Arabs and Israel. Such plans will however, remain vague until the EEC take the long-awaited step to formal recognition of the PLO.

Further preparatory meetings, focussing on political questions will be held in the coming months.

The different working groups set up within the dialogue to look at the possibility of increasing Euro-Arab trade, investment and transfer of technology have also resumed work in Rome, Tunis and Brussels. The group dealing with industrialisation has concentrated on the formulation of a Euro-Arab convention on technical standards and criteria.

Other projects being studied include the setting up of a Euro-Arab centre for the transfer of technology, the conclusion of a non-preferential trade and economic agreement linking the ten-member community to those Arab states which do not have existing cooperation agreements with the EEC, and the formulation of a convention on the promotion and protection of European investments in the Arab states and vice versa. Finally, experts are also looking at the possibility of upgrading Euro-Arab co-financing operations in the Third World.

Although a definite date for the ministerial meeting has still to be fixed formally, it is generally accepted that the meeting will be held under the British presidency of the European Community in July this year. It is clear that both the Europeans and the Arabs would prefer to hold the meeting after the Israeli national elections, scheduled for 30 June.

## POLITICAL PRESSURE STIFLES CARTOONISTS

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 5 Mar 81 p 7

(Article by Aly Ashry and Richard Pennell)

(Text)

"GIVE me two cartoonists and a calligrapher and I'll produce a weekly magazine on my own. Not only will it be a good magazine, I believe it can be one of the best, if not the best, in the country," Ihsan Abdel-Kaddous, the Egyptian editor, once declared.

But gone are the days when Arab cartoonists towed over political leaders and provided the substance of a successful magazine as described by Abdel-Kaddous. The cartoonist has become, said one, "fear-ridden, sterile, and security oriented simply in order to survive."

"It is a great loss," says Salim Nassar, editor of the influential weekly, Al-Hawadess. "In the old days the good cartoonists provided what were really the best editorials, now, like the journalists, they are under political pressure, instead of approaching a subject directly, they must go around it and in doing so have lost a lot of their power."

Veteran Egyptian editor Mustapha Amin attributes the debacle of the art to what he calls a "lopsided social system that makes the cartoonist afraid of the ruler rather than the other way round as it should be."

"A successful cartoon," he contends, "is one that belittles the giant politician and inflates the small one. Unfortunately, all politicians in the Arab world are big and strong, much bigger and stronger in appearance than in reality, and the artists are too scared to deal with them."

Most people chart the demise of the cartoon to around the early sixties when the late Egyptian President Abdel-Nasser first started to take action against the most powerful Egyptian artists. Some left the country, some left the profession and the rest simply left out the bite.

### DIFFICULT

For a while the art flourished in Lebanon but with the advent of the civil war, life for the cartoonist, as for the journalist, became increasingly difficult. "It is really hard for the politically committed cartoonist to keep working," says Mustapha Karkouti of the Beirut daily As-Sadr. "Some are still

producing but their work is hollow in comparison to what it used to be. In some cases the cartoonist is required to produce three, four or even five cartoons a day — for censorship reasons — before one is chosen for publication. Can you imagine the strain of this?"

How much are the editors to blame? It varies from publication to publication. "Our cartoonist knows the limits," says Salim Nasser, "but even so we have to step in from time to time." "We do not like to interfere," says Abdel-Karim Abul-Nasr of the London-based weekly Al-Majalla, "we prefer that the cartoonist does his homework and understands the restrictions, but this is not often the case."


For those working in the Gulf and the state-controlled newspapers in countries like Iraq and Syria, there is not much choice, according to Karkouti, they simply have to follow the official line.

Habib Haddad, based in Paris with the weekly pan-Arab magazine Al-Mostakbal, says he is in total agreement with his publication's line. Nevertheless he always discusses his ideas with his editor before going ahead. Mahmoud Khalil of Al-Majalla more or less has a free hand, though he has got used to the idea of his daily cartoon not appearing in the Saudi-based Arab News from time to time.

#### SALARY

According to some people, not only politics are affecting the cartoonist; money is also playing a major role. Many Egyptian and Lebanese cartoonists have moved to the Gulf, evidently lured by the higher salaries. Here they toe a self-imposed line, which some people do not agree is always necessary.

In Bahrain, where the Government has eased some of the restrictions and opened the door for writers and artists to tackle whatever topics they deem fit, people appear to be disappointed with the role of the cartoonist.



"Afghanistan"

"These imported cartoonists are more like mercenaries than artists," complains one Bahraini businessman. "They are keen on getting their pay at the end of the month but I do not see any of them trying to satisfy their own standards, which we all know judging from previous performance elsewhere."

Many of the cartoonists complain that they feel uprooted and out of place in the Gulf. They stick to "safe" themes like Camp David or broader world issues, insisting that this is the only way to survive.

Others disagree. One Arab diplomat told *The Inter-Arab* bickering has opened new realms for cartoonists. Those working in one country can easily tackle leaders in another, it is at least one way for them to exploit their talent."

"This is only a short-term solution," responds a Bahraini artist. "Leaders disagree and then they make it up and we get caught in the crossfire, or at best we must deny our previous criticism. No, the cartoon is like an oil painting, it must endure."

## SUBJECTS

Cartoonists in exile admit that their colleagues at home are no better off, having to handle subjects "as explosive as the bombs that go off around them every minute," as one Lebanese in Kuwait puts it.

"Our politicians seem to operate under the delusion that they are demigods, or prophets, or at the very least philosophers who can fabricate solutions for all kinds of problems. Can we really tackle such persons in cartoons without risking sniper bullets or finding a booby-trapped car at our doorstep?"

Most of the cartoonists who have remained in Lebanon now find that patriotism is measured by devotion to one or more political leader. In Egypt they try to survive by producing innocent themes to protect themselves against the wrath from above.

"The realities of the Arab world have overwhelmed our ability to instigate humour," comments Egyptian cartoonist Bahgat (once considered one of the best in the region). "We have lost our touch."

According to cartoonist-poet-musician Salah Jaheen of Al-Ahram, the situation is much worse. "Present-day cartoons in the Arab world are reminiscent of those during the Hitler regime. We have become supercilious and superfluous; our art has lost its profundity and its impact. We are without culture; our cartoons are often meaningless."

## PRESSURE

With no union to help or protect them, no organisation to shelter them, the cartoonists are feeling the pressure very acutely. Jean Mishalani from Lebanon, working for *Arabia* and *Al-Anwar*, says the situation is just too trying. He is quite happy to crack verbal jokes among his friends but he would not dare put many of his ideas on paper.



The situation, he says, is tragic, not only for Lebanon but for the hearts and imagination of all artists in the Arab world. "There are enough unkept promises, lies, etc. here to keep you busy for years, nevertheless we stick to a few away-from-home, scare-proof subjects like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Camp David and others."

Mishalani also complains about the "prostitution of symbolism" — cartoons wrapped in ambiguity in the hope that the reader might "smell" something. This, he says, is weak and dishonest. "The reader deserves clarity, our role is to inform, entertain, guide and educate."

Stavros Jafri of the Beirut weekly *Al-Ubu* *Al-Arabi* has settled for the oil theme. Most of his recent work de-

als with oil price frauds and cutback tactics.

There are times when he too finds the Lebanese tragedy "too glaring to ignore", but in this context he sticks to the Western-power involvement and Arab political machinations.

"I am in anguish," says Melhem Ir-rid of the Beirut magazine *Al-Kifah* (formerly with the pan-Arab paper *Al-Hayat*). "There are a multitude of ideas brewing in my head, none of which I would dare to put on my drawing board."

He would not elaborate, but his friends explained: "It is obvious, the artists feel threatened. What do you expect Imad to do, wait for a street-corner gunman to settle accounts with him?"

One of Lebanon's most famous cartoonists, Pierre



Zeta of Libya, one of the few social cartoonists depicting the cultural scene

Sadeq provides the best example of the intimidated artist whose creative faculties have been paralysed by events.

During Lebanon's civil war he left the independent West Beirut newspaper *An-Nahar* to settle with *Al-Amal*, the organ of the Phalangist Party in East Beirut, where he "produces at half-speed".

"The phantoms of death have chased a light-hearted Sadeq away from *An-Nahar*," one columnist wrote. "*An-Nahar* means daytime, and the absence of Sadeq turned the back page of that paper into a space too dark to look at."

Like others, Sadeq is apt to shun Lebanese politics, preferring to ridicule world statesmen for their errors.

#### BLEAK


The picture is very gloomy, even for those now working in Europe. Though Mahmoud Kahil has managed to grow and expand on foreign soil and is now syndicated internationally he finds the situation quite bleak.

"I am surviving," he says. "in so far as I am making a living, but I am not doing the work I would like to do. It is becoming increasingly difficult to criticise anybody. No politician can take a joke any more. The response comes, let us say, not in a gentlemanly fashion.

"Then there is the additional constraint of the sales market. Wherever a publication does well, the cartoonist must steer clear of criticising that country."

Kahil, in fact, finds his sources of information more limited in Europe — "in the old days in Beirut I had his 'hemes' more and more restricted — "there is imperialism, communism, and, of course, the eternal Israeli conflict. The day we get peace with Israel, I will be out of

Jabib Haddad of *Al-Mosawat*, feels the benefits of community, in terms of personal development, but is still conscious of the constraints of the Middle East market.





"I would rather work as working in an international an animator," confesses Had-dad, "but I have to make a living."

Could the answer lie in a change of theme, away from politics and more towards social topics? Khalil is the only one to think so. He sees no future for the political cartoonist, unless an underground press develops.

"Not so," says his editor Abul-Nasr, "even the most mediocre political cartoon will evoke a better response than a good cartoon with strong social comment."

"Social problems cannot be covered like in the West," agrees Al-Hawadess's Salim Nassar. "People in the Middle East are not ready to appreciate such cartoons."

The main exception to this rule seems to be Libya's

leading cartoonist Zawawi, whose work concentrates mainly on such themes as the conflict between old and new, on the rapid social change resulting from the sudden oil wealth and on the pressures on those trying to adjust. Zawawi's themes are also quite critical of the authorities.

He has been reprimanded on more than one occasion, yet his work has had a considerable impact both at home and in the region.

#### DEVELOPMENT

But there is little development elsewhere. "There are about 200 to 300 technically qualified cartoonists working in various papers throughout the Middle East," says Mustapha Karkouti, "but few can produce properly."

Editors Nassar and Abul-Nasr also recognise only two or three really good "editorial" cartoonists at work today. The rest, they say, are

illustrators carrying out the instructions from above.

Yet all those involved seem determined to encourage the art of the cartoon in whatever limited way they can. "We are wrong for not doing more to nourish new talent," says Nassar.

"We in the newspaper business should be sending our talented youngsters for training and we should be encouraging the teaching of the cartoonist's art in our schools."

"There are talented youngsters," says Karkouti, "some of them trained abroad, but already they have virtually given up under the pressure."

So what is the answer? Most see the solution only in democracy and freedom of expression, which in today's terms could mean no solution. Any other remedy seems impossible to achieve in an area where the hand of the censor lies heavily.

CSO: 4620

COUP IN MAURITANIA DESCRIBED

London WEST AFRICA in English 23 Mar 81 p 604

[Text]

TO ALLEGGE that Morocco was behind the abortive coup in Mauritania last week, as the authorities have done, and to back this up by breaking off diplomatic relations with Rabat begs a number of questions.

Both the army officers involved (see page 657 for details) and the political movement, Alliance pour une Mauritanie Démocratique, with which they are associated have close connections with Morocco. But before subscribing to the theory of Moroccan conspiracy, it is worth noting that King Hassan is a man known to be a diplomatically astute and the initial evidence of the attempted coup suggests it falls well below his high conspiratorial standards. Secondly, the Mauritians allege that the conspirators came with several Land-Rovers from Senegalese territory. Considering that the Fleuve Region of Senegal has always been carefully patrolled, such an allegation is tantamount to saying that the Senegalese knew of the plot. So far Senegal has made no official comment, but it should be remembered that President Abdou Diouf recently paid an official visit to Mauritania, where he was warmly received.

It must also be said that government in Mauritania has always been a precarious business. Divisions that are racial and ideological have always played an important role and it required considerable feats of diplomatic and internal political

gymnastics by Mokhtar Ould Daddah, who was president until mid-1978, to give the country a semblance of unity.

It was the Western Sahara that put paid to the flexibility which any Mauritanian leader would have wanted (it was also Ould Daddah's undoing). The speed with which the finger has just been pointed at Morocco merely underlines the fact that Mauritania by its geographical location currently has no choice but to see its internal politics influenced by the diplomatic relations of its powerful northern neighbours, Algeria and Morocco.

Morocco has always contested the Mauritanian notion of neutrality in the Western Saharan war. It will be recalled that the Mauritanian military regime withdrew from the conflict after coming to agreement with the Polisario Front in August, 1979. Recently there has been an escalating press and propaganda campaign in Morocco alleging that the Polisario Front use Mauritanian territory for their sorties into Morocco. The Mauritians deny this.

That King Hassan would like a pro-Moroccan government in Nouakchott is also very clear. Unless a compromise is reached in the Saharan conflict between Algeria and Morocco (a prospect which the Mauritians would not relish because they would come under severe pressure from the Polisario Front) a neutral Mauritania potentially exposes Morocco.

ARAB BANKING IN LEBANON DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 27 Jan 81 pp 50-52

[Article: "Kuwaiti Group Prefers Purchase of Existing Bank and Saudi Group Plans to Establish New Banks; Applications Pour In Despite Bank of Lebanon's Move to Raise Minimum Licensing Capital to 50 Million Lebanese Liras for All New Banks; Influx of Arab Capital for the Establishment of New Banks in Lebanon"]

[Text] The present movement among businessmen and financiers to obtain licenses to establish new banks in Lebanon or acquire various interests in currently operating banks is still at a peak. This is clearly indicated by the probing that certain businessmen and financiers or their representatives are conducting at the Bank of Lebanon and the Banks Control Administration to determine the basic position on the submission of new license applications. Another indication of the trend is the exploratory moves on the part of some agents or brokers representing existing banks whose owners wish either to sell them wholly or to sell large blocks (an absolute majority or controlling majority) of their shares.

These operations and efforts are taking place despite all the emerging difficulties and problems, which might have appeared to be sufficient to discourage owners of capital from making large-volume and long-term investments. For the trend is taking place despite the risks inherent in the political and military situation at the Lebanese and regional levels. It is taking place despite the relative "inflation" in the number of banks operating in Lebanon, which has grown as a result of licenses issued to new banks--now in operation--in accordance with the legislative act issued in June 1977. And the trend is taking place despite the many difficulties that some of the new banks--especially those which have not yet begun operating--are encountering in trying to ensure a sufficient number of qualified personnel and experienced manpower to get the bank off to a vigorous start and provide management for the main office or a small number of branches. Branch banks have almost become a necessary condition in order to guarantee certain factors for growth, expansion and success for any commercial bank in Lebanon, which is fragmented economically and commercially as it is fragmented politically and socially.

The interesting fact is that the individuals looking for new licenses or shares in existing banks are continuing their quest despite what they have learned from their predecessors during the last 2 years, namely, that there has been a tremendous increase in the costs of both setting up and operating a bank. These costs begin with the permanent "relinquishment" of 7.5 million Lebanese liras

(over \$2 million) as a frozen deposit with the Lebanese Treasury. This is a non-interest-bearing sum which is required of all new license holders, and it can only be recovered in case of bankruptcy (!), liquidation or the expiration of the lifetime of the bank. On top of this there are the inflated and inflationary salaries demanded by employees in the banking sector as the inevitable price for moving from established and relatively strong institutions to institutions which are new from the standpoint of structure and existence. Of course, there are also the high costs associated with modern equipment, suitable offices and the many fees required by the process of setting up or purchasing a bank, including the unofficial sums which may be exacted (from buyers more than from sellers) by those who cater along the line in buying, selling and licensing operations. To all this can be added the difficulties that prompted one chairman of the board of a new bank to declare that if he were ever again assigned the job of pursuing and carrying through the acquisition of a license and setting up a bank, he would not accept less than 1 million liras. Moreover, there are the difficulties associated with understanding a bank and its problems, such as those which prompted the new president of Francebank, 'Abnan al-Qassar, to show compassion for the burdens, preoccupation and concerns of previous operations.

Some of the reasons for this interest in banks in spite of the many discouraging factors that would appear to exist are the old, traditional and well-established ones based on the well-known prestige, influence and advantages available to someone who is "sitting on a bank." But there are also some new reasons which can be taken into account. These rest on the tremendous liquid assets available among the old, new and veteran businessmen and financiers at a time when there is a scarcity of suitable investment opportunities which combine a good return with influence, prestige and inauguration into the club of bank owners.

Perhaps what cinches the matter for new individuals who wish to acquire existing banks or establish new banks is the knowledge that the relative surfeit of banks operating in Lebanon and the continuing growth in the number of these banks has not prevented even the new institutions from recording adequate profits within a short time of their establishment, while the gains of banks in operation for less than a year indicate that the threshold of profitability is not remote but rather within easy reach.

While it is not possible--ethically or out of a sense of respect--to disclose any official figures relating to bank balance sheets that have not been verified by auditors and account examiners prior to official publication, perhaps it is possible to refer to some of these figures without naming any banks as a basis for drawing some conclusions:

--One new bank, which completed its second year of operations with the close of 1980, realized a total balance estimated at 220 million Lebanese liras. Under the heading of liabilities were 130 million Lebanese liras in deposits by the public and 70 million Lebanese liras in deposits by banks. Under the heading of assets were 103 million Lebanese liras in deposits with other banks and 100 million Lebanese liras in various investments. All of this was a part of activity and operations which realized profits of nearly 1 million Lebanese liras on a capital of 15 million Lebanese liras--of which 7.5 million is frozen in the treasury--

against a loss of under 100,000 Lebanese liras in the previous year--a matter which cannot give any cause for concern, especially in view of the certain but uncounted increase in the real assets of the bank.

--Another bank with an established name and long history was undergoing a complete liquidation of its assets by its management and previous owners when ownership was transferred to new shareholders who began operating the bank officially and in actuality early in the spring of 1980. It closed its balance sheet at the end of the year with 190 million Lebanese liras. This amount included 90 million liras in deposits by the public and 30 million liras in deposits by shareholders. Under the category of assets were investments estimated at 100 million Lebanese liras. The bank's total loss after all account settlements was under 300,000 Lebanese liras, while the first 9 months of the bank's life must be viewed as a period of origination and establishment.

The data provided by these two examples are perhaps sufficient to create a first impression of the situation and a focal point for studying the economic benefits of establishing a bank or the return to be realized from banking investments in Lebanon under current conditions--a return which begins to accrue at a reasonable rate in the second year of the bank's life based on deposits and investments each in the neighborhood of 100 million Lebanese liras. In addition, these data are sufficient to reveal that new banks which have been in existence for only 2 years or, in some cases, less than a year have come to occupy a reasonable position among the large and well-established banks.

Perhaps there is no better indication of this fact than the statistical report prepared by the Arab Bank in Beirut. This report revealed that a new bank such as Universal Bank, Ltd., was able as of the end of 1979--i.e., at the end of its first year--to occupy the 57th rank among the 89 banks then operating in Lebanon based on total balance, deposits, and so forth.

These data also serve to demonstrate the "inducements" or the objective mechanisms of attraction in the banking industry which bring in capitalists looking for existing banks and frantically seeking a precious license bearing the signatures of the officials in charge of licensing in the Bank of Lebanon.

Amid such a climate, perhaps it should also be pointed out that some intentions to obtain a new license or purchase existing banks are not entirely 'in earnest, their weakness and irresolution being revealed when it comes time to pay, or "lay the money on the table." However, those Lebanese who take pride in the strength of their banking system are gratified by the fact that some serious operations under discussion involve Arab businessmen and financiers. In this context, perhaps it would be worthwhile to mention two operations which are still secret, or in their early stages:

1. The first operation involves a group of Kuwaiti financiers--or more precisely, a powerful Kuwaiti group--which is interested in obtaining a majority interest in a new or existing bank.

2. The second operation involves a group of Saudi financiers who are studying--among several available options--cooperation with a Lebanese group to obtain a license for the establishment of a new bank in which the Saudis would have a majority interest.

The attraction of these two Arab groups into banking operations conducted in and from Lebanon is, perhaps, the culmination of a series of cases in which Arab capitalists have participated in existing banks. Such cases include the participation of the Saudi 'Abd-al-Rahman Maminah in the new formation of Francebank and the participation of Yusuf 'Atiyah (Saudi Arabia) and Muhammad Khalifah al-Yusuf (UAE) with other Arab capitalists in the new structure of the Lebanon and Gulf Bank. However, the full value of this attraction process is demonstrated by the fact that the individuals involved in the two operations mentioned are not concerned about the relative sizeableness of the minimum capital required for any new bank licensed in accordance with the legislative act of June 1977. For the Bank of Lebanon has notified all its examiners that it will impose a minimum capital requirement of 50 million Lebanese liras for new licenses based on its discretionary authority. This amount is, in fact, equivalent to the capital of the Bank of Lebanon and the Emigrant Countries, Ltd., which has a total balance of 1.5 billion Lebanese liras and deposits in excess of 1 billion Lebanese liras and which just completed raising its capital to 50 million Lebanese liras to correspond to the large size of its deposits and loans in December of last year.

In making this move, the Bank of Lebanon is not using its discretionary powers and authorities merely for the sake of exercising discretion but is employing them in an effort to prevent--by inflating the minimum required capital--an unjustified inflation in the number of banks. It is also attempting to prevent a new and undesirable infiltration into the Lebanese banking sector, which is energetic, strong and generally healthy but which suffers from deficiencies in a few areas that must be eliminated and overcome. These deficiencies should not be widened by facilitating the entry of new banks which are not at full strength and readiness (permitting the military terminology).

From this standpoint, the Bank of Lebanon is attempting through the medium of suggestion to discourage some license applicants from submitting their applications and is indirectly steering them toward purchasing existing banks or part ownership in existing banks. If this operation succeeds, the bank will have killed a second bird with the same stone by "disposing" of certain banks--some of them operating and others not--whose owners might wish to sell them wholly or in large part if their market value rises sufficiently, the minimum price of an existing license--disregarding the assets of the main office and branches and the bank's activities and operations--having already reached 7.5 million Lebanese liras.

It is natural to observe in this connection that the continued propensity of these Arab capitalists to go through with their plans to acquire banking interests in Lebanon despite the large amounts of capital required to do this is attributable to several interrelated factors.

In the first place, 50 million Lebanese liras, although a relatively sizeable sum, appears trifling today in comparison to the huge amounts of liquid capital

available among Gulf natives and other individuals operating in and from the Gulf, including some Lebanese businessmen.

In the second place, the huge scale of the affairs conducted by the groups which own this capital, the diversity of their activities and operations, and the relatively high costs they must pay for banking services cause these groups to think that their own varied operations and activities alone are capable of providing all or a large part of the business and activity of the banks they intend to purchase or establish. Thus they collect with one hand the costs they pay with the other for bank services and operations obtained from the banks they themselves set up.

These factors prompt the capitalists to look for a "banking entity in Lebanon," for which there is no substitute in the Gulf states either because of laws prohibiting the establishment of new banks in some Gulf countries or because of certain restrictions and deficiencies in others. These can be gotten around legally or in effect in Lebanon by those who so desire.

All this is taking place, observe the Lebanese, while Lebanon faces many dangers amid the unstable conditions that beset it. Thus, how much more could take place, the Lebanese and many others wonder, if Lebanon were able to maintain its stability, complete its growth and set its regime, its institutions and its various sectors in order, or if stability were to return to Lebanon tomorrow? The whole answer is contained in the question itself.

#### New Financial Company Listed With the Bank of Lebanon!

It is not only banks that are in great demand among capitalists searching for investment opportunities in Lebanon. This demand also extends to financial institutions and companies operating in the field of financial investment, ranging from investment in currencies, to investment in stocks and bonds, to investment in minerals and the financing of projects.

The latest project under preparation in this area is a project aimed at establishing a financial company for which the owners have not yet found an appropriate name. The shareholders in this company actually consist of a group with diversified activities in the construction, contracting and building sector. This group holds a portfolio of financial investments including shares in banks, investments in currencies and minerals, and stocks and bonds.

The new company will become one of the financial companies listed with the Bank of Lebanon. Other such companies include the Arab Financial Investment Company, Ltd., the Instant Finance and Investment Company, Ltd. (one of the companies in the (Jafinur) group), and the Arab Financial Institution, Ltd. The owners of the company plan to submit a license application immediately after they have finished preparing certain "papers" and "documents" required by the Bank of Lebanon.

The new company will be involved in managing those investments and interests of the owning group which fall outside the construction, building and real estate sector. It will also manage all investment and financial activities for clients in the fields of stocks and currencies. For this purpose, sister companies and branch offices will be established in the Gulf capitals, with the possibility that an office will be opened initially in Paris.

ECONOMIC GROUP URGES DEVELOPMENT OF ARAB MERCHANT SHIPPING

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 18 Feb 81 p 5

[Article: "Committee On Arab Economic Unity Working Paper: Arabs Are Urged To Develop a Strategy For Maritime Transport, Warned Of the Dangers Of Depending On Foreign Fleets"]

[Text] Amman -- AL-RA'Y — The secretariat general of the Committee On Arab Economic Unity has called attention to certain matters. It emphasized that considering the volume of their merchant shipping, the relatively poor maritime transport facilities of the Arab countries and their continued dependence on foreign merchant fleets leave the economies of the Arab countries exposed to a number of dangers, and link the fate of their trade with that of the foreign fleets and management.

The secretariat emphasized that the Arab countries must turn their attention to expanding their merchant fleets, improving their port facilities, and increasing their participation in international merchant shipping in accordance with a clearly defined Arab strategy.

A working paper submitted by the secretariat general at a conference on protocols for shipping route agreements that was recently held in Tunis indicated that despite the great strides the Arab countries have made in building their merchant fleets and expanding the capacity of their ports, despite the expansion of regular shipping routes among them, and despite the joint efforts carried out through the specialized Arab organizations and alliances, the Arab role in international shipping is still inadequate for the volume of Arab international trade, which in 1979 amounted to 1.157 billion metric tons.

By 1990 it is expected to reach 1.8 billion metric tons. In 1979 the dead weight tonnage of the Arab countries' merchant fleets did not exceed 15 million metric tons. This is only 7.7 percent of their total merchant shipping. It is barely 2.2 percent of the dead weight tonnage of the world's merchant fleets.

The paper also predicts that these percentages will rise inasmuch as Arab trade will increase at an annual rate of 4 percent over the next 10 years.

### A Warning

The study warned against continued dependence by the Arab countries on foreign fleets for transporting their freight, which will leave their economies exposed to dangers, including the possible unavailability of these fleets, and the dissipation of the Arab countries' foreign currency reserves because of the continual rise in shipping costs for imports and exports.

The study noted that the smallness of the Arab merchant fleets might be one principal reason for the absence of regular shipping routes among the Arab countries, which causes the volume of inter-Arab trade to shrink and forces them to direct their business to foreign countries. This consequently makes them highly dependent on those countries for marketing and distribution of their nation's products, despite the fact that there is a strong demand for them in the other Arab countries which import what they need in equivalent goods from non-Arab countries.

### A Strategy For Shipping

The paper suggested that an Arab strategy for shipping be devised in accordance with the following concepts and goals:

It is necessary to arrive at an appropriate legal formula by which the Arab countries can achieve cooperation and coordination among their national merchant fleets for shipping freight among themselves and the other countries of the world.

An effort must be made to establish a combined Arab company to develop merchant shipping facilities, organize the various means of transportation among the Arab countries and create regular shipping routes between their ports.

An agreement on the various means of transportation must be studied and a decision should be made on the appropriate arrangements to take advantage of them.

The Arab merchant fleets must be expanded with new ships and oil tankers so that they can carry no less than 40 percent of Arab cargo shipped abroad by 1990.

Arab port capacity must be expanded. Land routes, which help the other Arab countries make use of port facilities, must also be improved to relieve the congested conditions at some Arab ports.

Programs must be devised and centers must be built to train the technical and administrative cadres in the field of maritime transport and the various other means of transport.

Capacities and facilities must be expanded. Old ships must be repaired and new ones built through local efforts and joint Arab projects.

The possibility of creating a formula for considering transport between Arab ports equivalent to domestic transport, and accordingly limiting the cost of shipping between them, should be studied.

An effort should be made to reach a united Arab position on shipping lane agreements which apply to their ports when the consultations and negotiations on the agreements are carried out.

SEMINAR RECOMMENDS SOLAR TECHNOLOGY EXCHANGE

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 14 Mar 81 p 3

(Text)

EXPERTS from 11 Arab countries wound up a five-day seminar here on Thursday on ways of harnessing solar energy as an alternative to oil.

The experts drew up a set of recommendations on the sensible applications of solar energy in the countries of the oil-rich Arab region.

They blueprinted a programme for exchanging expertise toward utilising solar energy as a substitute for other energy sources, including crude oil.

The seminar was organised by the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research, in co-operation with the Royal Scientific Society of Jordan and the Federation of Arab Research Councils.

It was attended by delegations from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria, Sudan, Qatar, Morocco, Lebanon, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Oman.

The Arab oil have-not countries were eager to develop scientific means of solar energy utilisation with a view to minimising their dependence on crude oil, for which they pay large portions of their budgets.

The oil-rich countries also were seeking ways of redu-

cing reliance on crude oil, which they want to keep in the ground longer time and avoid its early depletion.

Addressing the closing session of the seminar, the Director General of the Kuwait Institute, Adnan Shihab-Eddin, called on the participating countries to "explore problems of energy in your countries in an order of priorities."

He urged closer cooperation in solar energy utilisation.

The Saudi chief delegate said his country was "operating the world's largest facility for the utilisation of solar energy in heating water."

In Jordan, where 12 percent of the national income is spent on imported energy, the need for solar energy is "pressing," the Jordanian delegate said.

The Royal Scientific Society of Jordan is in close cooperation with National Jordanian Industries in this field, he added.

Other participants also reported intensive researches were underway in their respective countries to accelerate researches for utilising solar energy for water heating, water desalination and other purposes.

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

**MAURITANIA, TUNIS TALKS**--Prime Minister Mohamed Mezali had a meeting at the Kasbah Government Palace yesterday afternoon with Mauritanian Foreign Minister Mohamed el Mokhtar Ould Zamel who is in Tunis for the 75th Arab League Council of Ministers session. At the end of the audience which took place in the residence of Mauritanian Ambassador to Tunis (Mohamed Abdelkader Ould Dadi) Mohamed el Mokhtar Ould Zamel made a statement to the Tunis press agency in which he said he had informed Mohamed Mezali of the latest developments in the situation in Mauritania in the framework of fraternal relations and consultation which have always existed between the two countries. He added that he had handed the prime minister a message from Mauritanian President Khouna Ould Haydala addressed to President Bourguiba and a second message from Mauritanian Prime Minister Ahmed Ould Benijara to Mohamed Mezali. [Text] [LD311155 Tunis L'ACTION in French 25 Mar 81 p 4]

**LOAN TO YUGOSLAVIA**--Belgrade, Yugoslavia (AP)--Representatives of a Yugoslav Banking Consortium signed an agreement in Kuwait on a 117 million dollar loan to Yugoslavia's economy, the Yugoslav news agency Tanjug reported. The loan was granted by Arab Banking Corporation, Gulf International Bank, and Industrial Bank of Kuwait among other Arab financial institutions. Kuwaiti Foreign Trade Contracting and Investment Company signed the agreement of the loan on part of the Arab institutions with the Yugoslav Bank of Ljubljana, which represented the Yugoslav Consortium. The loan was granted for seven years with a 3-year grace period. Half of the loan is to finance economic investments in Montenegro, a less developed Yugoslav constituent republic while companies, steel mills, chemical plants and railroads in other parts of the country will receive the remaining funds, Tanjug said. [Text] [Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 12 Mar 81 p 13]

**'ARAFAT VISITS PFLP'S HABASH**--Yesterday, Brother Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] accompanied by Brothers Abu al-Lutuf, Abu Iyad and Abu Mahir al-Yamani visited Comrade George Habash, the secretary general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP], to congratulate him on his return to resume his struggle after recovering his health. During the meeting, which was attended by Comrade Abu 'Ali Mustafa, the PFLP deputy secretary general, the latest developments of the situation on the local, Arab and international spheres were discussed. [Text] [NCO31006 (Landestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic to the Arab World 055 GMT 3 Apr 81]

PRESIDENT SEEN GUARDING LEGALITY DURING PURGE

LD021531 Paris LE MONDE in French 28 Mar 81 p 4

[Dispatch by Daniel Junqua: "The 'Purge' Campaign Could Affect Members of the Former Revolution Council"]

[Text] Algiers--The "purge" campaign which was launched last fall and has so far resulted in the arrest of several dozen cadres and civil servants accused of misappropriating funds, illegal practices or corruption, could soon take a new turn and affect very high-ranking members of the party or state hierarchy. Names are persistently circulating in Algiers, including those of several members of the former Revolution Council who enjoyed very wide powers in Boumediene's days. President Chadli Bendjedid, who has launched into this attempt to clean up public and economic life with considerable courage, has on several occasions asserted his intention to pursue the thorniest cases to the end in keeping with the wishes expressed by the participants in the Fourth FLN Congress in 1979.

He spoke on this subject at length in the speech he delivered at Batna at the end of last month. "At the same time as we are reorganizing the financial situation in the enterprises," he said, "we are pursuing the elements deliberately responsible for sabotaging the national economy....Some practices have reached such a scale that they could pose a threat to the revolution. This situation had to be remedied....This is not an easy choice. It requires militants to stand up against comrades and friends....The process has now started, and nothing can stop it."

The words "comrades" and "friends" clearly relate to members of the revolution's leadership group and could not apply only to the directors of national companies or offices already in prison, such as the directors of the Algerian Drilling Company, a subsidiary of the National Company for the transport and marketing of hydrocarbons, which specializes in drilling; the National Marketing and Technical Applications Company; the Algiers olympic complex; the National Zoological Park Office; the National Hydraulic Equipment Office and the National Fruit and Vegetable Office. The officials charged are apparently implicating other people, notably ministers on whose orders they acted. They are refusing to act as scapegoats, and the operation to "put things in order" seems to have gone too far for public opinion to make do with seeing a few fall-guys sentenced.

The affair has now taken on a political dimension. Under cover of tracking down dishonest elements the head of state, according to some circles, is settling scores and trying to eliminate adversaries or trouble-makers. Circles close to the

presidency report that there are rumors put about by those who have reason to fear the letter of the law. In his Batna speech, however, Chadli Bendjedid rejected any idea of "vengeance against an individual or group of individuals." Specific instructions have been given for the legal procedures to be strictly respected.

"I promise," the head of state said, "to ensure that no innocent person suffers injustice or an affront to his dignity. But we will never show mercy to individuals who have misappropriated state funds which they have deposited outside the country."

#### Procedural Reform

In order to increase the safeguards for those charged, the head of state has just decreed a series of provisions altering some articles of the penal procedure code. For instance, FLN Central Committee members and government members will henceforth only be called as witnesses by decision of the president on advice from the justice minister. The evidence of a Central Committee member for the purposes of a legal proceeding can henceforth only be heard at Central Committee headquarters in the presence of two members of the FLN Central Disciplinary Committee. If appearance in court has not been authorized, the evidence will have to be sent in writing to the court concerned. It will immediately be passed on to the parties to the proceedings (Article 542).

The new version of Article 573 of the penal code requires written permission from the justice minister for any charge against "a Party Central Committee or government member likely to be charged with a crime or an offense committed before or during his term of office or government mission abroad, during or in the exercise of his duties." Article 574 specifies that the accused will be judged by the Supreme Court, which will pronounce judgment with all chambers assembled, ruling out any possibility of appeal.

These provisions, which are to be put to parliament during its next session, will enable the head of state and justice minister to exercise strict control over these proceedings. They demonstrate their desire to give the purge operation a strictly legal nature and are likely to allay some fears.

The head of state also clearly showed this desire to reassure recently by holding a meeting in the nation's palace near Algiers at the beginning of the month for all the country's administrative cadres, government members, ministry general secretaries, FLN party leaders, mass organization leaders and state company executives.

On that occasion the president reaffirmed "the revolutionary leadership's confidence in cadres at all levels." The purging operation, he pointed out in substance, is not aimed at mistakes which might have been committed and which we all understand. It only threatens those who have dabbled in malpractice. "Sincere militant cadres who form the overwhelming majority," he said, "have no complexes on this subject." He appealed for work, discipline, and coordination of efforts to implement the 5-year plan and end waste.

CIO: 4400

BRIEFS

COOPERATION WITH SYRIA--At the headquarters of the Ministry of Housing and Construction an agreement on cooperation between Algeria and Syria in the fields of housing and construction was signed yesterday evening. The agreement was signed on behalf of Algeria by Brother Ahmad 'Ali Ghazali, the minister of housing and construction, and on behalf of the Syrian side by the minister of housing and chairman of the Arab Housing Ministers Council. The agreement, which was signed following two rounds of talks between the two sides, calls for exchange of expertise and experience between the two fraternal countries in the housing and construction fields and the exchange of studies between the bureaus of studies and the bodies which implement programs in both Algeria and Syria. [Text] [LD250554 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 0000 GMT 25 Mar 81]

ALBANIAN ECONOMIC DELEGATION--An Albanian economic delegation yesterday completed a 6-day visit to Algeria undertaken at the invitation of the Light Industry Ministry. During this visit the Albanian delegation held talks with a number of officials at the ministries of light and heavy industries and commerce and dealt in particular with bilateral cooperation and the means of its development. This visit followed a similar one by an Algerian light industry delegation to Albania last January. [Text] [LD020158 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 1 Apr 81]

GDR, ALGERIA SIGN PROTOCOL--Algerian Minister of Vocational Training Mohamed Nabi and GDR Minister of Electrical Engineering and Electronics Otfried Steger today signed in Berlin a protocol of agreement providing for the supply of equipment from the GDR to vocational training centers in Algeria. Brother Nabi is now on a visit to Berlin at the invitation of the GDR secretary of state for vocational training. He has had talks with German officials on cooperation between the two countries in the field of vocational training. [Text] [LD030200 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 2 Apr 81]

CSO: 4402

## CLERICS, KHOMEINI BLASTED AS 'TRAITORS, CRIMINALS'

Paris TRAN-E AZAD in Persian 14 Mar 81 pp 1, 3

{Text} Since the Islamic calamity has taken over our country and the nationless, criminal, pseudo-Moslems, headed by a group of clerics who claim the world as their homeland, have taken over the destiny, lives, possessions, and honor of the people of Iran, it has become clear what Iranian patriots must do to oppose these plundering usurpers.

The destruction of these rebels who oppose independence, freedom, and legitimate government and the suppression of the clerics who violate the rights of the nation are the main and ultimate objectives of all the forces who desire the freedom of our homeland. But a group of opportunists, a group who are merely afraid of and who follow the gullible, unaware masses, have suddenly repented with the beginning of the question of "Islam" and have become Moslem and are operating as the engines and motivating forces of the Khomeini mischief. They have eliminated the separation of government and religion and have trampled over the results of the struggle to determine the limitations on and place of legitimate power and religious influences achieved over two centuries. They have allowed under the name of "Islam" a group of illiterate barbarians to establish a fascist religious state and to dominate the destiny of our country. This group, headed by people like Bazargan, Sanjabi, Foruhar, and Madani, has all of a sudden scraped and bowed to the contrived Islam of Khomeini and the so-called "fighting spiritual leaders." They have gone to such extremes in ablutions, praying, salutations, reciting the Koran, and going on pilgrimage that they have helped a bunch of freeloading clerics, mostly parasites, who had never played even the slightest role in national production and social construction to contemplate the monopolization of power and the materialization of the dream of "government by the clergy," dominating all aspects of the people's lives. Meanwhile, international communism, which had long since prepared various kinds of "Islamic Marxism" in various shapes such as the "Organization of the People's Mojahedin," waved the flag of Islamic mischief forcing the lions of knowledge to roar and attack {as published}.

A traitor and criminal such as Khomeyni has become the imam. A traitor such as Taleqani has received the titles of "untiring freedom fighter" and "father." In this clerical circus of horror, every empty-headed sayyed has usurped a place of authority merely for having memorized a few prayers and knowing the protocols of ablutions after menstrual periods. Surprisingly, the supporters of the invading, usurping clerics have not only been the unaware masses of people but also those who had for a long time pushed Iran to the edge of the precipice through pseudo-intellectualism and battling the legitimate regime of the country.

Eventually, when the anti-Iranian, anti-humanistic nature of Khomeyni and his cohorts became clear to the world and it would have been embarrassing for anyone to support them, and when the "iconoclastic" functionaries and supporters of the imam began to disagree with their intellectual layman associates, these wretched people tried to think of a remedy and invented a new formula: they called Khomeyni's cohorts "monopolizers" and "reactionaries," declaring their kind of Islam backward and spoke of "true Islam," "committed and progressive spiritual leaders," and "the government of Islamic justice." These gentlemen supposed that in this way they would be able to weaken the strong relationship between the clerics and obtain the support of some of them. One would print in its publications the pictures of this ayatollah or that one who was apparently not on good terms with Khomeyni, declaring him the true spiritual source of emulation (!), the hope of the oppressed, and the leader of one of the country's provinces. Another would send telegrams to a number of the clerics requesting their cooperation. A third one would search and search until he finally found a National Front cleric from Zanjan, thinking that this one was really progressive. The terrorist freedom fighters discovered, after the elimination of Taleqani, a new "red" cleric, Sheikh Ali Tehrani, taking advantage of his irritation with the Beheshti crowd and tried to present him as progressive. In short, suddenly everyone began to look for a "good" and "kind" ayatollah who would ensure the success of their political struggle. And this game of "religionism" still continues. Every day it causes the strengthening of a superficial influence and power and it can easily be said that none of them are either "true" or "progressive." And their Islam, as well, is neither progressive nor acceptable. Those who call themselves nationalists and opposers of the Khomeyni regime must abandon and negate this public deception under the guise of Islam. They must not aggrandize or praise any Stone Age, hypocritical cleric merely because he opposes Khomeyni or has not been given a position in the Islamic government. The result of praising and aggrandizing anyone wearing a turban is exemplified in the story of last week that that degenerate man, Mohammad Reza Golpayegani, who is one of those "great sources of emulation" of the Islamic mischief, had the audacity to issue the religious pronouncement which follows: ". . . Our dear ones who are in the fields of the holy war with the infidelity of Saddam welcome martyrdom for God. There is no other motivation such

as nationalism or factionalism behind such self-sacrifice and resistance by our dear ones. . . . Eastern and Western ideologies such as nationalism oppose the teachings of the holy Koran and are among the ominous songs which the enemies of Islam have instigated and which the weststruck, consciously or unconsciously, have believed. And its corrupt results have cost the Islamic world its present disunity. Nationalism, in addition to not being constructive, causes deviation from Islam and is dualistic. Is Islam . . . incomplete to require these other ideologies to complete it? Therefore, be aware that this whisper of nationalism and its revival is a Western conspiracy to re-enslave the nation . . . , etc."

At this sensitive stage in our national struggle, the important question remains: What should we do with these ayatollahs of various sizes who claim no homeland but the world, this Islam which is full of revenge, punishment by whipping, executions, and stoning, and these clay idols who are the agents of colonialism and exploitation?

Our answer is that we must bravely dispose of these anti-national elements and demand their annihilation. Today, true Islam is that which harmonizes with the spirit of the times and the multifaceted progress of the world. And the "true," "progressive" religious leader can only be he who would bravely confess that Islam is neither perfect nor even sufficient for the administration of a country in the 20th century. Patriotism is both good and praiseworthy and is one of the pillars of faith. The framework of the activities of the clerics should be limited to the religious and moral questions of the people and nothing else. Religion is acceptable and useful to the extent that it deals with the relationship between the individual and his God. And the spiritual leader who is sought out and loved is he who propagates this objective. But a cleric who wants to establish for himself a government relying on the Koran, the principles of Shi'ism, the oral traditions of the Prophet, or any other such means of power and who merely for having wrapped two yards of cloth around his head and for wearing a cloak on his shoulders tries to subjugate others is neither worthy of respect nor are his religion or his book acceptable or worthy of reverence.

hence, the clay idols of the theological school of Qom and the false intermediaries of the Twelfth Imam must be crushed fearlessly and without any consideration. We must declare loudly that we only recognize the Islam and Koran of a spiritual leader who, above anything else, is proud of his and our nationality and who is dignified, pious, and a man of his day, not such parasites as Mohammad Reza Golpayegani or any other shameless vendor of religion. Until we have achieved this decree of bravery and stand boldly against this kind of bloodthirsty, treasonous, colonialist Islam, we cannot be called patriotic strugglers. The rest is all empty talk.

9593  
CSO: 4906

## BRIEFS

PIRUZABAD GENDARMERIE CALL UP--All sergeants with high school and junior college diplomas who were released in May 1977, graduate soldiers who were released between November and March 1977 and soldiers who have not yet graduated who were released between April-July 1977 and are residents of Firuzabad, Farrashband and Qir districts are asked to report for duty 16-20 March with the necessary documents to the gendarmerie regiments of Firuzabad, Farrashband and Qir districts. All those who completed their military service in 1977 and have received their dispatch papers from Shiraz and companies in Marvdasht, Abedeh, Eqlid, Sepidan, Sarvestan, Dehdid, Surian, Zarqan, Abarqu, and Arsenjan are asked to report at 0700 on 17 March to the gendarmerie regiment on Koran Avenue to be dispatched for service. It may be hereby noted that failure to report will be treated as absence and violators will be dealt with in accordance with wartime regulations. [Text] [GF161828 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1530 GMT 16 Mar 81]

SHIRAZ GENDARMERIE CONSCRIPTION--In his exalted name. All persons who completed military service in 1977-78 and who could not obtain dispatch papers for any reason or could not be dispatched are hereby notified that: a) All persons who have completed military service in the army with the exception of the literacy corps, religious (?corps) and rehabilitation corps and all officers and others from the air force, navy and gendarmerie should contact the Shiraz department and other attached military companies and report in order to obtain dispatch papers. b) All those who completed military service in 1976-77 should report to the Shiraz gendarmerie regiment by 4 April for dispatch. c) The specified date cannot be extended. All absentees and those who fail to report will be dealt with according to wartime regulations. d) All government offices and private departments are dutybound to report all employees who have completed their military service in the army so that their dispatch can be arranged. [Text] [GF301825 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1530 GMT 30 Mar 81]

CSO: 4906

IRANIANS URGED TO WAGE UNITED STRUGGLE

GFO31330 Baghdad International Service in Azeri 1900 GMT 1 Apr 81

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] Brave Iranian people, act together with courage and sacrifice in the struggles and demonstrations that have become widespread throughout Iran in order to put an end to the useless existence of the defenders of reactionary practices, illusions and legends in your sacred country. Fight with the spirit of martyrdom with the aim of crushing the oppressive and reactionary regime. Establish coordination committees comprising antiregime forces in order to organize and wage struggle. Thus you will promote your struggle to a more effective level.

Heroic officers and men of the Iranian army, don't ever forget that you are part of the Iranian people. Just as happened during the shah's rule, the Khomeyni regime wishes to use you as an instrument to (?crush) the people who struggle for independence, freedom and national liberation. You are part of the ranks of the heroic Iranian masses. Do not execute the orders given to you by the Khomeyni clique to shell your own parents and your own brothers and sisters. Rush and join the ranks of the people. Fight with all your might to defend the (?slogans) of the people. Take as your target the teachers of the school of reactionary practices and cruelty.

Patriots, [word indistinct] and property owners, the experience gained from various liberation movements in Iran until now confirms your effective role in the struggle against oppression and exploitation. Therefore, support the Iranian people's movement with your widespread demonstrations and put an end to the Khomeyni regime, which has caused you to suffer from a great moral and material loss through its treacherous and bloodthirsty policy. Do not forget that nor force can stand against the determined will of the people.

CSO: 4901

SENDING OF IRAQI KURDS TO WAR CONDEMNED

JN021852 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan in Arabic 1615 GMT 2 Apr 81

[Text] Yesterday, 1 April, butcher tyrant Saddam Husayn sent several thousand of the deluded elements of the popular army from among the sons of Kurdistan and Iraq to the infernal war launched against the friendly Iranian peoples. Most of them are Kurdish citizens. While seeing them off, Saddam reiterated his false allegations. A number of Kurdish traitors and agents, particularly vile traitor agent Hashim Hasan and mercenary 'Abd as-Sattar Tahir, who bear the titles of secretaries of his party, also saw them off.

Our people will take those criminals to task. They are dwarfish agents who are immersed in treason and crime. They stand by the side of Saddam in sending our people's sons forcibly or deceptively to the hell of an unjust and lost war.

We call on the deluded and all the armed elements, particularly in Kurdistan, to destroy this corrupt regime. We call on them to rebel against the tyrants' orders and to refrain from fulfilling the desires and interests of the fascist regime and its agents. We tell them, their families and relatives that the war to which they are being sent is an unjust war against the Iranian peoples, who are defending their revolution. In addition, it is a lost war that will end by destroying the Baghdad regime and its agents. The deluded must begin to join the people's ranks and to direct their guns' muzzles at the chests of the rulers and their agents.

As for those dwarfish agents like Hashim Hasan and 'Abd as-Sattar Tahir, they will receive their just punishment sooner or later. No agent, traitor and collaborator working with the fascist regime will escape the people's just court. This is the judgment of history and justice, which must be carried out.

CSO: 4802

## AID TO IRANIAN PEOPLE PLEDGED

GF030925 Baghdad International Service in Azeri 1900 GMT 1 Apr 81

## [Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Dear listeners, the war between Iraq and Iran has been going on for 7 months. Iran has been pursuing a base policy of aggression and hostility against Iraq for 7 months. The illiterate rulers of Iran are hurling the innocent sons of the Iranian people into fire. These illiterate rulers, who fail to realize the disaster that has befallen the Iranian people, are victims of their own pride.

The disaster that has befallen Iran and the cost that country has paid during the past 7 months are common knowledge. As our leader Saddam Husayn has said: From our inexhaustable resources we dispatch thousands of new troops to the battlefronts with unlimited equipment to reinforce our positions. And [words indistinct] we clearly state that the Tehran rulers must henceforth understand that, although there exists no reason for the shedding of new blood, we have the right to [word indistinct] for the blood that will be shed.

The abovementioned remarks of President Saddam Husayn highlight a number of facts. They prove that Iraq is resolutely fighting for its equitable rights.

Iraq was not in favor of war with Iran. This war was imposed on Iraq by Iran's reactionary rulers. Iraq is fighting with perseverance and determination in order to retrieve its rights which have been usurped by Iran. It will force the cruel Iranian rulers to bow their heads and admit our rights.

We have a just cause and we are heroes fighting for justice. We also believe that it is our duty to fully support the Iranian people in recognition of their national rights. As stated by our leader Saddam Husayn, we shall fully support the peoples of Khuzestan, Kurdistan, Azerbaijan and Baluchestan. We are ready to give them fraternal aid, including arms, so they can achieve their national and other rights.

Dear listeners, the heroism displayed by the Iraqi people and army during the past 7 months will resound in the history of the Arab world as do other glorious events. The crimes of the chauvinist Iranian rulers, on the other hand, will be condemned even after they end.

CSO: 4901

IRAQ

BRIEFS

SOMALI PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY SPEAKER ARRIVES--Somali People's Assembly Speaker Isma'il 'Ali Abu Bakr [title as heard] arrived in Baghdad last night heading a delegation on an official visit to Iraq, at the invitation of National Assembly Speaker Na'im Haddad. In a statement to the INA, Abu Bakr said that he will convey an oral message to President Saddam Husayn from Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre. He added that he is also carrying the greetings of the Arab people in Somalia and their support against the Persian aggression to their brothers in Iraq. He indicated that his talks with Iraqi officials will aim at strengthening the relations between the two assemblies and at exchanging expertise. He was received by National Assembly Speaker Na'im Haddad and a number of assembly members.  
[Text] [JN020920 Baghdad Voice of the Masses in Arabic 0800 GMT 2 Apr 81]

CSO: 4802

## KUWAITI PAPER ANALYZES ELECTION OUTLOOK

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 15 Mar 81 p 4

[Article by Tom Arms: "Change in Tel Aviv Would Mean Little for PLO"]

**[Text]** The collapse of Prime Minister Menachem Begin's coalition in Israel has virtually assured the victory of the Labour Party in the June elections.

So what Shimon Peres the Labour leader and his colleagues about Middle East peace talks on a special added significance — for the Palestinians as well as the rest of the world.

The party's 44-point recommendations for negotiating strategy in any peace talks got into the hands of the Palestine Liberation Organisation which released them together with their analysis to the Press before they were even made public way touring Europe trying to "in support for them.

Begin's foreign policy is left much to be desired in the eyes of the rest of the world. He has said Israel would continue with its plans to build ten new settlements on the West Bank, has refused to talk to the PLO or to re-engage any meaningful autonomy for the Palestinians.

Begin's hard line has stalled the Camp David talks and played a major role in bringing the Europeans into the Middle East with their own peace initiative.

**CHANGE**

Israeli diplomats have stressed that the Labour

Party's negotiating strategy would not be significantly different in real terms only perhaps more moderate language and approach.

But leading politicians and journalists in the West have been putting great faith in change should Labour win the elections. This is partly because of Labour propaganda, partly because a change in style could lead to a change in substance, and partly out of a desperate desire to find even the smallest streak of silver lining in the black cloud over the Middle East.

Indeed some of the clauses in the Labour Party's 44-point strategy do seem to indicate a ray of rationality. But most of them are offset by contradictory or qualifying clauses in the same paper.

For instance, the paper says: "The Labour Party rejects permanent imposed rule over 1,200,000 Palestinian Arabs inhabiting these territories (the West Bank and Gaza)."

This sounds hopeful until you get to point 13 which says among other things that upon the conclusion of a peace agreement the Israeli army will evacuate the Arabs from the West Bank and Gaza into a new demilitarized Jordanian-Palestinian state. The idea of an independ-

ent Palestinian state is rejected

**LIARS**

Commenting on this in London PLO leader Yasir Arafat's roving ambassador Dr Issam Al-Sartawi, said: "The Labour Party policy is racist. They are planning to kick out 1.2 million Palestinians. Shimon Peres and Abba Eban are, to put it bluntly, liars. They like to give the impression that they are the party of peace, but in fact, they are as much, perhaps even more, the party of war as Begin's Likud."

One ray of hope which many have pointed out is the Labour Party's promise that "the Government of Israel led by the Labour Alignment will be prepared to negotiate for peace with each of her neighbours without preconditions from any side on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338."

To this Dr Al-Sartawi replied: "This is sheer hypocrisy. The entire document is a set of preconditions."

The Labour Party document also "rejects the policy of 'not an inch' in regard to the West Bank and Gaza." This sounds most hopeful until in a later clause it is learned that Labour would still want 40 per cent of the West Bank and Gaza. This 40

per cent, according to Dr Al-Sartawi, includes 60 per cent of the arable land and nearly all the water and refugees.

#### **REPEATED**

The other points which put up the back of the PLO are the same which the Begin government repeated over and over again.

Dr Al-Sartawi sums them up as the four No's: "No to the PLO, No to the Palestinians' self determination and the establishment of a Palestinian state; No to the withdrawal from Jerusalem, and No return to the borders of June 4, 1967."

Israel's answer is that PLO opinion does not matter, and it refuses to negotiate with the organisation until it agrees to drop its clause calling for an end to the state of Israel.

But the fact is that the PLO is now recognised by almost everyone as the representative of the Palestinian people and vital to any pe-

aceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Israelis are emboldened by the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in the United States and his campaign assertion that a strong Israel is vital to America's strategic interests in the Middle East. But there are also trends in the United States which the Israelis would do well to take note of.

There are signs that the European initiative is having its influence on officials in the State Department. Some are talking about "discussing" problems with the PLO without actually recognising them or entering into "full-scale negotiations."

Others are pointing out that because of President Reagan's age—he recently turned 70—he is likely to decide that he is a one-term president. This could free him from the pressure of the Jewish lobby that any president, bent on seeking a second term faces.

CSO: 4820

## EGYPT SAID COOPERATING WITH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Valletta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 7 Mar 81 p 6

[Article by Franco Remoro: "Mossad 'At Home' in Egypt"]

[Text] • AGENTS belonging to the far-flung Israeli espionage organisation "Mossad" find the political climate in Egypt "an excellent one". Unofficial, though reliable sources say that for some time now Mossad agents in Egypt have been enjoying almost unrestricted access to government institutions and several military installations, until recently "off limits" to the Israelis.

The extraordinary collaboration now going on between Egyptian and Israeli intelligence is explained away as "reciprocal co-operation".

However, it is believed that Egypt is "heavily indebted" to Mossad for what are loosely termed as "valuable services" which the Israeli organisation has given Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The Mossad "services" probably consisted in the provision of information about recent attempts on the life of Sadat. In return, the Egyptian National Security and the "Mukhabarat" (secret service) were instructed by Sadat to discontinue surveillance of their "Israeli friends".

President Sadat is constantly guarded by an elite corps of 20 CIA-instructed and trained bodyguards who, in turn, collaborate closely with Mossad and the Israeli Intelligence Service.

Until recently contacts between Sadat's CIA bodyguards and their Israeli counterparts took place away from prying public eyes and co-operation between the two secret services was more or less looked upon as "classified". However, these contacts have recently become more obvious, and according to political observers in Cairo secret agents of the three countries (Egypt, the United States and Israel) no longer tend to "hide themselves" when they are guarding Sadat - especially during the meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and other Israeli leaders.

Sadat's bodyguards are reputed to be earning a "fantastic salary".

As contacts between the Mossad and the Mukhabarat continue to grow, Israel is going on ahead with its plans to extend an increasing number of "tourist routes"

to the pyramids. Prospective visitors are guaranteed a "safe passage" through protection by Israeli and Egyptian secret services...less than one year ago locked in a deadly struggle noted for its perfidy and cruelty.

As one French journalist said:

"Egypt under Sadat has become full of surprises - you never know when torture gives way to smiles and when smiles give way to torture."

A traveller to Cairo was even more explicit. He said:

"After the war of 1967, I did not see the funny side of a travel poster in London which said Visit Israel and See the Pyramids. Now that Sadat has allowed precisely this to happen I wonder how every true Arab must feel."

Meanwhile, it has been revealed that some six thousand Egyptian officers and enlisted personnel may soon be deployed to South Africa to participate in military operations in Namibia. They will be seconded to the South African army.

Jerusalem sources have disclosed that high ranking staff officers from Egypt, South Africa and Israel

recently met in Johannesburg. Quoting spokesmen for the South African army, the Jerusalem sources added that the meeting agreed that South Africa "would be happy to see Egyptian enlisted personnel among its ranks." The sources confirmed that the South African government "would highly appreciate such a step which is full of common sense and friendship."

In return Egypt has been promised economic and financial aid. Apparently the South African government is willing to pay Egyptian soldiers the same salaries as other mercenaries recruited from West Germany, Britain, the United States, Israel and the Netherlands. A spokesman for the South African Army was reported to have said that enlistment "would make it possible for Egyptian servicemen to render generous financial support to their families and to their country". Their earnings as soldiers in the South African Army would not be taxed in Egypt.

A second round of talks between the representatives of the South African, Israeli and Egyptian armed forces was reportedly held in Cairo. The meeting was detailed to conclude the agreement and "to take all possible precau-

tions not to bring it to the attention of the public".

However, it has been disclosed that Egyptian servicemen to South Africa will be deployed to war zones in Namibia by Israeli Air Force air transporters. They will also be provided with identification as Israeli citizens.

These stringent precautions were apparently insisted upon by Cairo in view of its delicate position in the Arab world and what has been termed as Sadat's "desire to avoid anything that "might trigger off another anti-Egypt campaign".

Military co-operation between Israel and South Africa dates back to a long number of years. However, Israeli personnel deployed to South Africa mainly consisted of technicians, specialists, military advisors and instructors. Now, as South Africa continues to step up its campaign in Namibia, its need for infantrymen has become more acute than ever before.

Apparently, Egyptian personnel are to meet the needs of South Africa and it is believed that the larger majority of Sadat's mercenaries will be stationed at the military garrison of Katima Mulilo, close to the Namibia-Angola border.

CSO: 4820

SHAK'AH VOWS NO COEXISTENCE WITH ISRAEL

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 6 Feb 81 weekend supplement pp 8-9

[Interview with Basam Shak'ah: "Extremism As A Faith"; in Nablus, date not given]

[Text] The meeting with Basam Shak'ah, mayor of Nablus since 1976, was set for Monday at 10 am at the city hall. We had spoken briefly several times by phone, but in spite of the friendliness of his tone, I knew that on the other end of the line was a hard, smart, and self confident man.

I sought information about his past and learned:

Basam Shak'ah was born to a well to do family in Nablus, and while a youth he was taken into the business. As a young adult he showed an inclination towards communism, was arrested several times by the Jordanian authorities, and spent varying amounts of time in Prison. A few years before the Six-Day War, he lived in exile, in Egypt and Syria.

When he returned to Nablus after the Six-Day War, he opposed the city government on the grounds that it had no link with the younger generation, did not represent the masses, was subservient to the Israeli military administration, and devoted most of its efforts to advancing private deals. He became a competitor of the mayor of that time, Hajj Ma'zuz Al-Misri.

In the West Bank elections which were held in 1976, he was elected mayor of Nablus. According to reports of the time, he then identified with the Ba'ath party of Iraq and the ideology of Aflaq. The Iraqi Ba'ath established the "Arab Liberation Front" a terrorist organization which carried out the murder of Kfar-Yovel and recently at Misgav-Am.

At the beginning of 1980 he became very famous because of things which he said in favor of the murder of Jewish children in the struggle for national liberation. (Basam Shak'ah denies this and characterizes the press reports as a "terrible lie.") He was one of the initiators and founders of the "Committee for National Direction", which was established on 1 October 1978, a few days after the signing of the Camp David Accords, to oppose the Sadat initiative, the accords, and the autonomy program. It was a kind of local "rejectionist front," paralleling the general Arab rejectionist front. Basam Shak'ah was considered to be one of the

most extreme people in it. Most of the members of the committee support the popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine of George Habash. According to Israeli press reports (HA'ARETZ, 16.5.80) the murder at Hadassah House in Hebron would not have been possible without the endorsement of the Committee for National Direction.

In December 1979 an attempt was made to expel Bassam Shak'ah, an attempt which led to a wave of protests and demonstrations in the territories. The Committee for National Direction also opposed the expulsions.

He spent 24 days in an Israeli jail and became a hero. The cancelling of the expulsion decree and his restoration to office was interpreted as Israeli weakness. His wounding, and the amputation of his legs as a result of sabotage, the perpetrators of which have not yet been discovered, his popularity sky rocketed and he became a symbol of the Palestinian struggle.

Everything which I learned about his past and his life today painted a picture of a man of rigid ideology, not inclined to compromise, and even ready to sacrifice his life for what he calls "the absolute right of Palestine."

We arrived at Nablus at the appointed time. The day was cold and the rain had driven the city people to seek shelter. At the gate of the city hall there was a guard who knew of our coming. Without searching us he led us into the entry hall, which was full of people, some dressed in village clothing, jalabas, and some in European suits and police uniforms. Next to the stairs was a large man wearing a red and white keffiyah. Just as we entered the hall, as if by command the crowd divided into two groups. We moved from the door to the stairs across a narrow space empty of people. The man wearing the keffiyah touched his forehead with his hand and without a word showed us the way to the first story and brought us in coffee from tiny cups. The secretary, who was neatly dressed in a gray suit, asked us to wait and went in to Bassam Shak'ah's office. Some of the men on the sofas rose and asked us to be seated, while we were exchanging a few polite words, they served us small cups of strong, black coffee. By evening I did not know how many cups of coffee I had drunk that day, and I even learned to finish only one fourth of the coffee served. I felt that it was coffee, and not blood, coursing in my veins. The secretary asked us to enter the mayor's office. Beneath the window in the large room was a desk, behind which on a wheel chair a smiling figure attempted to rise. He was much bigger and broader than he appeared on television--Bassam Shak'ah.

I hastened to him and asked him to remain seated and he extended his hand and said: We are happy that you have come to our city and us, the leaders of Nablus. Only then I perceived that the office was filled with men, and it became clear that they were the important people of the city. They had gathered around their leader for a short time, and would keep me from limiting myself to polite questions. I realized that the purpose of our meeting was the publication of their manifesto. Later I realized that people do not come to chat with Bassam Shak'ah, and he said to me: I have been placed under a ban. No one comes to ask what we think, what we want, they do not even say 'hello' to me. I am in a vacuum.

I was confused, and to be polite I asked: "How are you and how do you feel?" He smiled and turned to his colleagues and said:

"Nothing has changed here. That I have lost my legs? That is not important. I feel well and we have a lot of work, a lot of plans to realize." I asked permission to put on the tape recorded, and Shak'ah said: "Definitely. I am interested that what I say be recorded."

Question: You have been mayor for almost 5 years. Do you have a rotation?

Shak'ah: Elections for the mayor have to be held, but the military government does not permit it.

Question: If the voters did not re-elect you as mayor, what would you do?

Shak'ah: I would be satisfied. I have lands, and I own a soap factory, and there is yet the struggle against the Israeli administration.

Question: Has there been a basic change in the city administration of Nabulus, as compared to preceding city administrations and mayors?

Shak'ah: Politically, nothing has changed. But the city is quiet, life proceeds at a normal pace. We are trying to raise the standard and quality of living. We built a new electrical power station. We purchased three GMC trucks. It took two years to get approval for this from the government. We dug a new and efficient well. We have built schools and are expanding the university.

Question: Are you still opposed to the Camp David Accords? And is this opposition in the best interest of the Palestinian community?

Shak'ah: Certainly I am opposed. I am not serving any community's good. I am opposed to and will fight the accords and what you call normalization, because it ultimately means the elimination of the Palestinian people.

Question: Wouldn't it be better to solve the problems by dialogue and compromise agreements?

Shak'ah: How can there be dialogue? I talk to the wall. No one is ready to talk to me! And compromises? I do not believe in compromises.

Question: Do you think that your extremism is aiding and encouraging the extremists among the Jews, such as the members of Gush Emunim?

Shak'ah: Why don't you ask them? Their extremism is oppressing us and causing us to resist. Why do they take our lands? Don't we have the right to live in our country as citizens on our land? Only in war is land taken.

Question: With which of the community forces in Israel could or would you like to speak? Is the political program of Mapam acceptable to you? Or of another party?

Shak'ah: There is no one to talk to and no one who will talk with me. Mapam? Once I thought it was an independent party. Its ideology is an improvement. The youngsters come to me, an open generation ready to listen. They are encouraging. But the leaders of Mapam, or of the Alignment, are a different matter.

Question: Do you expect a change in the policies of the U.S., with Reagan entering office?

Shak'ah: There will be no change on their part.

Question: Are you the exclusive decision maker in the city administration, or is there democracy in which you consult and listen to your colleagues?

At this point Shak'ah burst out laughing and said to his colleagues: "Tell him how it is here." I felt that they were a bit uncomfortable, but they at least began to participate in the discussion. A tall man approached us and introduced himself: "I am Naimy Arafat. I am the city engineer." I laughed and said: "That is just what I needed here, the name Arafat." Finally, the atmosphere eased and Arafat said: "We have no alternative. We have to work together, and with understanding, because we are isolated. Certainly there are arguments about programs and problems. Bassam Shak'ah consults us and professional people and listens to our opinion."

A chubby man entered the conversation, and said: There is only one problem about which he does not want to hear what we have to say and on which he will not accept our advice. That is about his health. He needs care and rest, and will absolutely not listen to his doctors. Shak'ah interrupted: "I am healthy! I have neither the time nor patience for cosmetic care."

I turned to the city people and asked: What do you think about normalization? Could not Sadat serve as a bridge between you and Israel?

There was a commotion, and Shak'ah requested to respond:

"I refuse to engage in any discussion of normalization. Neither with Sadat nor the Egyptian government. They are the enemy of the Palestinian people. At the Camp David talks they made an agreement with their enemy."

I interrupted: "There has to be a way of reaching peace!"

Shak'ah: Not Sadat's way. Peace can only come with a change in the political way of the Israeli government. It must recognize the Palestinian people and its leaders. Sadat removed himself from those who seek peace. Sadat is against us, and believe me, against the Jews.

Question: Are you ready to talk with other Arab countries and their leaders?

Shak'ah: After there is an agreement between Israel and Palestine, we will find proper ways for constructive dialogue with Jordan and the other Arab countries.

Question: You are so worried about the Palestinian people, but what do you propose for us, the Israeli people?

Shak'ah: Until 1948 we were in our country. We on our territories, you on yours. We only want our land, the return of the refugees, and autonomy. The day will come when you will recognize these things are our rights, and you will recognize the Palestinians and their leaders, the PLO. Then you will find a means of dialogue and coexistence.

Question: It is impossible that the most extreme way is the only way to peace!

Bassam Shak'ah: There is no other way to peace.

Question: Are there no women in the city council?

All of them laughed. There were none. Why? The men answered almost in unison: We would like a woman among us, but have not found one who is suitable. I laughed and said: That is just an excuse. At that moment a man entered carrying a large picture. He approached Shak'ah, said a few words in Arabic, and extended the picture. It was a portrait of Bassam Shak'ah, given to him as a gift by the artist, Karim.

I asked: What do you hope for the future? Bassam Shak'ah broke out into a high pitched laugh. I was confused and said: Why are you laughing?

Bassam Shak'ah stood up and refused the assistance that was offered him. He approached me with difficulty, took my hand and said: You are a human being, a sensitive woman, don't you know what I want? I do not fear for my life. I fear that there is no ear in the world willing to listen, and no sympathy and understanding. I want a real peace, and not just the peace of politicians.

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**MK MA'DI'S POSITION IN DRUZE COMMUNITY ANALYZED**

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 6 Feb 81 weekend supplement pp 10-11

[Article by Yehudah Tsur: "MK Ja'bar Ma'di: Growth of Power"]

[Text] The day before Ja'bar Ma'di was sworn in as member of Knesset, he was asked about his feelings regarding this position. His answer was natural and short: "Why should I be excited. I have always been a member of Knesset, perhaps for 27-28 years," was his answer before the television cameras. Such seniority challenges the position of Dr Burg and Menahem Begin as the elders of the Knesset. Not everyone can write in their ID card that their occupation is "member of Knesset." Ja'bar Ma'di of Kfar Yarka can say this.

How does a man become a leader, or at least an MK representing his community, and hold the position for such a long time?

Ramal, of Yarka, says: "We, the Druze, did not send him to the Knesset. You, the Jews, were concerned with that."

He is cut off by a young man who asks that his name not be mentioned. "You are not being precise. Even many Druze supported Ja'bar Ma'di at the beginning. They were concerned with the whole community, and Ma'di who was acceptable to the authorities, was pushed into his present position with the support of many in the Druze community."

Today, the Druze in Israel number less than 40,000--a minority within a minority. "We are less than 8 percent of the non-Jewish population of the country. Most of the Druze are concentrated in the Western Galilee and in two villages--Dalyat al Karmel and Uafia on Mt Karmel. In the Middle East there are about 400,000 Druze, and we in Israel are only 10 percent of them. We are a persecuted minority, although in Lebanon and Syria we often ruled others. It is reasonable to assume that because of the fact that we constitute a minority, the Jews wanted us as allies."

Ramal interrupts: "That is not an assumption but a historical fact. After the events of 1929, the leaders of the Jewish community sought ways to reach the heart of the Druze community. I studied this subject, and I know that Yitshaq Ben-Tsvi, Reuven Barkat, and later Abba Khushi, were concerned about the security

situation of the Jewish community, they sought allies, and they came to the conclusion in the 1930's that the best, and perhaps the only allies were the Druze. For a long time relations were nurtured between the Workers' Haifa and the villages on Mt Karmel, at first with Usifia and later with Dalyat al-Karmel."

Muhammad of Kfar Yarka heard from his cousin in Usfia about caravans which brought weapons from Atlit to Yagur, accompanied by Druze. "They would secretly unload the weapons at the coast and my cousin, and others like him, together with the Jews, would deliver the weapons. It is possible that they paid them money for this work, but I do not think that the money was the principle, but rather the desire to help their Jewish allies. When the disturbances of 1936 broke out, the leaders of Haifa turned to Salah Tarbia, Abu Paras, and 'Anan of Usfia, and Khalbi of Dalyat Al Karmel and asked for help. Thus the Jews and the Druze worked together to repel the Arab attack. This was the beginning of a process in which, in my opinion, the positive outweighed the negative."

Ramal adds: "At the beginning of the War of Liberaion, a Druze unit was created under the Haganah command, and later the IDF. A kibbutz member commanded that unit and he fell in combat while opening the road to Kfar Yanoah. With him fell 20 Druze fighters. At the end of the fighting, the Druze became a force which was courted by the authorities. At first, after the establishment of the state, Abba Khushfi spoke of creating a Druze Agency, similar to the Jewish Agency, in which all levels of the community would be represented. But the Jewish "experts" did not want another body, and preferred to go along with the reliable traditional leadership."

"That is true," says a man with a thin moustach, who appears young but who, I discover has a rich past in security work. "I remember that they wanted to appoint as representative of the Druze a young man who had links with the Haganah. He was Salah Khanifas of Shefar'am. I think he was right for the job. But a struggle had developed between two groups of families. On eht one side was a group of traditional families who during the Mandate period had held the leadership positions in the community, such as the Ma'di, Khir, Abu-Sanan, and Tarif Majlius families. They were the richest and most powerful families, and after the establishment of the state, they demanded the leadership for the creation of a representative body for the Druze. They claimed that they were entitled to the leadership, from the Mandate peri-d. They were the spiritual and traditional leadership, and kind of rabbinate. Don't laugh, we also have a rabbinate. When I was in school, I read about "court Jews" and their special status. In Israel, you Jews have been concerned that the Druze leadership be composed of "court Druze".

The young man who preferred anonymity says: "Another thing. As you know, the Druze religion is a secret religion. The Druze sect originated in Ismailia, and at the beginning of the 11th century it focussed around the figure of Khalif Al-Hakim Bamar-Allah, the Fatimid, whose disciples considered him to be the incarnation of the spirit of Allah on earth. The Druze constitute a more extreme faction in Shi'ite Islam, a faction which deviated from the mainstream. The principles of our secret religion are known only to the Uqal, who are the knowledgeable ones, the religious leaders of the community. Because of this, the

leaders of the Jewish community said to themselves that it was better not to intervene in the internal affairs of a secret religion. It was better to allow the traditional leadership to retain the reins of power in the Druze community. After many discussions of the issue of leadership, the community leaders turned to the Ma'di family, first to another son of the family and finally to Ja'bar Ma'di. Thus ended the attempt to create a true leadership which could have become a true partner of the Jewish people in Israel."

I call the attention of these people to the fact that they have had several decades in which to change any arrangements which had been made when the state was established, and that this does not explain why Ma'di has remained in the leadership since the second Knesset. Ahmad Mullah, head of the local council in Kfar Yarka, explains to us: "The religious issue is very important. Ja'bar Ma'di has a common language with Shaykh Amin Tarif, the spiritual leader of the community, and he is the man who supported Ma'di all the way. Then there were the banquets. Ma'di knew how to organize banquets for a king. They had all the best. I estimate that at today's prices, each banquet cost 400,000 lira. Where did the money come from? I don't know for sure. There were rumors that the Prime Minister's Advisors for Arab Affairs took care of the financing, as part of official activity. But these were only stories circulating in the village, and it is no wonder that stories circulated, for not only you but all of us asked ourselves where all the money came from. At the banquet, everyone could see Ma'di surrounded by important men of means."

The man who preferred anonymity has his own interpretation: "Every request made of Ja'bar Ma'di received a positive response. He never said no. That is considerable power. It is worth it for the authorities to retain such a man in the command position." Jamal adds: "Ma'di knew how to help people. Every Druze who needed something from the state needed Ma'di. If you were OK with him, you got what you needed. It should be remembered that in the first year of the state, everyone needed the authorities. The Jews, the Arabs, and of course the Druze.

Mullah says: "Apparently, everyone who had served in the IDF did not need connections in order to get positions in the police or the Border Guard. In fact, in spite of your legal right to be a policeman, they still sent you to Ma'di to get a recommendation. Sometimes you received recommendations from your officers in the IDF. That did not help. In the eyes of the authorities, Ja'bar Ma'di was a better guarantor than the straightest officer in the army. People very quickly understood that if you wanted to be at peace with the authorities, to get work in the security services, you first had to find favor with Ja'bar Ma'di."

Jamal relates: "Things reached the point that everyone knew that a word from Ma'di could determine whether a man would spend 48 hours in jail. Once, the police came into Yarka and surrounded a house whose owners had been accused of holding drugs and stolen property. Village youngsters gathered and prevented the police from entering the house. Ja'bar Ma'di appeared with a drawn weapon and chased the youths. The police wanted to arrest those who misbehaved, but because they did not recognize anyone they obtained a list from Ma'di. That is how my younger brother was arrested, supposedly for being in that group. On that day he was not in the village. A few days later he was released."

Mula tells us: "It may be the fruit of imagination, but in Yarka we lived for years with the feeling that Ma'di was using the Acre Police for his own wishes. His word could decide whether a man would sit in jail or be released. They say in Yarka that the parents of people arrested could come to Ja'bar Ma'di, and if he promised to take care of the matter, the accused would be released the next day, as if they had never been charged. Thus Ma'di's respect grew and grew, for everyone knows who decides in Druze matters. If you tie all of these things together, you will understand that Ma'di's power stems from several causes: support of the religious people, headed by Amin Tarif; support of the authorities; and his good relations with the Muslims.

Ma'di was the first to forge strong links between the Druze community and the leaders of the Muslim and Christian Arab community. For example, in the third Knesset, Shaykh Sayf-e-din Zu'abi vacated his place for Ma'di. Of course the authorities wanted it that way, but the fact is that an Arab vacated his seat in the Knesset for a Druze.

"In fact, even the Muslims strengthened the position of Ma'di. If voting were held only within the Druze community, it is doubtful whether Ma'di would be elected. It was a substantial segment of the general Arab electorate which assured his position in the Knesset for many years." Ramal adds: "Yehoshua Perlmutter, who was the prime minister's advisor for Arab Affairs, told me that there were many who opposed the creation of separate Druze courts. Their creation strengthened Ma'di and his supporters. I say this as a Druze. Immediately after their creation, Shayka Amin Tarif became the spokesman for the Druze community. His word became decisive in matters of control."

I ask what their attitude is regarding the recent disturbances which have battered the community in the wake of the murder of Shaykh Abu-Rabia.

Ramal says: "Whenever had a problem with the beduins. I remember that even during the period of the Mandate, some of the Al-Na'im tribe came to the Western Galilee from Mr Hebron. They received lands from us, and we worked together without disputes or arguments. After the creation of the state, and according to the land settlement, they moved to Tarshikha and Abu-Sanan." Ahmad Mula adds: "I served in the IDF for 21 years and reached the rank of lieutenant. From 1951, when I enlisted, I served in units in which there were always beduins. I had excellent relations with them. My commander was the beduin lieutenant colonel Abd-el-Majid, who today lives in Beer Sheba. I also commanded beduins. I sensed a closeness between the communities in the Negev and in the army camps. I am not ashamed to say to you that the two communities together served the homeland. Yes, you can write that I feel this way. Even in the Border Guard there are beduins and Druze serving together today. Relations were very good, and to this day I am welcome in the homes of Negev beduins.

"Several days ago the brother of Ja'bar Ma'di, Salim Ma'di, came to me. He asked me to come to his brother. I told him that I am ready to organize a delegation of 120 people, 30 Jews, 30 Druze, 30 Christians, and 30 Muslims, and I would ask Yitshaq Navon to head it. He knows me and I am sure that he would respond affirmatively. The same delegation would go to the tribe of Abu-Rabia and make a proposal. The first thing we would do is put 2 million pounds on the table as

an advance against a sum which would be determined as reparations, perhaps 20 million. Every Druze would contribute his share, and would thus feel a partner in the peace between the communities. And the most important thing, I told Salim, was that Ja'bar Ma'di would voluntarily resign from his Knesset seat, and not because of any unproven accusations regarding his sons, but because until today Ma'di has claimed that he is the leader of the Druze community. Therefore, he must remove the stumbling block to the repairing of relations between the communities. I am certain that this would have healed the relations between the communities, although Ali Abu-Rabia, the son of the murdered man, told me when I paid a condolence call: "You know that we do not hold the whole Druze community responsible for this, not even the whole family of Ma'di..."

"Ja'bar Ma'di came to ask me not to travel to console the beduins. Why not? There are 100 Druze from Yarka working in the Negev, and 10 studying at the University of the Negev. There security is important to me. I am concerned about them. So we went so that they would all know that good relations with the Negev beduins are important to us."

We tried to speak with members of the Ma'di family. We are shown Ma'di's house, and we can see many vehicles in the broad inner court. We ask about Sulhan Ma'di or Anwar Ma'di, the brothers of those under arrest. The one who speaks with us is Hikmat-Baria, one of the youngest of Ma'di's seven sons. The youngest is still in school. He says: "I don't know anything. I was at a military course near Shechem, and now I am on special leave. I have already served a year and a half in the IDF, at Ne'ot-Hakikar. What happened exactly I do not know, they are OK. They are serving the country. I am sure that in a short time, the truth will be known and they will know that my brothers are OK." Two youngsters come out of the door of the house. One of them says to us: "Hikmat does not know anything. Only Shaykh Ma'di speaks with strangers. Today he is in the Knesset. Come back tomorrow." It seems as though even Hikmat is confused about the hostile youths, and invites us indoors. We go in. People are seated on sofas and chairs. Everyone is quiet. Hikmat, who as the only Ma'di son at home is obliged to be host to guests, politely suggests that we come back later. He accompanies us to the door and says one more time: "I do not know anything, but these are my brothers, and that is enough for me." We leave with a handshake.

The man who showed me the way to Ma'di's house meets me and says: "I told you, they have decided that only the father will talk with strangers. I am not happy about their situation, and I am especially sorry about the mother. Maybe this whole affair will teach other community leaders that times have changed and there are laws in this country. It is very possible that the indictments were wrong, and that the police have arrested innocent people, but the fact that there is an investigation, and the sons of so important a personality are arrested shows the Druze that things have changed in the country..."

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## BIG EXPORT INCREASE ANTICIPATED IN 1981

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 Jan 81 p 4

Article: "Patt: Israeli Export May Reach 7 Billion Dollars in 1981 After 5.5 Billion Dollars in 1980"

Text In 1981 Israel's export may climb to a total of 7 billion dollars after the impressive achievement of 5.5 billion dollars in 1980.

Mr Gideon Patt, minister of industry, commerce and tourism, stated this yesterday during a tour to the Migda Medical Preparation Plant in the park for science-based industries at the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot.

### "Sea of Blackness and Deceit"

Mr Patt said that "in the sea of lamentation, blackness and deceit surrounding us, in which the reputation of the state is blackened every day, in the area of industry and export we finished the year 1980 very well."

He said that hundreds of new enterprises were opened in 1980, including 140 in development towns, and all of them contributed to the increase in export.

The minister noted that in the export of 5,528 billion dollars in 1980 the component of raw materials accounted for 200 million dollars and the rest was the fruit of the sophisticated labor of workers, innovators, planners and developers of new methods of production.

### Growth of Industry

In 1980 industry grew 29.6 percent and the real growth of export comprised 15.5 percent.

Moshe Barqan, director-general of Migda, said that the enterprise, which was established in 1975, was moved a few days ago to a new structure in the industrial part built by the Africa-Israel Investment Company. The investment in the new enterprise was 1.6 million dollars. Among other things, a 750-square meter hall for sterile production was built in it. It is up to American standards and is the largest sterile structure in the country.

Among other things the Migda Plant manufactures artificial kidney tubes, needles inserted in veins and various transfusion systems.

#### A Total of 100 Workers

It now employs 100 workers, 80 percent of whom are women immigrants from the Soviet Union. In 1980 Migda manufactured medical preparations worth 2.5 million dollars, including preparations worth 1.4 million dollars for export, that is, exports comprised 60 percent. The forecast for 1981 is manufacture of preparations worth 3 million dollars and export, 1.75 million dollars.

The new enterprise will make it possible to triple production. Plans are also made to manufacture disposable systems (for one-time use) to the United States, since the enterprise is up to American standards in all its production stages.

Today the main export is to European countries.

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**ADMINISTRATION OF TOURISM PROMOTES HOTEL CONSTRUCTION**

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 8 Jan 81 p 8

Article by 'Amiram Fleisher: "A Total of 6,200 Hotel Rooms Are at the Stage of Construction"

Text About 6,200 hotel rooms are now at the stage of construction throughout the country, of which 4,300 rooms are in four- or five-star hotels (that is, luxury hotels). The total investment in the hotel rooms under construction reaches about 1.2 billion shekels.

According to the plans that have already been approved by the Administration of Tourism in the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism, 2,600 additional hotel rooms will be built in different places in the country during the 1982-1987 period.

In December 1980 the number of hotel rooms in Israel reached 26,600, of which 14,000 rooms were in four- to five-star hotels. A total of 11,000 rooms were in 1- to 3-star hotels.

According to the policy outlined by the minister of industry, commerce and tourism, the Administration of Tourism will encourage the construction of popular hotels throughout the country as of next year. In the next few months the officials of the Administration of Tourism together with the officials of the Israel Land Authority will consider the requests for the construction of popular hotels submitted in the last few months.

The site plan for the development of the city of Tiberias was prepared and approved by the Administration of Tourism and the Israel Land Authority. According to this plan, 4,000 additional hotel rooms will be built in the north of Tiberias. A big conference hall will also be built in order to encourage conference tourism. The marina that is being established in north of Tiberias will be completed, the investment in it reaching 30 million shekels. The marina will service only tourists and fishermen will not be permitted to enter it.

A 350-room hotel is being built in lower Tiberias with an investment of 110 million shekels. The antiquities discovered there will be incorporated in this hotel. At one time their discovery evoked a public storm, because of the fear that they would be damaged by construction work.

An additional center with about 3,000 rooms will be built in the south of the city of Tiberias. It will be a health spa for tourists.

Amnon Altman, head of the Administration of Tourism at the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism noted that his associates were convinced that the potential of the city of Tiberias for tourism must be utilized and, indeed, the new site plan does this.

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GROUP WORKS TO IMPROVE IMAGE OF NORTH AFRICAN JEWS

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 22 Jan 81 p 11

Article by Dani Blokh: "'Beyahad'--For Changing the Image and Doing Away With the Sense of Deprivation"

Text The "Beyahad" [Together] movement is an ideological movement of immigrants from North Africa, which sets for itself the goal of changing the image of North African Jewry as viewed by itself and by Israeli society at large. The movement has about 250 activists from all the strata of society and from various occupations, most of whom are not traditional party figures. The movement receives assistance and encouragement from the Jewish Agency and from Aharon Ozen, head of the Sepharadic Federation in Israel. A short time ago we met four heads of the movement in its modest office in Jerusalem to discuss the movement and its goals. The following participated in the discussion: Sam Ben Shitrit, chairman of the movement, Avraham Sluq, secretary of the movement, Dr Shim'on Shitrit, jurist, member of the secretariat of the movement, and Dr Efrayim Hazan, who is responsible for the development of traditional values in the movement. Below we will present abbreviated versions of the statements made by the participants.

Sam Ben Shitrit: When we established the movement about 1 and 1/2 years ago we sought to set two main goals for it: first, changing the distorted image of North African Jewry as viewed by itself and by society at large, among other things, by emphasizing our great contribution to the country's development, security and flourishing. We want immigrants from North Africa to get rid of their sense of deprivation nurtured by professional activists who turned distress into a "business" and exploited it.

Hence the second goal, whose direction is totally inward. We deny the way of presenting our problems by exposing defects, by wailing and by showing misery in order to receive charity. This is not the way for the salvation of those who live with a sense of deprivation, whether real or imaginary. We believe that emphasis should be placed on the values, culture and heritage of North African Jewry and, indeed, we did this with the "mimona" celebrations. We think that people in Israel should be given the opportunity to find out about the wonderful culture, spiritual leaders and past achievements of this community.

In another matter we proposed that the government set 23 Tevet as the day of underground and illegal immigration from North Africa and give state recognition to the 43 victims of the ship "Pisas," which sank in the Straits of Gibraltar. The

government responded positively to our request and this year we will organize events to mark 30 years of immigration and settlement from North Africa. We want to faithfully represent matters, not to sin by pride and haughtiness and to depict our share and contribution to the nation and the state as they are.

Dr Efrayin Hazan: A person who does not know his cultural heritage inevitably belittles himself, his personal image is deficient and he develops relationships of dependence on others. When members of our community and Israeli society at large fully recognize our wonderful heritage, we will reach the proper blending and the proper integration. Today, for example, there are children whose school curriculum lacks the chapters concerning them and their families. They study mainly another part of the history of the people of Israel. They study about the Biluim, but not about Yosef Moyal, who liberated them, not about the Shlush, Moyal and Asulin families, which preceded the first immigration by dozens of years and lived in Yafo. We do not disparage the Biluim, or the history of Eastern Europe. North African immigrants can identify with East European Jewry, because there is a great deal of similarity in the lives of these communities. My father of blessed memory read Shalom Aleichem in Hebrew and enjoyed it, because he was able to find parallel characters in the life that he knew. It is no problem to teach the history of North African Jewry. There are many sources and we encourage additional writing. We held a quizz about the history of North African Jewry, which enjoyed success and evoked great interest among young people of another origin as well. Our purpose is to see to it that young people are proud of their names and then they will look for a way to give, not only to receive.

This approach has already produced such local leaders as Eli Dayan from Ashqelon, David Magen from Qiryat Gat and Yitzhaq Qinan from Bet She'an. If we continue along this road, in two or three generations we will produce leaders for the entire nation.

Dr Shim'on Shitrit: In the "Beyahad" movement I see a group whose every member according to his experience, outlook and background, tries to advance the cause of true social integration in Israel. What spurs me on is the national interest of the whole society. The value guiding us all is love for Israel. I for myself am trying to find a legal basis /few illegible words/ explosive arguments to orderly channels of orderly society.

In its own way the "Beyahad" movement helps to strengthen the value of love for Israel. In this way we weaken the grumbling and shouting, which do not lead to a positive and practical solution. "Beyahad" gives prominence to the beautiful Israeli who sprang up from North African immigration, who through his own efforts, despite the difficulties, reached important positions in the liberal professions, in senior administrative work, in the academic world, in public life and in the political system.

We, who have been released from the bonds of conservatism of the community's former institutions, seek to emphasize the historical depth of the heritage of our origin and the tremendous positive contribution of the immigration from North Africa to the State of Israel. Shimon Peres once said that Zionism is an Ashkenazi dream realized by the Sepharadim. Indeed, the immigrant from North Africa, is,

among others, a true Zionist. It is he who established the settlement base of the 1950's and the development towns. Members of the communities of oriental countries got up and immigrated as one man without calculations. In 1957-1963 a total of 130,000 people left North Africa illegally. They left all their property there and came to Israel. This is the embodiment of Zionist devotion.

In the diaspora we were one nation. The split was created here. There was a close contact between Rabbi Hayim Ben 'Atar and Ba'al Shem Tov. The roots of the Hassidic movement were connected with the Kabbalah movement of North Africa. To this day the Hassidim study the Torah with the "Or Hahayim" [Light of Life] commentary by Rabbi Hayim Ben 'Atar and visit his grave. Hayim Ben 'Atar had a Zionist outlook. He said about "I will speed it up at the proper time;" "I myself will speed it up." In 1741 he came to Zefat and then to Jerusalem with a large number of students. He is an outstanding Zionist symbol. Prominence should be given to such a figure. But what happened at the beginning of the 1950's was the root of evil. People looked down on immigrants from North Africa. They worked to realize the dream of the melting pot and the blending of the exiles, while destroying traditional culture. Part of the destruction was due to objective reasons, to the very transition to a new society, but much of what was done was not necessary. Even when people realized their mistakes, they tried to rectify them in the wrong way. What should be done today is not to issue separate curriculums and separate books, but to combine the history of Oriental Jews with the general curriculum. Shabazi, Ben 'Atar and David Hasan should be studied together with the other Jewish leaders and intellectuals that are studied, not separately. We must introduce an integrated approach in all areas and be particular about symbolism. There is nothing more symbolic than changing a textbook, or a television newscaster named Bozgalo--of course, after he passed all the tests. We will reach a situation of partnership when everyone understands that such phenomena are ordinary matters.

We must remember, and this was obvious in the Abu Hatzeira case, that the social problem is the central problem of the people of Israel. Those who are not sensitive to this are in for unpleasant surprises, which will present danger to the social fabric. We must be aware of this in curriculums, in means of communication and in the political area. If we are not aware of this today, tomorrow it will be difficult to rectify this. As the security tension is reduced, social problems will intensify. We are at a stage at which, if we do not act with caution, fateful dangers lurk for us. That is why I devote my time to these problems, to the "Beyahad" movement.

Avraham Sluq: When I came to this country, I did not know what a Sepharadi or an Ashkenazi was. I came with youth immigration to a kibbutz. I knew Hebrew and I became integrated in the life there. When I left for the city, I was told: You don't look like a Moroccan. At first I thought that this was a complement, but then I began to understand this differently. The founders of the "Beyahad" movement are not embittered people who meet personally to talk about their troubles. Therefore, such an organization has a future and chances for success. This is an attempt to contribute to the community at large. The framework of "Beyahad" is only the means, not the end. We did not follow the direction of rehabilitation of neighborhoods, care of young couples and increase in welfare allocations. We turned to cultural and social matters. We want to raise people's stature. I want

my son and daughter not to be ashamed that their father is a "Moroccan" and I don't want them to ask: "What have I done?" We must change the textbooks, reveal the historical truth and emphasize the value of religion in the life of North African Jewry. It should be known that those who read "Zohar" are not illiterates and uncultured people.

The historical truth is that Oriental Jewry created in moshavim and development towns the base for the absorption of the waves of immigration from Romania, Poland and Russia in the 1960's. The European market with its refined taste enjoys the fruits, vegetables and flowers grown by those immigrants from Oriental countries. The distorted image results from the fact that in the 1950's and 1960's inferior leaders were appointed for the community and they created this image of ours. They blocked the way for young people to grow and rise as natural leaders.

Dr Shim'on Shitrit: I suggest that we don't throw mud. Those leaders did what they could within the framework in which they operated. In another atmosphere they could have been natural candidates for senior positions.

Avraham Sluq: We cannot ignore the fact that there were some who sold their birth-right for a heap of lentils. The party is still an East European product.

Sam Ben Shitrit: All the parties will make a bitter mistake if again they submit nonselective representation. Even if the representation is small, it must be the best and be able to wrestle with problems. We must get rid of presumptuous, allegedly representative old timers.

Dr Shimon Shitrit: When integration is concerned, I don't believe in integration with goodwill on all parts. But we must integrate more and change the name of the center for the integration of the heritage of Oriental communities in the Ministry of Education to the center for the integration of the heritage of the communities of Israel. Both Morocco and Poland are communities.

Dr Shim'on Shitrit: When integration is concerned, I don't believe in it without the personal component. There is a difference between my concept and someone else's concept. This will demand a higher price from the people in control... If we do this, if we enable this culture to exert influence, there will be a true blending of Israeli pluralistic culture and society without aggression on the part of one group.

11,439  
CSO: 4805

DAMASCUS REPORTS 27 MARCH ARRESTS IN JORDAN

IN271348 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1215 GMT 27 Mar 81

[text] Amman--The authorities of King Husayn's regime have recently escalated their repressive measures by conducting a large-scale arrest campaign among the ranks of the army, Jordanian citizens and the Palestinian resist-

In a report published by the Jordan Studies Center [Markaz Dirasat al-Urdun], it was reported that organs of the Jordanian regime arrested 27 army officers, including First Lt Shaykh Muhammad 'Isam as-Samadi, who was arrested for praising fedayeen action and the Palestinian revolution and for his severe criticism of those refraining from fighting the enemy and preventing others from fighting. Also arrested with as Samadi were two officers, Muhammad Salim al-'Umari and 'Abd ar-Rahman al-'Umari, and Sgt Maj Khalil Mizhir and Corp Rajab Hassan. The Jordanian authorities also arrested 24 officers and NCO's from the Al-Yarmuk Brigade and from the 'Amr ibn al-'As Platoon at 'Ayn at-Turab.

In addition the organs of the Jordanian regime arrested a large number of citizens from the village of 'Aqrabah, including several members of the Jordanian Armed Forces and others with close ties to the citizens of the village. These organs also arrested eight Palestinian fedayeen from the Fatah movement. They are: Ibrahim Khalil al-Bakhit, Salih al-Hamdan, Yusif al-Bakhit, Sulayman Marwah, 'Atallah Yunis, Ziyad al-'Adwan, Na'il al-'Adwan and Malih Hasan Hammad. The report affirmed that King Husayn's intelligence arrested the young man 'Adil Kamal 'Anfur, and that he is still inside the general intelligence building in Amman undergoing all forms of torture, despite his young age.

CSO: 4802

'CONSTRUCTIVE' USE OF ARAB OIL AS WEAPON DISCUSSED

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 18 Feb 81 p 5

[Article by Fahd al-Fanak: "Arab Oil and Foreign Policy"]

[Text] An embargo is not the only way that oil can be used as an effective force in international politics. The fact is that the oil weapon is not being used, but in a constructive way. The Arabs produce more oil than it is in their interests to do, merely to satisfy the needs of the United States and the major industrial countries for this vital product.

When the Iranian revolution occurred an Iranian oil shipments were cut off, and when the Gulf war broke out and oil shipments from both Iraq and Iran were halted, the other Arab oil-producing countries used increased production as a weapon to aid the consuming countries and to prevent a rise in spot market prices.

Just as oil can be used as a constructive weapon, it can also be used with equal effectiveness at the right time as a destructive weapon. But the Arabs have decided that they do not want to use oil other than in self defense against aggression and tyrannical occupation.

However, Zionist propaganda is trying to exploit this Arab weapon by portraying all international support for the Arabs as nothing more than knuckling under to the pressing need for Arab oil. The European initiative, for example, is stigmatized as a surrender to scandalously high Arab oil prices.

It is therefore important for the Arabs to make the justice of their cause clear and demand Israeli withdrawal from the occupied land of three Arab countries. This is a legitimate demand, regardless of oil. But this fair and reasonable demand will become hard to ignore in the way that the rights of other peoples are ignored if it is backed up by Arab power with the help of Arab oil used as a constructive weapon.

Oil supplies are the main area of concern for American and European political leaders and planners. Oil considerations are thus a fundamental part of international politics, regardless of the Arabs' feelings about the matter.

The continued export of Arab oil to the industrialized countries is in the interests of both sides. The countries' mutual interests are contingent on mutual understanding and confidence. It is important for the West to ensure the continued flow of Arab oil, and it is important for the Arabs, in turn, to receive assurances that they will not be the victims of occupation, aggression and backwardness.

In return for oil the West must give us two things which for us are as vitally important as oil is for them. The first is technology--including nuclear technology to enable us to generate nuclear energy, because oil will not last forever. The second is justice, which says that compelling Israel to withdraw from the occupied land and giving the Palestinian people the right of self-determination demand nothing less than cutting off military and financial aid to Israel as long as it violates international law and resolutions of the family of nations, and persists in occupying by force land that belongs to others, threatening their well-being, and denying them the right to their own land and self-determination.

9123

CSO: 4802

NEW GREEK ORTHODOX PATRIARCH URGED TO HEAL CHURCH RIFT

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 18 Feb 81 p 3

[Article by Emile al-Ghuri: "An Open Letter To the New Orthodox Patriarch"]

[Text] Allow me, Patriarch Diodorus, to express sincere congratulations on your successful effort to become the Greek Orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem. You attained this high office on Monday after the electoral meeting held by the holy synod in the church in Jerusalem. I will not conceal from you the fact that it was a pleasure for us that the masses--who are the foundation of the church and the patriarchate--participated in these elections through their legitimate representatives, as is the practice in several orthodox churches.

In view of our extensive knowledge about you, your various accomplishments, and your conduct during your tenure as bishop of the East Bank, we feel that we must address you with candor and sincerity about something that must be done in the interests of the feelings and needs of the people now that you have attained the highest position in the clergy. In doing this we emphasize our total commitment to these needs as well as our commitment to the position of the Arab Orthodox sect on the conflict which still exists between the people and the patriarchate.

The first thing we hope for is that you will make an effort--now that you are in a position that allows you to take initiatives--to end this conflict on the basis of truth, justice and history, and to reestablish true solidarity and brotherhood between the clergy and the people.

We fully appreciate the difficulties you face, the dangers confronting the patriarchate, and the general circumstances which prevent the people from satisfying their needs. However, we believe that it is within your power to overcome many of the obstacles, and satisfy some of the vital needs of the denomination's members.

The Arab Orthodox denomination is the largest and oldest of the Christian sects in Jordan and Palestine, with over 200,000 adherents. Make your primary concern preserving the position of this denomination, safeguarding its existence and interests, preventing the continued deterioration of its position and decline in the number of its adherents who came here, as you know, as a result of events and actions which need not be explained here.

In general, this Arab Christian sect has been deprived of the simplest essentials of a life of honor and respect: schools, for example, as well as institutes, competent priests and churches. We very much hope that you will take the initiative and deal with these matters. Specifically, we hope that you will make an effort to rescue the patriarchate from the grievous plan which has caused a not insignificant amount of its property and resources to be wasted.

We are certain that you understand the status of Jerusalem, and you appreciate its history and know its Arab character. The people expect you to continue to participate in all the efforts that are being made to preserve Jerusalem's Arab character, restore it to Arab sovereignty, and preserve and protect its eternal holy places, particularly the Church of the Resurrection at which your election to the patriarchate was announced.

May God, the source of all help, grant you success.

9123

CSO: 4802

NEW ASSEMBLY PANELS

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 15 Mar 81 p 1

[Text]

THE NEWLY elected National Assembly held its first ordinary session yesterday and elected eight permanent committee and an adhoc committee.

The adhoc committee has been assigned the task of preparing a reply to the Amir's opening speech in the Assembly.

The speaker of the House Mohammad Yusuf Al Adasani presided over the deliberations.

The Speaker informed the House that the Crown Prince and Prime Minister Sheikh Saad had referred to the Assembly all Amiri decrees and laws issued since August 29, 1976 and had asked various Parliamentary committees to review them.

The Speaker also asked members of various committees to meet today to elect their chairmen.

Speaking in yesterday's session Deputy Jassim Hammad Al Saqr hailed the contribution of the former Deputies to the parliamentary life in Kuwait.

**EFFECTIVE**

In an indirect reference to the group headed by Dr Ahmed Khatib, Al Saqr said 'some of our colleagues who were unlucky to win the recent parliamentary elections had played an effective role in strengthening the legislative authority in the country.

"Despite of the fact that we differ with them on their political thought and way of action, we shall their effective role and patriotic stands in the previous Assemblies, Al Saqr said.

The Deputies elected yesterday for various committees are : Abdul Karim Al Juhaidli, Hamoud Al Roumi, Salim Al Hammad, and Mubarak Al Dabous (Amiri Speech Committee).

Nayef Abu Ramia, Mohammad Al Barrak, Mohammad Al Rasheid, Saleh Fadhalah and Huzam An Mai' (Committee of Complaints).

Abdul Karim Al Juhaidli, Yu Al Shaheen, Fayed Al Baghli, Sayah Abu Shaiba and Falah Al Hajraf (The Committee of Interior and Defence).

Jassim Al Kharafi, Faisal Al Qadaibi, Khalid Al Jum-

ai'an, Salim Al Hammad, Khalaf Al Anzi, Mutlaq Al Masoud, Khalid Al Ajran, Khalid Al Sultan and Murdhi Al Othainah (Finance and Economic Affairs).

Mechari Al Anjari, Mohammad Habib Bader, Mohammad Al Merchid, Yusof Al Shaheen, Hamoud Al Roumi, Khalid Al Wasmi and Issam Shaheen (Legal and Legislative Affairs).

Khalid Jumai'an, Saleh Fadhalah, Dr. Khalid Al Wasmi, Hamoud Al Roumi and Mobarak Al Dabous. (Education and Culture).

Hadi Hayef, Ahmed Al Tukhaim, Rashid Seif, Mohammad Habib and Mutlaq Shlaimi (Social Affairs and Labour).

Jassim Al Sakar, Issa Al Shaheen, Khalid Al Nazzal, Bader Al Modhaf and Jassim Al Oun (Foreign Affairs). — Kuna.

## RELIGIOUS, POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS OF CABINET SUMMARIZED

PARIS AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT &amp; MEMO in English 9 Mar 81 p 3

[Text]

The new Kuwaiti government formed last week by Crown Prince Sheikh Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah reinforces the technocratic content of the ministerial team. Otherwise, there were few surprises. The new government was named following Sheikh Saad's *pro forma* resignation after elections for a new 50-member National Assembly (*An Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, March 2).

The two most notable absenents from the new cabinet list are former Finance Minister Abdul Rahman al-Atqi and former Information Minister Sheikh Jaber al-Ali. Mr Atqi's retirement after some 15 years in top ministerial posts had been long expected. He is to head a new investment institute being set up by the Gulf Cooperation Council. Sheikh Jaber was dropped, according to reports from Kuwait, because of his opposition to the elections. He told an interviewer recently that he favoured the creation of a "select committee" encompassing all political groups in the state rather than a new legislature.

There are five new ministers in Sheikh Saad's cabinet, which will appear before the assembly for investiture on March 9. They are Abdel Latif al-Hamad, who takes over the Finance Ministry after a distinguished career as Chairman of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, Dr Yacoub al-Ghonaim, the new Education Minister, Public Works Minister Abdullah al-Dakhail, Communications Minister Issa al-Mazidi previously Deputy Trade Minister and a member of the new assembly, and Ahmed Saad al-Jassem, the new Minister for Awqaf (religious endowments) and Islamic Affairs.

Two members of the outgoing cabinet who were dimmed by Sheikh Saad are members of the Association for Social Reform, generally considered to be the Kuwaiti chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood. They are former Awqaf Minister Yousef Jassem al-Hajji and former Justice Minister Abdallah al-Mofrige. A Shiite,

former Social Affairs Minister Abdel Aziz Mahmoud, was also dropped and Kuwait's Shiite community will be represented in the government by Mr Mazidi.

Sheikh Saad took the opportunity afforded by the naming of a new government to undertake a limited reorganisation of ministries. The Ministry of State for Legal and Administrative Affairs in the old government has been transformed into a Ministry of Justice and the Planning Ministry, which had been headed by Khalid al-Moncef, has been merged with the Ministry of Finance. Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jaber has been named as acting Information Minister as well, indicating that the 15-member cabinet may be expanded later. Article 56 of Kuwait's Constitution stipulates that the size of the government should not exceed one-third of the number of members of the assembly and Sheikh Saad therefore still has room for one more minister.

## The new cabinet:

Prime Minister	Sheikh Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah
Deputy Premier, Foreign Minister and acting Minister of Information	Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jaber
Awqaf and Islamic Affairs	Ahmed Saad al-Jassem
Labour and Housing	Hamad Issa al-Rajab
Trade and Industry	Jassem Khaled al-Marzouk
Water and Electricity	Hamad Ahmed al-Khalaf
Oil	Sheikh Ali Khalifa al-Sabah
Interior	Sheikh Nawaf al-Ahmed al-Sabah
Defence	Sheikh Salem Sabah al-Salem
Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs	Abdel Aziz Hussein
Health	Dr Abdel Rahman al-Awaidi
Communications	Issa al-Mazidi
Education	Dr Yacoub Ghonaim
Finance and Planning	Abdel Latif Yousef al-Hamad
Public Works	Abdullah al-Dakhail

## COOPERATION WITH INDIA DETAILED

London 8 DAYS in English 21 Mar 81 p 37

[Text]

A KUWAITI delegation has held talks in India's capital, New Delhi on increased economic cooperation between the two countries. This follows the recent visit to India of the Emir of Kuwait and the subsequent meetings between the Kuwaiti and Indian trade ministers.

The delegations discussed setting up a joint investment corporation and, according to Indian sources, the Kuwaitis also favoured the idea of establishing a joint venture in commercial banking. While the Kuwaitis stressed the exploratory nature of their delegation's visit, they assured their Indian counterparts that Kuwait is prepared to invest 'substantial' sums in joint ventures. It is thought the Indian team raised the issue of Kuwaiti funds being made available for the country's sixth Five Year Plan.

Both sides apparently agreed that prospects for joint ventures in the cement and fertiliser industries were particularly bright. The question of setting up joint industrial estates for small and medium-sized industries — both in India and Kuwait — was discussed, and the Kuwaitis visited several industrial units and met leading industrialists and bankers.

The Kuwaitis also showed a keen interest in setting up joint ventures in tourism. It is

understood. In this connection, the Indian government has drawn up plans for a chain of five-star hotels to be built in Bombay, New Delhi and other cities with possible aid from Middle East countries.

Meanwhile, according to figures just released by the Indian trade ministry, the value of Indian contracts in eight Middle East and North African countries is nearing the IR40bn (\$5bn) mark. Of this, Libya accounts for \$1.8bn, Iraq \$1.2bn and Kuwait \$600m. According to survey by the Indian *Financial Express*, Indian exports to Kuwait have registered a fourfold increase in five years, from \$47m in 1974 to \$190m in 1979, on the basis of available figures.

However, exports from Kuwait to India are still modest. From \$95m in 1976, they rose to \$102m in 1977 and to \$131m the next year. But in 1979 — on the basis of actual exports worth \$48m during the first half of the year, for which figures are available — they fell to \$96m.

The survey points out that there is scope for far more Indian exports to Kuwait, since that state's small productive base makes it import most of its commodity needs. India's share in Kuwait's aggregate imports, the survey points out, is still only around four per cent, despite the proximity of the two countries.

WOMEN'S RIGHTS SAID TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH ISLAMIC REVIVAL

Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 12 Mar 81 p 5

[Article by Abdullah Ahmed Hussein]

[Text] One can't tell whether we are living nowadays through an Islamic revival or not. All Muslims believe there is such a revival and they are happy, optimistic about it. But their optimism is dampened by some ideas. For example, how can there be an Islamic revival when some writers claim in newspapers that women are not fit for responsible posts, such as that of the dean of a university faculty?

Although arguments and dialogues between rival groups are a healthy feature, yet we should not look down on women and claim that it is inconsistent that a woman becomes the dean for the faculty of law.

How dare we claim this when our Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) advised Muslims to learn about their religion from his wife Ayshah?

How can we claim that Dr Badriyah Al Awadhi is unsuitable for the post of law faculty dean? Women in other countries have become ambassadors, premiers and heads of state; they proved as competent as men.

Such conflicts about the role of women show we are not yet civilised enough. The university must not be involved in such futile arguments or else we will appear revisionist and backward in the eyes of the world.

Kuwaiti women have been subject to campaigns to restrict them to the house. Women should oppose such moves and stand for their rights.

Half of society must not be paralysed. The issue had better be settled by men and women together. We have to guard against recurrence of the same adverse campaigns or else how can we ensure an Islamic revival?

CSO: 4820

## FUNDAMENTALIST WOMEN EXPRESS ANTI FEMINIST SENTIMENTS

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 10 Mar 81 p 3

(Text)

THE big surprise at International Women's Day festivities held on Sunday were the large number of young men around the few coeds in the gathering and the very earnest looking fundamentalists who went about distributing leaflets denouncing the emancipation of women.

University sources said the low turn-out of coeds was probably because they preferred to avoid confrontation with the militants.

The festivities were organised by the university's Economic and Political Science Association and held at the football ground near the Faculty of Commerce.

**DIABOLICAL**

The leaflet-toting fundamentalists claimed that the so called emancipation of women was a diabolical trend borrowed from the West and would only lead to the spread of vice in society.

Addressing the gathering at the outset, Dr. Luluah Al Qutami said that the Kuwait

woman had had her constructive role in society even before the advent of oil. Their responsibilities extended beyond those of their own family to families in the district during the absence of their men who were out pearl diving for periods as long as three and nine months.

**VITAL**

With the advent of oil, women in Kuwait had played an even more vital role in developing the society, Dr Luluah added.

The Dean of the Faculty of Law, Dr Badreyah Al Awadi, said that Kuwaiti legislators had denied the women of some of their essential rights. She, however, highlighted the articles of law that ensure certain freedom to women.

Dr Noura Al Falah, Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Arts, launched a bitter attack on those who stood in the way of the emancipation movement. She called on Kuwaiti women to stoutly oppose any such legislation.

## KIO INVOLVED IN NEW LONDON PROJECT

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 14 Mar 81 p 3

[Text] London, Fri.--Kuwait is going ahead with another major property development project in the London area.

The St. Martin's property group, wholly owned by the Kuwait Investment Office, is to develop a large shopping precinct in Croydon, just south of the British capital.

The £35 million (\$77 million) project for an ultra-modern climate-control arcade covering 400,000 square feet should be completed by 1984.

St. Martin's is experienced in this type of development.

### Profitable

It was responsible for a large shopping mall in Hammersmith, West London, and another similar project in the industrial town of Slough, its chief executive, Brian Cann, told Kuna today.

Both the Hammersmith and Slough projects have proved highly profitable, real estate analysts here point out.

In addition to providing modern shopping centres, both have acted as a spur to economic and industrial activity in these previously run-down areas.

These factors appear to be the rationale behind St. Martin's involvement in the Croydon development, they add.

For the Croydon project, St. Martin's acquired a prime site in the centre of the town in the face of stiff competition from two other development groups.

### Scheme

The new shopping mall will include a large supermarket, a department store and 44 similar shop units, all entirely enclosed and air-conditioned.

The Kuwait-owned company is also involved in the largest single property development scheme ever seen in London, an office and housing complex to be built on the south bank of the river Thames, opposite the tower of London.

that project is the subject of a public inquiry called by the British Ministry of the Environment, but if it receives the final go-ahead, it is expected to cost up to £400 million (\$880 million) over a period of several years.--Kuna

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

LOAN FOR INDIAN PROJECT--New Delhi, March 11 (UNI)--The Energy Minister, Chani Khan Chaudhry, told the parliament today that the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development had indicated its willingness to give a loan for Anpara Thermal Power Project being constructed in Mirzapur District in Uttar Pradesh. A mission from the Fund came to India and visited the project site, but details of the amount and terms for lending had not yet been finalised, he said. [Text] [Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 12 Mar 81 p 6]

LATEST SAVOY SHARE PURCHASE--London, Mar 14 (KUNA)--The Kuwait Investment Office (KIO), the Ministry of Finance agency here, has acquired another 25,000 shares in the Savoy Hotels Group, financial sources here report. The world's largest hotel chain, Trust House Forte, is attempting to take over the Savoy Group, which it valued at 58 million pounds (130 million dollars), a move that has been rejected by the Savoy's Directors as "wholly unacceptable." The KIO, which now owns slightly over one-third of Savoy, is backing the Trust House take-over bid. [Text] [Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 15 Mar 81 p 7]

FRENCH BOND ISSUE--Kuwait (AP)--The Kuwait International Investment Co. (KIIC) is managing a five-year 400 million French Franc (83 million dollars) bond issue in favour of the Banque Francaise Du Commerce Exterieur, the company announced. The bond carries a coupon of 14.5 percent per annum, it said. The bond issue also was lead-managed by Societe Generale, Paris, along with a group of 14 international banks and financial institutions. The KIIC announcement said the bonds carry the "unconditional guarantee of the French government" and will be listed in the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. The KIIC is active in French markets and is co-lead managing in the Charbonages De France 400 million franc bond issue at an interest rate of 13.875. It also is co-managing in Gaz De France 600 million Franc bond issue that carries 13.78 percent coupon. These are due in 1985 and 1986, respectively. [Text] [Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 13 Mar 81 p 9]

RISE IN COST OF LIVING--Kuwait, March 11 (KUNA)--The cost of living index in Kuwait during the period January-October 1980 rose by 7.6 percent over its level in the corresponding period in 1979, according to an official report. This increase is attributed to a rise in all indices involved, particularly those of medicines, education, recreation, foodstuffs and household appliances which rose by 12.6 percent and 8.2 percent respectively. The increase in the indices of housing, clothing and cosmetics, transport, and durable consumer goods was relatively slight, the report added. [Text] [Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 12 Mar 81 p 5]

**FINES FOR EXPATRIATES' OVERSTAY--**Many expatriates have lately complained that the fine for illegal overstay (Carameh) has been increased steeply, from the standard 15 dinars in the past to over 50 dinars presently. The court officials, while explaining this, have told the violators that the amount of fine is calculated according to each week's or each month's overstay, the expatriates allege. The fine has to be paid when a person overstays in the country beyond the allowed visit period, and then applies for either departure or the regular visa. This is processed after the person pays the fine for the overstay. But some expatriates have claimed that they have been asked to pay between 50 to 70 dinars, which they could not afford. In response to this, Mr Yusuf Mohammed Al Saleh, Director General of the CID, said: "There has been no increase in the fine by the Government. The Ministry, as a matter of procedure, refers all such overstaying foreigners to the court, which decides on the amount of the fine, which could range from 5 to 75 dinars, depending on the nature, duration and the type of the violation. Any other explanation, allegedly told to the violators, is thus invalid. I must, however, stress that this standard procedure of fine does not preclude the Ministry from taking other administrative measures--including deportation--against the violator, where it is thought necessary." [Text] [Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 12 Mar 81 p 1]

**ELECTRICITY PROBLEMS SOLVED--**Next summer will not witness any phased electricity cut-offs except in extraordinary cases, an official source at the Ministry of Electricity and Water said yesterday. The source confirmed that all citizens will enjoy round the clock electric current supply except for ordinary maintenance operations or new extensions. This electric current availability is due to the completion of repair works on all units at the southern Shueiba station which was burnt last summer, in addition to the inauguration of new stations. However, the ministry is still maintaining an information campaign to limit electric consumption after the Shueiba case, the source said. The source added that an increase in consumption levels over what is calculated will force the ministry to resort to scheduled cut-offs.--Kuna [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 15 Mar 81 p 3]

**THIRD WORLD MINING VENTURE--**The Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting and Investment Company (KFTCIC) has set up a joint venture with a French research institute with the aim of promoting mining in Third World countries, it was announced in Paris last week. The new company, known as Compagnie Internationale de Developpement Minier (CIDEM), "will also actively seek to promote the direct investments of its own shareholders and other French and Kuwaiti investors," according to a communique issued in the French capital. The agreement setting up the joint venture was signed in Kuwait by KFTCIC officials and by the Chairman of the Bureau des Recherches Geologiques et Minieres, Jean Audibert: the Bureau and KFTCIC will each contribute 50 per cent of the capital of CIDEM, FF 125 million (\$25 million). The Bureau is already active in a large number of developing countries, particularly in Africa, and it will act as operator of CIDEM: the joint company's operations will concentrate on Africa and Latin America, the communique said. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 23 Mar 81 pp 10-11]

## LEBANON

### KARAMI'S EFFORTS TO FORM NATIONAL FRONT DISCUSSED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 5 Feb 81 p 15

[Article by Walid Zahr al-Din: "Karami's Actions Have Entered the Critical Stage; Obstacles Impeding the Establishment of the Broad National Front; Conservatives Ask for Deliberation and No Improvisation"]

[Text] Local observers in the Lebanese capital have not been able to determine the nature and the identity of the results that former prime minister Rashid Karami has been able to achieve in the actions and contacts he has been carrying out for almost over a month.

The proclaimed objective of these actions is the establishment of a broad national front that would be able to overcome the negative factors that exist in the Lebanese national and Islamic rank. These are negative factors that manifest themselves in the fragmentation, the marginal disputes and the secondary conflicts [that are taking place on the Lebanese scene].

Many people who are informed have expressed their belief that Prime Minister Karami may be able to achieve noticeable practical steps in this direction, especially since his action is supported by more than one agency, such as Syria; by former president Sulayman Franjiyyah; by the leaders of the Islamic community, with the prime minister, Mr Shafiq al-Wazzan being considered one of them; and by a few other national and Islamic figures. In addition, Karami's actions have the special support of President Ilyas Sarkis who welcomed Karami's actions despite the fact that Karami did not assume the initiative to break the wall of ice that exists in his relationship with the president.

### There Is Less Optimism

Expectations for Karami's success seemed at first to be great, despite the fact that the land mines, the obstacles and the difficulties did in turn appear great from the first instant. However, after more than 1 month since Karami's actions, the optimism has diminished. Many people are talking about the fact that the time is drawing near for Karami to go back into seclusion in his town, Biqa' Safrin, which is close to the city of

Tripoli in the north. [There], he would be close to President Franjiyyah who is still holding himself in political and personal isolation in his town, Zgharta, ever since his withdrawal from the Lebanese Front and his declaration of war against it at that time.

At any rate this does not mean that Karami has proclaimed his "political bankruptcy" regarding what he is doing. It is still possible that "the operation will be successful," as the "physicians of Lebanese politics" would say, even though the chances for that success are small.

#### Positive Responses...But!

So far, Karami has had a series of contacts with numerous political and party figures in the western region of Beirut. He met with senior leaders and officials of the National Movement, the National Front, the Islamic Council and the Islamic Community. In addition, he met with some independent figures who can directly influence the existing situation as well as other organizations and agencies.

In what context were Karami's negotiations carried out with those whom he met?

An official of the Front for the Preservation of the South commented on this after a meeting between Karami and the leaders of the front. He said, "The meeting dealt with the most prominent characteristic facts which are aggravating the Lebanese political situation in particular and the regional situation in general. Among these facts are [the following]:

"--A new U.S. administration that is making preparations that may or may not be peaceful for the purpose of finding a solution to the crisis of the region. It is now feared that the effects [of these preparations] may backfire and affect part of the Lebanese territory.

"--Arab conflicts that seem to be revolving in a multi-faceted, single core vicious circle. What resolutions of the al-Ta'if Summit will be realized? Will the wounds of the Amman Summit heal? What effects will this or that have on the Lebanese question?

"--A Lebanese administration that is powerless and bewildered, seeking the protection of an impotent government that does everything well except deal with public matters."

The official added, "It has become evident to those who are assembled, as they see these dangerous incidents setting their own course to political currency, that any political action at this time would assume extreme danger that would be derived from the danger of this stage which is now, more than any time in the past, forcing us to unify the ranks, to align them on clear principles and to suspend the hateful conflicts in the Lebanese Islamic rank for the purpose of achieving a unified view that would generate uniform conduct. Subsequently, we would all find ourselves

rising to the occasion to confront the crisis of existence that is still blowing quite a storm over the Lebanese people.

### Franjiyyah Is Optimistic

During that time President Franjiyyah expressed noticeable optimism, indicating that Karami's action will lead to results that are more positive than many people expect. This was what he said.

He said in this regard, "Certainly, there are positive inducements for taking action. There is no doubt about that. Not only for me, but for the whole country. Persons are not important. God willing, the country will be gratified because of this action. I am optimistic. I am beginning to feel optimistic, and I am satisfied. God willing, something good will come of this."

Franjiyyah said this after the end of the visit to Zgharta that was made by Mr Ibrahim Qulaylat, president of the Independent Nasirist Movement, al-Murabitun. After the visit Qulaylat said, commenting on a question about whether he would approve of Prime Minister Karami's action leading to the creation of a broad national front, "There is no doubt that the creation of a broad national front is imperative. I am making it clear that the front is not an operation for gathering forces, but that it is [a process of] bringing together [people who are] capable and who have an effective desire for making the future of the homeland."

He added, explaining the position of the National Movement on Karami's actions, "There are no contradictions in the positions of the National Movement, but there are independent efforts which we are in the process of organizing and putting to use in the interests of the fully integrated national frontline action which would coincide with the directions of President Franjiyyah, Prime Minister Karami and all the national leaders."

Deputy Dr Albert Mukhaybar considered Karami's actions to be "a sound democratic measure stemming from a policy of avoiding unilateral opinions."

He added, "Following the fraternal understanding between the various groups of the north I have come to the realization that Prime Minister Karami has given up all personal interests and all emotional sensitivities. [I have come to the realization that] he has achieved an intra-Lebanese peace with the people of the north. This peace gives Prime Minister Karami a share that cannot be ignored in an account that would make him--if he were to try today--contribute to the restoration of an intra-Lebanese peace in various areas. I think it is his right to do so."

### What Does Karami Want?

Karami himself answered this question by saying, "We want first to unify our position on a national, reform program for Lebanon. When we are able to achieve this, it will become easier for us and for the administration

to come to such convictions that would consequently lead to solutions that would be acceptable to everyone. This would be possible either through dialogue or through the authority so that whatever is involved in the establishment of a new Lebanon can be achieved."

[When asked about] the reasons why Franjiyyah was optimistic about his actions, Karami said that Franjiyyah based that optimism "on these new climates that express a desire for the removal of differences and the unification of ranks because Lebanese cooperation, or the Lebanese accord, constitute the real beginning of the way out of this crisis or this maelstrom."

Then he said, "I am reaffirming that what we want is the proper and constructive action to achieve [this end]. If we really want to terminate the role of the deterrent forces, the establishment of balanced organizations in Lebanon is required. At the forefront of these organizations is the army. This means the creation of a national army that is capable of winning the confidence of all the people, and, accordingly, achieving security in the country. This is also contingent upon the achievement of a national accord, the removal of all the illegal mini-states and the prohibition of all manifestations of armaments and the accumulation of weapons. When this capable and just state is established, the deterrent forces will leave simply when the president asks them to leave. Anything else would be verbal oneupmanship."

In another context Karami said, "All the meetings that we held were episodes in a series of actions that we are carrying out to prepare the climate for realizing an agreement among all to serve the supreme national interest. God forgive the few people who are members of well-known agencies and who are circulating rumors that we want to destroy the national accord. This is because at this critical stage of our history, we have a sense of the tremendous responsibility that lies on all our shoulders: this is that of the necessity of unifying the ranks to unify the objectives and the principles in the search for a universal national front and for the achievement of the national unity that is being sought so that one faction would not be oppressing another. We reject this. In return, [the only thing we can accept] is whatever would bring about the public interest, justice and equality."

#### The Possibilities for Success

But the question that is being raised on the sidelines of all this optimistic talk is as follows: Will Karami be able to achieve his goals?

The political circles to which Karami basically belongs are saying that the principles upon which he is basing his assertions are not sectarian, but rather purely patriotic. Accordingly, the goals he is striving to achieve are not sectarian; they too are patriotic. However, this is not enough and does not constitute a standard for making a judgment that Karami will realize the goal of establishing the broad national front.

Why?

These circles respond by saying that Prime Minister Karami is trying to force change and that some of the national forces are considering this an infringement on them and a diminution of their role. This explains, for example, the anger of Mr Walid Junblat, president of the National Movement, who thinks that the establishment of a broad national front requires sufficient time to change the political mentality that moves many of the political forces.

This naturally does not mean that Junblat is opposing the national front, but it means in practical terms that an appeal is being made to avoid improvisation and rashness.

In this sense Prime Minister Karami becomes precipitous [in his efforts] to achieve an objective about which everyone would agree. But he cannot achieve it so easily, especially since there were several attempts during the last few years to establish a front of this kind.

But Karami is optimistic. He affirmed that this time he will prove his words by action.

We've heard the words. We will be waiting for the action.

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LEBANON

ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES BY COUNCIL OF THE SOUTH QUESTIONED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 6 Feb 81 p 17

[Article by Walid Zahr al-Din: "Where Do the Arab Funds Go That Are Earmarked for South Lebanon?"]

[Text] Forged Reports Prepared by Imaginary Appraisal Committees.

Incredible Incidents Consume Millions of Pounds.

An important party official said, "We will not allow it to open its doors, and we will not permit its employees to go back until 'Ali Baba and the 40 thieves are thrown out of it."

The doors that are being referred to here are the doors of the Council of the South which is chaired by Mr Hasan Farahat. There is a political storm brewing around the council with implications of scandals, surprises and curious occurrences.

The significance of the investigation of this council actually stems from the fact that it is a council designated for the south, first, and intended, on the other hand, to function as administrator of the funds and aid offered by the Arab countries to help the people of the south, to alleviate their pain and to brighten their hopes.

About 2 months ago when the Lebanese government was suffering from the numerous land mines that had been planted before soon after it was formed, the Council of the South turned out to be one of these land mines and even perhaps the greatest of them.

Correcting the Conditions of the Council

Political and party agencies called upon the ministers who are their proteges to resign if the state refused to expel "'Ali Baba and the 40 thieves from the Council of the South." This problem was not settled until an official promise was made by administration staff to the leaders of these agencies that they would act in a radical manner to correct the conditions of the council.

At that time more than one Arab country became interested in the subject, and these Arab countries asked their embassies in Lebanon to supply them with reports about how the financial and material aid they had offered the Lebanese people was being spent.

As these lines are being written, this subject is still being sharply discussed in all circles. Although the sparks of the discussions have been somewhat fainter at this time, informed circles believe that prevailing conditions in the Council of the South will soon create new storms, not only for the government, but also for the administration as a whole.

What is happening in the Council of the South and around it? Accordingly, how and where are the Arab funds being spent--or at least most of these funds--these funds which have been earmarked to subsidize the south and the people of the south?

#### Incredible Acts

Attorney Nabil Barri, the president of the Command Council of the Amal Movement responds to this question by saying, "There has been a series of incidents that one has seen and heard but cannot believe. These are some of the general and pertinent examples:

"A. The Council of the South has narrowed the scope of its activities, suspending the following activities, for example: giving financial aid for damages to agricultural crops, cattle and funds; offering financial assistance to the children of the victims of Israeli attacks; building, paving and repairing roads inside the villages; providing free medical care and medication; and (fulfilling) other priorities of the steadfastness [effort].

"B. The Council of the South paid the sum of 15 million pounds for alleged damages inside the border strip. It is to be noted here that these damages, assuming they did occur, did not result from Israeli attacks. The minister's excuse--the minister of labor--in making such a payment is that he did not pay a single piaster until he had received the approval of the National Movement. However, it has been established that the appraisal committees were pressured by the militias and that they had no other role to play but to write down what was dictated to them.

"C. There is no system to monitor how employees of the council are appointed and dismissed. The general manager sometimes balks at implementing the decisions of the board of directors and dismisses or appoints anyone he pleases. Central Inspection, for example, recommended that an old, illiterate employee of the council who is about 76 years old be dismissed, but the general manager appointed him as a member of a technical committee to inspect damages and supervise repairs. His wages when he was dismissed from service were 425 pounds, but they became 1,500 pounds a month after he was employed by the committee. It seems that the reason for this lies in the fact that he is the father of the wife of one of the

followers of an influential figure in the world of political feudalism in the south.

"D. The council suspended aid to the societies and organizations that offer significant services to the south and to its people, such as, the Society of Piety and Charity in Tyre; the Jabal 'Amil Women's Society; The National Association of the Young Women's Christian Association; and the Charitable al-Zahra' Society. It is known that the Council of the South had established some of these societies and that it had supported others until 1974.

"E. Even in its transactions, there is no principle to be observed by the council. If it is said that there would be no grants for the education of victims' children, one is surprised by the fact that the children of 15 victims, out of 264, are awarded grants even though the decision to award educational grants to the children of victims was made after the incident of the death of citizen Taribah Muhammad al-'Anz, from the village of al-Mari in the district of (Hasbaya). He had stood in the way of an Israeli patrol that had entered his village on 25/6/1972, and he died in action, leaving behind two children, an unborn infant and a widow.

"F. The damage inspection committees are headed by engineers, and they include members who in most cases are illiterate or profiteers. They forge the reports. There is a member who is 68 years old, illiterate and who never leaves his home in Beirut. He actually traces his signature on the lists.

"G. Favoritism and bribery also control the business of the committees. Forged lists that include the names of homeless people are compiled, and a housing unit is registered several times under different names."

#### Payment Numerous Times

"H. There were collective damages in the buildings of some of the villages during the destruction of 1978, but the compensation for the damages was paid several times even though the damage occurred only once. There are many examples [of this], but we will mention only the following:

"('Ayta al-Zat) was paid collective damages three times: the first time payment of 237,500 Lebanese pounds was made on 20/10/1978; the second time payment of 180,000 Lebanese pounds was made on 21/6/1979; and the third time payment of 82,000 Lebanese pounds was made on 25/10/1979.

"Hadatha was given two payments, and so was the town of Bayt Yahun."

#### Deprived Villages

On the other side [of the coin] a large number of villages were subjected to momentous attacks, and the Council of the South denied them aid, such as, al-Khiyam, Hawala, al-Taybah, Markaba, Bani Hayyan, Dabin, Tulin,

Majdal Salam, Shab'a, Kafr Shuba, al-Habariyah, Rashaf, 'Ayta al-Sha'b, Marun al-Ras, 'Aytarun, al-Tayri Hanin, al-Naqurah, Yarin, al-Bustan, al-Dhahirah, Maruhin and Shama'.

### The Onset of Corruption

All this is happening at a time when everyone knows that the principal objective of establishing the council is "to ensure south Lebanese steadfastness in south Lebanon and not to evacuate the residents from the land."

When the council was established in 1970, officials and those who were in charge of its management realized what their duty was and how absolutely important it was. Despite the dearth in its resources at the time, the Council of the South decided to give those whose buildings were damaged full compensation for the damages so that the injured party would be able to rebuild or restore his destroyed or damaged property. They also decided to pay the compensation in installments that would become payable only when the injured party undertakes to carry out the rebuilding or repair work.

Thus an injured party received financial compensation that enabled him to repair the damage. Compensation was paid for actual construction and repair work. Thus the villages continued to thrive, and their residents continued to inhabit them.

By applying these principles and by utilizing honest and experienced inspection and appraisal committees, the compensations [paid] for building damages over [a period of] 8 years--from June 1970 to June 1978--did not exceed 17 million Lebanese pounds. These included the damages that occurred in the south, in the north, in al-Biq'a' and in West Beirut.

### Illiterates in the Appraisal Committees

But during the subsequent period, and beginning with July 1978, the Council of the South pursued a different course. It replaced the inspection and appraisal committees, and it appointed to these committees illiterate and very old people who are considered proteges of influential political agencies. These committees thus began to put together imaginary and forged inspection reports that included the names of persons, whose buildings had suffered no damages, or of persons who had no homes in the villages in question. There were also repeated entries in these reports of the same damage to a group of people in the name of the same injured party and in the names of all the members of his family.

Despite the fact that the maximum compensation for a house that had been destroyed was 10,000 pounds and the maximum compensation for a house that had been damaged was 2,000 pounds, the compensations paid by the Council of the South in its pursuit of this new course amounted to more than 38 million pounds in the past 2 years. Of this sum, the sum of 23 million pounds was paid during the first 8 months of last year.

All these sums were paid without the stipulation that construction or repair work be carried out. This means that by pursuing this new course, the Council of the South [has done the following]:

--Departed from its objective, which is to ensure the reconstruction and the repair of the buildings that were destroyed or damaged by the attacks.

--It is no longer realizing the national goal of enabling the resident of south Lebanon to exercise steadfastness on his land, which is being sought by the enemy and which is liable for occupation and for settlement projects that are being planned by the enemy.

--It has wasted funds that were earmarked for steadfastness and [diverted them] to other uses.

--It has aroused in the hearts of those who suffered damages from the attacks a sense of injustice and deprivation, and it has stimulated envy. This is creating a spirit of despair, a spiritlessness, defeatism and disunity.

--It has contributed to the spread of bribery and corruption and the development and reinforcement of favoritism.

#### Parliamentary Questions

For all these reasons the Council of the South has turned into a political question. The deputies, in turn, took an interest in this subject, especially the deputies of the southern province, among whom is the deputy from al-Nabatiyah, Mr 'Abd-al-Latif al-Zayn. Mr al-Zayn asked the government several questions.

He said, "The members of the board of directors of the Council of the South have admitted that they gave false testimony. Some of them have stopped coming to the sessions because of political pressures, influences, exploitation, poor conduct, violations and the decline in the executive agency's standard of efficiency and experience."

"Has there been an investigation to find out why the members of the Council are not performing their parts? What are the measures that are being taken to remedy these reasons?"

"Will the authority to which the general manager of the Council of the South is subject, as well as the executive agency which is under him, carry out the administrative supervision and inspection activities of the [council's] executive business and will that authority investigate excesses and complaints?"

"Is it true that some villages did not pay financial assistance to their residents whose houses were damaged as other villages that benefited from this assistance did? What are the reasons for that?"

Deputy al-Zayn added, "Has the Council of the South carried out a comprehensive survey of the school buildings that were damaged by the Israeli attacks, and did the council repair them? What is the plan of the Council of the South which it had presented to the Council of Ministers in 1978? How can the Council of the South improperly dispose of scores of millions of pounds that it had received as contributions?"

The words of Deputy al-Zayn come to an end here, but the questions that are being raised around the Council of the South cannot come to an end as long as the government remains incapable of getting matters under control.

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INTERVIEW WITH UNIFIL COMMANDER REPORTED

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 9 Mar 81 pp 24-30

[Interview with Maj Gen William Callaghan, commander of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), by Mona es-Said: "UNIFIL Invites the Army South"; week of 1 Mar 81 in Naqoura]

[Text]

"With certain exceptions I would say that UNIFIL, in the main, is maintaining peace in its area of operations... And I see no difficulty whatsoever in supporting the deployment of the Lebanese Army, the gendarmerie, or indeed any other Lebanese organizations in that area..."

"Six hundred (Lebanese Army) elements are already deployed and they're doing patrolling at the checkpoints. You see them all over the area with our UNIFIL soldiers. Now the idea is to increase this presence..."

"That's in the planning stage and we look forward to that happening soon. I should also say that this is a wonderful assistance to UNIFIL because the more troops we have, the more areas we can cover. The higher incidence of checkpoint or observation duties, the more locations we can manage. The more patrolling we can do in the villages, the more protection we can give."

The words are those of Maj. Gen. William Callaghan, who took over from Gen. Emmanuel Erskine the command of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) officially on February 15.

He was responding in Naqoura last week to one of my set of queries on his "style" of command, his expected plans to reside in Jerusalem or Beirut, and UNIFIL in general — whether it can help the Lebanese Army deploy in the border area; whether it will try to deploy further south to the internationally-recognized boundaries; how successful it was in stopping infiltration across its lines; if its current peace-keeping mandate could be stretched to cover other areas in Lebanon than the South; and whether an enforcement mandate wouldn't have served its purpose better.

Callaghan, who has been "in the area for three years in Jerusalem" and is "now looking forward to giving Beirut a trial," gave credit to his predecessor, Gen. Erskine, "for a tremendous job so very well done."

"Generals have different styles," he told me, "and it takes generals some little time to effect that style on the force..."

"I would now see perhaps a need for an assessment and an address to certain specific areas of re-deployment... a requirement for more active, specific, all-time patrolling... and a need for international reaction forces to attend to trigger spots which may come up from time to time."

The Irish officer said he felt there was "undue expectancy" for "an instant dividend from the U.N. for a job that the major politicians have failed to solve... It takes time to implement a mandate... The best way that (UNIFIL) mandate can be implemented and the speed at which it can be implemented is in direct ratio to the cooperation of the parties involved."

Callaghan said he was "optimistic that this mandate will be implemented" since "in most areas in which I have served with the United Nations, mandates have been implemented."

He said UNIFIL should not be blamed for not intercepting Israeli forces that are crossing the borders to mount so-called "punitive raids" against Lebanese villages and Palestinian strongholds, since "none of these raids you mention go through the UNIFIL area of operations."

"With certain exceptions," he elaborated, "I would say that UNIFIL, in the main, is maintaining peace in its area of operations. The other daily attacks are something else. Although we would like them to stop, we don't see them as our task because we don't have control over those areas. But we know that the U.N. uses its good offices to stop these at higher echelons."

Asked if he would recommend changing UNIFIL's mandate at the Security Council from a peace-keeping force to a deterrent force such as some Lebanese politicians have suggested, Callaghan had this to say:

"That is a rather difficult question and I don't think one for me. I think that is a question for higher political consideration, discussion and assent..."

"I would say this: give UNIFIL a chance and give it the cooperation it deserves, and there will be no need for considering a change in UNIFIL's mandate."

Likewise, he said, extending UNIFIL's current peace-keeping mandate to cover a wider area of

operations than the South, such as Beirut or the North, was a question for the Lebanese host government and the Security Council to answer.

On the purported move of UNIFIL's headquarters from Naqoura Callaghan said, "There is no question of moving the military headquarters from Naqoura. However, there is the question of assessing the economics of redeployment of logistic support."

The questions and answers:

As the new commander of UNIFIL, in what way would your "style" of command be different, if at all, from that of Gen. Erskine?

I thank you for that question. It's a very good question and I hope you don't expect from me a complete answer because I have been in UNIFIL for just a short time.

However, I would say that South Lebanon is not unknown to me. I have been in this part of the world for some time before.

Now, how does my style change from Gen. Erskine's?

First of all, I must compliment Gen. Erskine on the force which he presented to me. I was in this area when UNIFIL did not exist. Now that I have come back, and I am honored to take over UNIFIL, I find an organized military force, internationally-based, deployed, efficiently and logically supported, and working. So to Gen. Erskine I give credit for a tremendous job so very well done.

Again, how do I see the change?

A military operation is ever ongoing, ever studied and ever changing. Generals have different styles and it takes generals some little time to effect that style on the force.

At the moment I am quite clear on my style. I am starting to inject

that style to the force and it will take a while before that becomes evident.

Generally, I would now see perhaps a need for an assessment and an address to certain specific areas of re-deployment on the basis of knowledge received throughout the service of the mission.

I would see perhaps a requirement for more active, specific, all-time patrolling, with maybe particular emphasis on night-time patrolling.

I would see perhaps also a requirement for international reaction forces to attend to trigger spots which may come up from time to time.

These are generally aspects on which I would see some changes.

Would you be establishing residence in Jerusalem or somewhere in Lebanon?

I like the Middle East because I have been in the area for three years in Jerusalem and I now look forward to giving Beirut a trial.

I am living in Naqoura now, but I would spend quite a lot of my time in Beirut. It's a beautiful city. We have our place in Beirut, and my family will join me. My family are beyond school-going age. They're all settled in their professions and I will see them visiting me here (in

Naqoura) and they will certainly be visiting me in Beirut.

UNIFIL was deployed where the 1978 Israeli invasion had reached and it is still there. When, if at all, will it try to further deploy up to the internationally-recognized boundaries?

That too is a very good question.

When the United Nations is interposed in a situation such as in South Lebanon, it is interposed in an area where there has been conflict and where higher politicians had failed earlier in preventing that conflict from erupting. It is when the politicians have established a tentative peace that the United Nations, and in this case UNIFIL, is interjected into that area where there was conflict, and it gets a mandate or a directive to implement.

I often feel that there is an undue expectancy, a sudden expectancy, or rather a requirement for an instant dividend from the UN for a job or a task that the major politicians have failed to solve. I think any job or task of that nature to UNIFIL takes time to accomplish. It takes some time to implement a mandate.

The mandate is not in a firm time frame, and UNIFIL ever continues to use its best efforts, in a variety of ways, to implement that mandate.

The best way that mandate can be implemented and the speed at which it can be implemented is, I think, in direct ratio to the cooperation of the parties involved.

Will UNIFIL try to deploy further south to the internationally-recognized boundaries?

That's the mandate. I think UNIFIL is always making the effort

to implement the mandate. And as I said, it is relative to the cooperation.

I am optimistic that this mandate will be implemented. As a matter of fact, in most of the areas in which I have served with the United Nations, mandates have been implemented.

So you are optimistic?

I am very optimistic.

The Israeli forces are now carrying their acts of aggression in South Lebanon beyond the area of UNIFIL almost regularly, so that UNIFIL finds itself in the middle of two fronts: one front between the UNIFIL area of operations and the Lebanese-Israeli borders, and another north of the UNIFIL area of operations. Under what conditions, if any, would you anticipate a change in this dramatic and precarious situation?

I would dispute you saying that UNIFIL has two fronts. UNIFIL is looking four ways, five ways perhaps. It looks north, south, east, west, and it looks inward.

First of all, I would say that the acts of aggression you refer to are not carried out through the UNIFIL area of operation. So there is not a "front" as you call it. I think the word "front" is a misnomer. It is not a "front" for UNIFIL because UNIFIL is not involved in these hostilities which are going over our heads or taking place in an area which is not under our control.

Now, how do I see a change in this situation?

I see there is an international responsibility here, i.e., the responsibility of the authorities and countries with influence on these parties. This can be changed.

In other words, this being an international responsibility, and the major states being involved, influence can be brought to bear on the parties who are having this contest.

**Can these major states with influence help solve the problem? I think they have to, yes.**

**But so far they haven't...**

They have to. I think so. I am not a politician, you know, but I think they appreciate their responsibilities to the world too.

Nevertheless, I have seen this area of operations when nobody lived in it after the Litani operation (by Israeli forces in March, 1978). Villages were empty, houses were deserted, the farmers had left. It was at the beginning of 1978, the beginning of UNIFIL.

I was involved in the beginning of UNIFIL and I walked the ground at the time. I came back after three years, and no later than yesterday I was admiring some magnificent pieces of architecture, of new housing in Shakra, in Qana and in Tibnin. I saw farmers working on their tobacco crops. I saw farmers marketing their crops. I have seen children going to school. I have seen hospitals and clinics being established. I've seen roads being repaired and electricity working. You switch on a light and it goes on.

To me, the place is alive. It is progressing. It's really wonderful. The day-to-day development is ongoing successfully on the ground.

UNIFIL has taken it upon itself to intercept attempts by Lebanese leftist and Palestinian forces from infiltrating across its area of operations and into the enclave of Maj. Saad Haddad and Israel. Why

is it not intercepting Israeli forces that are crossing its area of operations northward to mount so-called "punitive raids" against Lebanese villages and Palestinian strongholds?

A very easy answer. None of these raids you mention go through the UNIFIL area of operations.

Let me develop this question of infiltration, any infiltration, i.e., infiltration generally, not in the Lebanese context, but in the context of a country with the responsibility of preventing movement through a border.

I don't think you will get any country anywhere in the world to underwrite total prevention of infiltration.

But I can say that UNIFIL has been successful in preventing quite a lot of infiltration. The report of the U.N. Secretary General (Kurt Waldheim) on the last mandate period quotes 140 or 150 interceptions. There are also the infiltrations that UNIFIL prevented from even starting by its presence. So it's quite successful.

**Still, Israeli forces are infiltrating into the South without UNIFIL intercepting them.**

You may cite an isolated case. But as I said earlier, in the international interpretation of infiltration some would happen. I still think we prevent a tremendous amount of infiltration on all sides.

**Should I also talk about the blowing up of houses?**

You know, houses are blown up in society generally for a variety of reasons. Some of them are built on ground where someone had a right of way. The way to clear that right of way is to blow up that house. You

have many family squabbles in all countries. You have them in Lebanon too and often the solution to that problem is to demolish the house and take the people away.

This is not to say that there may not be some specific, isolated incidents of blowing up of houses for political reasons. But I don't think that every house destruction incident should be seen as a specific incursion for the purpose of blowing up a house.

Happily, we have, within the UNIFIL area of operation, ample freedom of movement for the Lebanese people, so they can go about their daily work, from the enclave travelling to Beit Yahun, Tibnin, Tyre or Beirut and conversely so, and to other areas. Once they have their Lebanese identification, they can move freely. Vehicles are checked, but they are quite free to move. This freedom of movement, while it is wonderful and a tremendous indication of progress, does offer facilities to people who want to take advantage of it.

This is to say that normalization in one way is a wonderful thing. In another way, it does place additional taxation on UNIFIL's task.

**UNIFIL has been repeatedly defined as a peace-keeping force in Lebanon. People wonder: Has UNIFIL actually been keeping the peace in South Lebanon?**

Yes, I would say definitely keeping the peace in South Lebanon, because I think the rehabilitation of the people and the return to normality are indicators of peace.

With certain exceptions, then I would say that UNIFIL, in the main, is maintaining peace in its area of operations.

The other daily attacks are some

thing else. Although we would like them to stop, we don't see them as our own task because we don't have control over those areas. But we know that the U.N. uses its good offices to stop these at higher echelons.

**If UNIFIL cannot stop the on-again, off-again war in South Lebanon, the artillery exchanges and the Israeli airborne and seaborne raids, do you think it is in a position to help the Lebanese Army deploy in the South?**

In its area of operations, as I have been saying to you, UNIFIL is successful in peace-keeping and I see no difficulty whatsoever in supporting the deployment of the Lebanese Army, the gendarmerie, or indeed any other Lebanese organizations in that area.

I welcome the deployment of the Lebanese into my area of operations.

**How can you help the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the South and under what conditions?**

By inviting the Army into the battalion areas of UNIFIL, deploying them with UNIFIL on the same tasks as UNIFIL and on other special tasks and support projects of engineering, medical or humanitarian nature. This is happening. The Army is in fact deployed (since April, 1979, when about 500 to 600 troops were dispatched to the South). So we are really talking about increasing the Lebanese Army presence because they're already here. There are elements of the Army with the Senegalese, Nigerian, Irish, Dutch and Fijian battalions.

**How many Army elements are there now?**

Six hundred elements at least, and they're doing patrolling at the checkpoints. You see them all over the area with our UNIFIL soldiers. Now the idea is to increase this presence. It takes a little time but it is coming. We have plans for further deployment of other Lebanese units.

**How soon?**

Well, that's in the planning stage and we would look forward to that happening soon. I should also say that this is a wonderful assistance to UNIFIL because the more troops we have, the more areas we can cover, the more patrolling we can do. The higher incidence of checkpoint and observation duties, the more locations we can manage. The more patrolling we can do in villages, the more protection we can give. It's all ongoing.

**Do you have any plans to discuss this with the Lebanese government?**

I have many plans to see many people on an ongoing basis. This is the only way it can happen.

I ever convey recommendations to the Lebanese government and I am getting the utmost cooperation, support and encouragement from the Lebanese government in all departments.

**Would you recommend changing UNIFIL's mandate at the Security Council from a peace-keeping force to a deterrent force such as some Lebanese politicians have suggested?**

UNIFIL's is a peace-keeping mandate and I think that should be clearly understood. It's the keeping of a peace that has been made. It is a specific mandate. It is effective in

direct ratio to the cooperation it is given.

As to whether I would recommend an enforcement mandate, that is a rather difficult question and I don't think one for me. I think that is a question for higher political consideration, discussion and assent.

Of course, changing a mandate of that nature automatically involves a change in armament, in the troop contributions and in many aspects. It's not just something that one can throw a switch and say, 'We move to peace enforcement tomorrow from peace-keeping yesterday.'

People, if I may say, tend to express expectancies and to recommend changes in a rather easy way.

**So you wouldn't recommend such a change?**

I would say this: give UNIFIL a chance and give it the cooperation it deserves, and there will be no need for considering a change in UNIFIL's mandate.

**Does this imply that UNIFIL is not given the necessary cooperation?**

I'm only quoting the Secretary General on this. UNIFIL needs cooperation from everybody.

**But doesn't this imply that UNIFIL is not getting it?**

I am not saying it is not getting it from the Lebanese government, but on the ground, when there is infiltration. We have talked much about this — if you have cooperation, you don't have infiltration, you don't have shooting of the UNIFIL soldiers, and you don't have bombing of their positions.

**Isn't this one reason why UNIFIL should become an enforcement force?**

No, I think we must get people to give us the cooperation we deserve, to be reasonable and fair to Lebanon, to give peace a chance and to give UNIFIL a chance. I am sure the end-product will be successful. As a matter of fact, I am optimistic and confident it will be successful.

**Would the countries contributing troops to UNIFIL approve of turning it into a deterrent force?**

I don't know. That's a matter for the national governments and politicians (to decide).

In the same context, would you recommend UNIFIL's peace-keeping mandate being extended to cover a wider area of operations than the South, such as Beirut or the North?

I am afraid I must refer you to my answer to your previous question. That's for the politicians and the Lebanese government.

UNIFIL is here at the invitation of the Lebanese government and it has a mandate from the Security Council. Your question then can be answered only by the Lebanese government and the Security Council.

**Is the feeling among UNIFIL's rank and file one of frustration or achievement?**

To me, certainly, one of achievement. I don't have any doubt UNIFIL has achieved. It will continue to achieve. I think they are encouraged by the normalization on the ground. I don't think the term

"frustrated" is even in context.

**Why is the feeling one of achievement?**

If you can see development and normalcy in an area like South Lebanon, this is achievement. This is positive achievement. It's something you can touch, something you can see, something you are part of, something you make happen.

**Lebanon has lodged a complaint with the Security Council this week over the repeated Israeli raids. Do you expect something to come out from a council meeting on the complaint?**

If I were permitted to comment, I would hope that there will be a successful outcome.

**Are reports that UNIFIL's headquarters may be moved from Naqoura well-founded?**

There is no question of moving the military headquarters from Naqoura. However, there is the question of assessing the economics of redeployment of logistic support.

Originally, we were almost totally dependent on Israeli channels for our procurement. Now we're getting at least 80 to 90 percent of our procurement through Beirut. So for practical, economic reasons, if you can reduce the distance you need to travel to deliver the goods, then you continue to reassess the most suitable location in which to position your logistic support. But there is no question of moving the military headquarters. •

FORMER PREMIER SEES RETURN TO PAST ROLE FOR BANKING SYSTEM

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 24 Jan 80 pp 49-50

[Interview with former Lebanese Prime Minister Salim al-Huss: "Past, Present and Future of the Lebanese Banking System as Seen by Former Prime Minister Salim al-Huss; Banking System With the Capacity of The Lebanese System Can Weather Any Storm!"]

[Text] Dr Salim al-Huss, prime minister of the last Lebanese government, has conclusively chosen an appropriate framework for his activity during the present phase. This framework is part of a formula which balances his desire to pursue political activity with complete effectiveness against his desire to pursue professional activity in the banking field from which he came to the premiership in December 1976.

It was this formula which compelled Dr Salim al-Huss to reject more than one offer to assume the responsibility for directing a banking or financial institutions because of some evident conflicts between the requirements of political activity and the achievement of success in directing any banking or financial institution. Such conflicts include moral conflicts, inasmuch as a commitment to accept the management of a private institution may give rise to a commitment to defend its interests, or material conflicts, inasmuch as the time required to run an organization necessarily takes time away from political activity.

From this standpoint, Dr Salim al-Huss drew up the following framework for his professional activity during the current phase:

1. A consultative framework, within which he has contracted his service as a consultant to the Arab Monetary Fund, which includes all Arab states in its membership, and to one of the commercial banks in Lebanon (Francebank, the Sabbagh and French Bank of the Middle East, Ltd.) owned by a group headed by 'Adnan al-Qassar, president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Beirut.
2. A framework of temporary or contingency consulting in the context of economic, financial and banking studies for certain projects.
3. A framework of university teaching in one of the colleges of the American University.

Within these bounds, and in consideration of the new pattern in the professional life of this economist-banker-financial expert, AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-IQTIRADI took a tour with Salim al-Huss through the past, present, and future of Lebanese banking activity. During this tour, we recorded the following series of analytical ~~comments~~ by Dr al-Huss:

Without a doubt the events which have convulsed Lebanon since the beginning of 1975 have caused the banking system to lose the opportunity for growth that it could have had if these events had not taken place. Lebanon and its banking system would otherwise have been able to profit from the growth of oil revenues in the area and the accompanying financing activity connected with the development programs in the various countries of the region.

This was the chief loss which befell the Lebanese banking system as a result of the Lebanese crisis.

One of the repercussions of this was the transfer of banking activity which could have fallen to Lebanon during this period to other banking centers, including Bahrain, Cyprus, Greece, and certain other Arab countries. Moreover, some of this activity went directly to the monetary and financial centers in the Arab markets, bypassing the Lebanese link.

However, the growth lost by the Lebanese banking system as a result of the disturbances was not all an unforeseen loss. Undoubtedly a not inconsiderable part of it constitutes a permanent loss since the sudden collapse of the Lebanese banking role during the period concerned strengthened the role of other banking centers at Lebanon's expense. In addition, certain policies pertaining to finance and financing were formulated or expedited whose existence can no longer be ignored.

However, from a different standpoint, it is possible to note a few positive effects which the Lebanese banking system was able to achieve during this period.

Among other things, the pressure which the banks experienced because of the disturbances within Lebanon forced a number of them to establish branches or allied banks abroad. This development opened up new horizons for Lebanese banks, a fact which yielded a return at that time and will yield a continuous return for Lebanese banking activity in the future.

The Lebanese banking presence abroad during this period established something unparalleled in the long history of the development of the Lebanese banking system up to the outbreak of the disturbances in 1975. For we have begun to find out today that this presence has a substantial influence in Paris, Brussels, London, Geneva, Jiddah and other places.

However, the greatest positive achievement recorded by the banking system during this critical period was the sheer fact that it was able to endure.

In spite of everything that happened, the Lebanese banking system was able to maintain its existence and the solidity of its position. It was even able to record some growth, although this growth was modest compared to what could have been expected had the disturbances not taken place.

It will be recorded that the Lebanese banking system was able to pass through so severe a trial as the one which convulsed Lebanon and emerge from it sound and healthy. It will also be recorded that a banking system with such a capacity will be able to weather any storm.

I say this to emphasize that the performance of the Lebanese banking system during the crisis will tend to strengthen confidence in the system and in the soundness of its position and its ability to confront difficulties. This is a positive achievement which we cannot underestimate, and it can benefit the development of Lebanese banking activity in the future, especially in its relations with other countries.

Another positive factor in the banking situation is the endurance of the legal and regulatory structure of banking activity in Lebanon--or in fact, the development of this structure. Thus:

1. The system of banking secrecy has not been affected in spite of all that has happened.
2. The regulation concerning the establishment of new banks in Lebanon was revised to allow the establishment of new banks following a ban which lasted a full 10 years.

It is a well-known fact that the ban on the establishment of new banks was imposed in accordance with Law 28/67 which was issued in the wake of the (Intra) Bank crisis. It was originally imposed for 5 years and was then renewed for 5 more years.

When this law elapsed in 1977, a legislative act was issued permitting the establishment of banks based on special conditions.

In actuality, a number of new banks have been licensed, some of which have begun operations and some of which are now in the process of being set up.

Moreover, is it not gratifying that the number of banks operating in Lebanon has increased since the outbreak of the disturbances? This is evidence of the endurance of the Lebanese banking system.

3. The freedom to transfer assets has not been affected, either. The same situation that existed prior to the outbreak of the disturbances in 1975 remained in effect and is still in effect today.

The movement of capital is free from all restrictions. Assets can enter and leave Lebanon without any controller or auditor.

If the freedom of movement of assets was one of the factors that helped in the development of the Lebanese banking system in the past, the preservation of this freedom through the years of crisis--and in spite of the crisis--is one of the positive achievements which must be recorded in favor of the strengthening of the Lebanese banking system's development in the future.

4. One other thing which remains to be mentioned in this context is the additional development and progress recorded in the legal and regulatory structure of banking activity in Lebanon, especially the implementation of the free banking area system for the first time.

The law pertaining to this system--and I take pride in the fact that I originated the idea for the law in 1969--was not issued until 1974 and was not put into effect until 1977 when a regulatory act was passed.

I believe that this system will be tremendously effective in opening up new horizons of development for the Lebanese banking sector with respect to the role it plays in the region--and particularly in the area of intermediation between sources of funds in the region and fields of investment in the outside world.

In general, I believe that the banks in their present position can play the role required of them and conform to the requirements of the current phase.

However, this conviction does not prevent my pointing to the necessity of introducing some improvements in order to strengthen the role of the banks and their competitive position in the world by means of some additional legislation and regulations relating to Lebanese banking activity.

We must develop the structure of the Lebanese financial and money market generally outside the framework of pure commercial banking activity. We must develop the machinery of this market if we want the market and Lebanon to play a full role in the coming phase in the movement of international capital as it pertains to the Middle East region. In order to attain this, the Lebanese banking sector must undertake back-up activities in the field of financial securities, commercial securities, and financial and investment institutions.

The years of crisis which curtailed the role of the Lebanese banking system have not selected a replacement for Beirut.

Although some of the other centers obtained a certain amount of the activity which could have fallen to Beirut, the present situation indicates that no specific center has emerged to take the place of Beirut and assume the role it played in the past and expects to reclaim in the future when stability returns to Lebanon and, with the return of stability, the machinery of the money and financial market is perfected.

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CENTRAL BANK TIGHTENS RESTRICTIONS ON LICENSES FOR NEW BANKS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 24 Jan 81 pp 50-52

[Article: "With Number of Banks Near 100, Lebanon Moves to Restrict Opportunities for Establishment of New Banks"]

[Text] It appears that the Lebanese authorities, including both political and monetary authorities, are making a general move toward instituting a policy aimed at restricting licenses for the establishment of new banks or tightening up on the granting of new licenses during 1981.

This move was revealed to AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-IQTISADI through statements by sources in the Bank of Lebanon indicating that the central bank intends to submit "proposals and ideas" to the government concerning the introduction of amendments to the provisions of the legislative act issued in June 1977 which gave the Bank of Lebanon discretionary power to license the establishment of new banks. The move was also evidenced by an assertion by the same sources in the central bank that the concerned authorities in the bank will not wait for government approval and government measures before adopting these proposals but will themselves apply new principles and a new procedure in considering applications for licenses to establish new banks. The basic framework of this procedure will be "stricter procedures in studying applications, tighter conditions on licensing, and a tighter policy on approval of any new application."

This does not mean that the Bank of Lebanon wants to close the door permanently on the principle of licensing new banks. Rather, it wishes to keep this door open in principle while narrowing the opening as much as possible.

Monetary authorities in Lebanon moved in this direction based on several things. First, there are the negative comments which the Lebanese Association of Banks continues to make regarding the proliferation of bank licenses approved by the Bank of Lebanon. Second, it has become apparent to the Bank of Lebanon that its move to raise the minimum required capital for a new bank from 15 million to 30 million and subsequently to 50 million Lebanese liras has not checked the continual influx of applications for new bank licenses. Nor has the Bank of Lebanon's stipulation (based on its discretionary powers) that at least 51 percent of the shares of a new bank must be owned by native-born Lebanese prevented some Arab financiers who wished to own whole or part interests in banks in Lebanon from resorting to the use of agents in order to conceal their names.

In its last session at the beginning of the second week in January, the Bank of Lebanon--or rather, its Central Council--completed the consideration of license applications submitted during 1980. It approved two of these applications, which are as follows:

1. A license to Messrs Rashid Rassamani, Fu'ad Khalifah, Joseph Khalifah, and Zaki Shuwayhat to establish a new bank under the name of the Lebanese National Bank with a capital of 50 million Lebanese liras.
2. A license to another group represented by Attorney Karim Baqrudini to establish a new bank under the name of "al-Manar Bank" with a capital of 50 million Lebanese liras. Some information indicated that a Saudi-Kuwaiti group will own a large percentage of the shares of this bank.

While bankers wait to see what steps the holders of new licenses will take to establish their banks within the specified legal time limit of 6 months, information being circulated indicates that the central bank refused to extend the time limit granted to two license holders (Messrs Ghandur and Hashimi) to establish a bank to be called the International Commercial Bank. This time limit had been extended for 3 months beyond the original period on two successive occasions.

If this license lapses or is revoked due to the failure of the license holders to set up their bank--or else to sell the license as occurred with the license of the Foreign Commerce Bank, whose original holders (Messrs Walim Qazan, Khalid Khadr Agha, and Ilyas Saba) sold it to Salim al-Hajj--this will be the second case in which a license has been revoked. The other case involved the license of the Lebanese National Credit Bank which had been obtained by Messrs Talal al-Mu'ib (former minister of economy), Ghassan Matarji, Antoine Dib and Ja'far Sharaf-al-Din. Offsetting these are several other cases. First, there is one bank which followed through with the steps toward establishment. This is Globe Bank, which was originally issued a license with a capital of 15 million Lebanese liras and then raised its capital to 30 million liras after the effective period of its license was extended. Six other banks actually began operations (Universal Bank, Capital Trust Bank, Metropolitan Bank, Foreign Commerce Bank, American Express which was originally a financial company, and Revenue Bank). Another bank called the Lebanese-Saudi Business Bank, in which Rafiq al-Hariri owns a large majority interest, needs only to complete the formation of its board of directors and conclude detailed negotiations with its primary candidate for general director in order to begin operations.

In this climate, the Bank of Lebanon will have to begin shortly to consider a license application by a multi-national group seeking to establish a bank called the Construction Bank with a capital of 50 million Lebanese liras. Meanwhile, the existing bankers will have to continue their action to convince the Lebanese authorities to come to agreement with them on an official or effective "halt" to the licensing of new banks. These bankers have made their opposition clear on more than one occasion, and a number of banking authorities have characterized the law which authorized the licensing of new banks as a law without any force.

The fact is that the behind-the-scenes controversy over this matter is still going on between the two "disputants." The sides divide along the following lines:

The objecting side, led by the Banks Association, feels that the number of banks operating in Lebanon is too large, not only in comparison to the size of the Lebanese economy but in relation to the viable range of these banks, as well. This is especially true at a time when there is a relative decline in the number of qualified banking personnel available to manage and develop these banks and their branches and conduct their affairs.

This side, which originally consisted of the old banks, has been unable to endorse complete opposition to the principle of lifting the ban on the licensing of new banks. There are several reasons for this.

First, their objection was in conflict with the principle of economic freedom which prescribes equality for all before the law.

Secondly, their objection clashed with the direction taken by the government of Dr Salim al-Huss--which passed the law and lifted the ban--toward freeing the economy from certain obstacles and restrictions. These included laws and measures revoking many importation permits, the nullification of laws and regulations establishing quotas for the building of pharmacies and factories, and elimination of public market permits, and so forth.

Thirdly, the protest ran up against the fact that three senior officials were behind the lifting of the ban, namely, President Ilyas Sarkis, Prime Minister Salim al-Huss and former Finance Minister Farid Rufayil. These three officials entered office from banking positions and were concerned to avoid harming at the very least, the legitimate interests of the banking industry.

A fourth factor that handicapped opposition to the lifting of the ban was the fact that the licensing of new banks was considered a means of asserting Lebanon's confidence in the return of its prosperity and a possible means of attracting some foreign and Arab capital back into the country, with the added realization that Lebanon depended on the confidence of sources of capital in order to resume its progress.

However, the old banks and the Banks Association, which had not spoken out very much against the law liberalizing the issuance of bank licenses, did speak out on more than one occasion when the Bank of Lebanon "went overboard" in granting licenses. In fact, they went so far as to "charge" the bank with laxity in this area. The new banks, although with a certain amount of timidity and quietness, finally joined with the banks protesting the expansion in the licensing of new banks after the number of banks operating or slated to begin operating in Lebanon neared the 100 mark.

Some of the protestors point out that Lebanon is the only one of the Arab countries which still allows the establishment of new banks. While the states which follow a controlled system did not permit the establishment of new banks from the

beginning (after they had nationalized the old), the capital-exporting oil states halted the licensing of new banks either a long time ago (Kuwait), somewhat more recently (Saudi Arabia), or within the very recent past (the UAE). Some of these had limited the licensing of new banks to a free banking area (offshore banking). At the same time, we note that Jordan, which wished to grow into a regional banking center, was not lax in allowing the establishment of new banks and halted licensing of new banks after permitting them for a period of time. Similarly, Egypt, which opened its doors to all banks, has halted its open door policy in effect and is moving toward regulating this policy officially and legally.

However, this basic opposition to the establishment of new banks still faces an insistence on the part of many economists in the private sector and in official positions on the necessity of sticking to the law establishing the principle of licensing new banks.

Some of the bankers who insist that the licensing of new banks should be halted and that this door should be closed permanently base their demand on the fact that there are now too many banks operating in Lebanon and all the other Arab states have officially or effectively closed the door on the licensing of new banks. However, those who insist on retaining the principle base their case on the same arguments that their opponents use to arrive at the opposite conclusion.

Those who urge that the principle of licensing be retained--and one of the foremost members of this group is former Lebanese prime minister Dr Salim al-Huss--argue as follows: The number of banks in Lebanon is indeed large--very large for a country Lebanon's size and for an economy of this size. However, the Lebanese banking system does not base its existence on Lebanon alone and it is not just concerned with Lebanon. Its market is unlimited. If Lebanon's market was the sole market for its banking system, there would be no need for more than three or four commercial banks.

The fact that the other Arab countries do not permit the licensing of new banks, continue the proponents of this view, coupled with the fact that the Arab market is the market of the Lebanese banking system, provides an additional reason for permitting the licensing of new banks in Lebanon. The purpose of this is not only to demonstrate the viability of Lebanon and its ability to continue its progress through interaction with Arab capitalists, but also to attract some Arab investors who are searching either for opportunities for direct investment in banking or for diverse channels through which to enter the investment markets.

Some bankers and economists feel that the deficiency does not lie in the provisions of the law which authorized the licensing of new banks but rather in the application of this law. Application of the law has led to the great increase in the number of banks, and application also permitted the entry into the banking system of elements which should not have been allowed to enter.

There is some truth to this statement. However, those who feel that it has not been possible to apply the law in a better manner say that the "elements whose entry is complained of" are no more open to criticism than previous elements in the old or veteran banking system. Moreover, it was not even possible to

prevent such elements from joining the existing club of banks before the new law went into effect, because the previous situation based on the ban on the licensing of new banks merely led to an increase in the value of the limited number of bank licenses without preventing either "good" or "bad" investors from bidding for shares and interests offered for sale at elevated prices.

It must be noted, however, that even though the law gave the central bank the discretionary power to license or not license new banks, political, security, sectarian and regional conditions in Lebanon guarantee the creation of countless pressures under which it is impossible for the Bank of Lebanon to refuse to license one bank without refusing to license another.

In this broad setting, the opponents and supporters of the law which lifted the ban on the licensing of new banks agree on only one point, namely, that the proliferation of banks is, in fact, causing the limited number of qualified banking personnel--who are also attracted to Arab, mixed and foreign banks abroad--to be "snatched up." This is at a time when Lebanon lacks sufficient facilities to turn out enough banking and financial personnel, who are absorbed rapidly due to strong inducements from all the banking systems.

And in this broad setting, the central bank has found itself involved in acting to amend the rules and procedures for considering new bank license applications, instituting a tighter approach to studying these applications, and restricting the opportunities for obtaining a new license. Along with this it is moving to ask the political authorities to amend the legislative act pertaining to the regulation authorizing the licensing of new banks, thus leaving the door open in principle to those who want to submit applications for new licenses while closing the door in practice--with the help of the political authorities--on many applications which are still in the planning stage.

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**INTERNAL SECURITY OFFICERS PROMOTED**

**Beirut Al-SAFIR in Arabic 29 Jan 81 p 7**

**[Article: "Decree Promotes 69 Officers in Internal Security Forces"]**

**[Text]** A decree was issued yesterday promoting 26 officers in the internal security forces and placing 41 officers on the promotion schedule.

**The decree stated:**

**T**he President of the Republic, in accordance with the constitution, in accordance with legislative decree number 54 of 5 Aug 1967, Organization of Internal Security Forces, and in accordance with decree 3734 of 31 Dec 1980, Placing Officers of Internal Security Forces on the Promotion Schedule, decrees the following:

**First article:** As of 1 Jan 81, officers of the aforementioned internal security forces are promoted as follows, and their names are to be placed on promotion schedule number 1 for 1981, in accordance with the first article of decree number 3734 of 31 Dec 1980, as follows:

- A. To the rank of Lt Col, provisional Lt Col Firuz al-Yazji.**
- B. To the rank of Major, provisional Majors Ramiz Mafuz, 'Adnan al-Ghatimi, George Hijar and Ghazi Faraj.**
- C. To the rank of provisional Major, Captains Samir Abu Jawdah and Ghassan Najim.**
- D. To the rank of provisional Captain: First Lieutenants Habib Lutfi and Ilyas Ka'yakati.**
- E. To the rank of First Lieutenant, Second Lieutenants Fadi Abu Hasan, Naqula al-Habab, Hasan Baydun, Dib 'Abdallah, George Salamah, Ibrahim Basbus, Antun 'Abud, 'Abd-al-Rahman Ghalayini, Yasir Mahmud, Salah 'Ayd, Jamal Ramadan, Ghassan Sabah, Zahir Kashfi, Louis Ghafri, Muhammad Qasim, Bayar Nassar, Ahmad Hunaynah, Salah Jibran and Husayn Za'ruri.**

**Second article:** The names of the following officers are to be placed on promotion schedule number 2 for 1981:

To the rank of First Lieutenant, Second Lieutenants Kamal Sabah, Mustafa Hasan, Lahhad al-Tanuri, Bisharah Bisharah, Mikhail Sarkis, Muhammad al-Sabsabi, Rudolf Saliba, Rulan 'Abd-al-Satir, Barar al-Awi and Muhammad Qadurah.

**Third article:** The names of the following officers are to be placed on promotion schedule 3 for 1981:

- A. To the rank of Colonel, provisional Colonels Mishal Shababi and Ramiz Kanj.
- B. To the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, provisional Lieutenant Colonels 'Abd-al-Karim Ghandur, 'Ali 'Ashur, Sharif al-Hajj, 'Isam Abu Zaki, Ahmad Sami Minqarah and Mikhail sam'an.
- C. To the rank of provisional Lieutenant Colonel, Majors Ziyad Dhibyan, Adwar Ta'mah, Fu'ad Agha, Ibrahim Mahanna and Kalim Wakim.
- D. To the rank of Major, provisional Captain Samir Abu Jawdah, who was placed on promotional schedule number 1 for 1981 for provisional rank of Major under the provisions of paragraph C of the first article of this decree.
- E. To the provisional rank of Major, Captains Hasan al-Hallaq and 'Ali al-Makhal.
- F. To the rank of Captain, provisional Captains Hafiz al-Hawat, Jirji al-Naddaf, 'Ali 'Abbas Makki, Walid Qalilat, Samir Rahmah, Mishal Karan and Faysal Marrar.
- G. To the provisional rank of Captain, First Lieutenants 'Abd-al-Rahman Jamal, Amin Saliba and Muhammad Sha'itu.
- H. To the rank of First Lieutenant, Second Lieutenant Butrus Tannus.
- I. To the rank of First Lieutenant, Musician, Second Lieutenant, Musician Aylifa Faransis.

**Fourth article:** The names of the following officers are to be placed on promotion schedule number 4 for 1981:

- A. To the rank of Major, Captains Ghassan Najim, who was placed on promotion schedule number 1 for 1981 to the provisional rank of Major under the provisions of paragraph C of the first article of this decree.
- B. To the provisional rank of Major, Captains Ali Mahmud Makki, Antun 'Abbud, Ramzi Kalab and Fadi Abu Zayn.

**Fifth Article:** This decree is to be published and disseminated as necessary.

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## BRIEFS

**PHALANGE ARMS** -- The Lebanese Rightist Phalange Party has received new weapons from the Sadat regime, the United States and Israel during the past few days. AL-KHALIJ stood alone more than a week ago in publishing information about arms exported to the Phalange Party. An informed source gave AL-KHALIJ more details yesterday about arms shipments to the Phalange Party. He said: "Transports and vehicles [malalat] fitted with intermediate machine guns, military jeeps and Kalashnikov guns were received by the party from the Sadat regime." He confirmed that a shipment of arms reached the Phalange Party from the United States, including six armored vehicles of the ("Banhad") rapid movement type and a number of intermediate size guns, in addition to a number of advanced M-16 rifles and hunting rifles. A shipment of bulletproof garments also arrived from the United States to be used by the "B.J." unit, the most important group used by Bashir al-Jumayyil in his special operations. At the same time, the agent Sa'd Haddad received a shipment of Israeli weapons, including a number of advanced "super-Sherman" tanks. On another matter, it was learned that the Phalange War Council is now studying a request which it will submit to the American Department of Defense (the Pentagon) asking for a number of American officers and military experts to supervise the training of the Phalange militia within the framework of the increased interest which the Phalange Party is showing in converting the militia to a regular army. [Text] [al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 28 Jan 81 pp 1, 7] 7587

**WEAPONS SMUGGLERS** -- Sources investigating those arrested on charges of attempting to smuggle weapons to the United Arab Emirates (Shaykh Saqr Muhammad al-Qasimi, age 23, 'Abdallah Hamid Rashid al-Jari and Sharik Yusuf Abu Jawdah) have advised that a customs settlement has been concluded. As a result, those arrested will pay a fine of 9,400 pounds and remain under arrest, especially since diplomatic immunity does not apply to Saqr, who limited the operation to himself, because he has no diplomatic function in Lebanon. It appears that Saqr is a student in the business department of the American university and that he is the nephew of the ruler of Sharjah, while his father holds the position of head magistrate in the Emirates. It also appears that Saqr asked to buy weapons and that Sharik, who is employed as director of sales in a company in Sharjah, bought them from a person named George Nakuzi in al-Dakwahah for 9,000 pounds. The weapons consist of four machine guns of the Kalashnikov type with eight cartridge clips and 285 rounds, in addition to two revolvers of the ("Komba") type with two cartridge clips and 150 rounds. [Text] [Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 27 Jan 81 p 7] 7587

SA'IQAH GENERAL COMMAND -- An official of the al-Sa'iqah operations branch announced that during last month and the first half of this month al-Sa'iqah has carried out five fedayeen operations within the occupied territory. The most recent of these was on 8 January, when "a unit from the internal forces was able to detonate an explosive package in the vegetable market in the western sector of occupied Jerusalem, which resulted in several injuries to Zionist residents." In another matter, Comrade 'Issam al-Qadi, a member of the National Command of the Arab Socialist Ba'thist Party and the secretary-general of the al-Sa'iqah organization, announced that a general command has been formed for al-Sa'iqah "including a number of members of the party's national command, the reserve national command, and the regional command of the Palestinian organization in the party as its members," in addition to him as secretary-general and Comrade Majid Muhsin as secretary of the organization in Lebanon. Al-Qadi said that he will start to announce the new leadership "after the first meeting, at which duties will be divided and staged schedules and various arrangements for all of the organization's activities will be determined." [Text] [Beirut AL-NIDA' in Arabic 27 Jan 81 p 10] 7587

CSO: 4802

## COOPERATION WITH USSR MOVING FORWARD

Valletta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 14 Mar 81 p 6

[Article by A. Skripkin: "Equal and Mutually Advantageous Cooperation"]

[Text]

•OIL-AND-GAS industry forms the basis of the economy of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Prior to the revolution, this most important branch was fully controlled by the imperialist oil monopolies. Today, when the country's natural resources have been placed under the control of the people, the strengthening of the national oil-and-gas industry in that country has acquired special importance. Quite naturally, therefore, that precisely in this sphere co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Libyan Jamahiriya is developing at an especially rapid pace.

Soviet organisations have drafted a General Scheme of Complex Development of Gas Industry in the Jamahiriya over a period ending in the year of 2000 which envisages, in part, the construction of a number of big enterprises, which will use gas to make fertilizer for the fields, plastics, and synthetic materials formerly imported from industrially developed capitalist countries. The territory of the Jamahiriya will be crossed by powerful gas pipe-lines, through which gas from the gas-fields will be received by the electric power stations, plants, by the cities and villages.

The realization of a number of these projects has already been started, with Soviet organizations for actively participating in the work. With their participation, for in-

stance, a cross-country gas pipe-line is being built from El Brega to Misurata, almost 600 kilometres long.

In May 1978, Soviet and Libyan organisations signed a contact to do the drilling at the Sarir oil deposits. The Soviet drillers' teams, despite the hard, unusual for them conditions in the Sahara, have fast installed the equipment delivered from the USSR and are at present fast sinking oil wells. In 1980, agreement was reached on further extension of co-operation between corresponding organizations of the USSR and Libya to develop the oil producing industry.

Of great importance for strengthening the country's economy and for raising the living standards of the population is electrification. Two high-tension electric transmis-

sion line have already been put in operation with the Soviet participation and is being successfully used, substantially improving electric power supply to the northwestern part of the country.

Now when the country's provision with foodstuffs depends to a considerable degree on import, development of its own agricultural production acquires a great importance for Libya. In this field, large group of Soviet scientists have prepared detailed maps and scientifically substantiated recommendations regarding optimal use of lands lying between Tripoli and Benghazi.

The many-sided Soviet-Libyan economic cooperation includes also metallurgy, geology, chemistry, public health and a number of other fields.

## TROOP TRANSPORTS PURCHASED BY VARIOUS METHODS

London 8 DAYS in English 14 Mar 81 p 28

[Text]

ALTHOUGH LIBYA has been banned from taking delivery of eight already paid-for C130 troop transport planes, it is collecting a force of L100s, the civilian version of the C130. The US refuses most military sales to Libya and direct diplomatic relations between the two countries were suspended in 1979 when an angry crowd attacked the US embassy in Tripoli. The two countries, however, continue to have extensive trade relations: America is a major customer for Libyan oil.

Libya is buying L100s from private dealers in Italy and Luxembourg, according to one *8 Days* source. Although all aircraft and vehicles capable of conversion to military use are covered by the restrictions imposed by the State Department's office of munitions control (OMC), the only available sanction for any who bypass the OMC is to blacklist the company involved. So the dealers set up separate firms for each deal: if a corporation is blacklisted by OMC, it doesn't matter, because by then the firm no longer exists.

In the case of one of the L100s, a one-man Miami company registered in Delaware leased the plane for one day, with pilot and fuel included in the price. The pilot flew it to Libya, where he was told his services were no longer required; Libya then paid the owner, who was a party to the scheme, and acquired the aircraft.

Libya is still trying to obtain the blocked C130s through such intermediaries as Billy Carter, former Texas legislator James Day and new Republican Senator Steve Symms (who supplanted Frank Church). It received eight of the planes before the US ban, but lost one to guerrilla fire at Entebbe, Uganda, where Libya supported Idi Amin. One of the 'bootleg' L100s now bears camouflage paint and the same registration number as the lost C130, the *8 Days* source says.

In an unrelated action, France has decided not to deliver ten missile-launching naval patrol boats to Libya as 'retaliation'

for Libya's intervention in Chad and its proposal of a political merger with that country. The French government embargo was placed suddenly, only hours before one of the patrol boats was due to be handed over to its Libyan crew.

Tripoli signed the French francs 3bn (\$610m) order in August 1977, and five of the vessels are already completed. Three are currently lying in the French Atlantic port of Lorient and the other two are at Cherbourg. About 100 Libyan sailors are waiting at Cherbourg to take over their new craft but only French sailors are aboard the vessels.

French sources said that security has been stepped up considerably in Cherbourg. The two vessels there are still being fitted out but all approaches to the Charles X basin are under armed guard. The entrance to the basin is normally blocked by a revolving bridge.

Clearly, the French have learned from their lesson of Christmas 1969, when five similar patrol boats, which had been built and fitted out for the Israeli navy but then placed under embargo, slipped their moorings and quietly put to sea under Israeli command while French personnel were busy celebrating their completion.

Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie has built identical patrol boats for the Argentinian, Greek, Iranian and Nigerian navies. The craft are seventy metres from stem to stern and displace seventy tons. Four 4,500-horsepower diesel engines give them a speed of up to 40 knots. The patrol boats are armed with four Otomat ship-launched missiles, a 76mm quickfiring gun and a 90mm twin-gun turret astern.

Three other patrol boats of this type are already blocked in Cherbourg, and have been hauled out of the water. They are the last of the 12 boats ordered in 1974 by the late Shah of Iran. The other nine had already been delivered to Iran before the new regime took over there.

## TRADE WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA PROGRESSES

Valletta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 14 Mar 81 p 8

[Text]

**T**he Socialist People's Libyan Jamahiriya is an important trade partner for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, even though their relations do not have a long history to look back upon.

The Trade Agreement and the Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation between the two countries, signed 8 February, 1974 create sufficient scope for expanding and intensifying trade and economic cooperation and for granting services by Czechoslovak specialists in science and technology and for the practical and theoretical training of Libyan specialists in Czechoslovakia.

The fifth session of the Joint Czechoslovak-Libyan Committee for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, which met in Prague in May 1980, specific projects of mutual cooperation in the sphere of the petrochemical industry, oil processing and power generation were discussed. At the end of the talks, a protocol containing provisions for further development of economic relations between the two countries in the sphere of industry, agriculture, transport, construction, technical assistance and trade cooperation, was signed.

Trade relations and commodity structure have been gradually developing in harmony with the expansion of the economies of both countries. At present, Czechoslovak-made tyres, kil-

ches, stencils, tools, footwear, structural steel, glassware, textiles and costume jewellery are well established on the Libyan market. Among engineering exports, mobile cranes and lorries assert themselves well on the market. The volume of Czechoslovak engineering exports, especially of complete industrial plants, is unsatisfactory so far.

An important item in Czechoslovak exports is construction of roads in Jamahiriya. Of equal importance are geological and hydro-geological surveys.

Cooperation in the field of technical assistance has achieved a high level recently. At present, several hundreds of Czechoslovak specialists are working in the Jamahiriya in different branches, especially in the health service.

In the future, Czechoslovakia would like to contribute towards Jamahiriya's industrialization, mainly by deliveries of complete industrial plants, participation in the construction of petrochemical and chemical plants and power stations. In addition, we want to offer assistance in the construction of Jamahiriya's railway network.

Czechoslovakia is ready to intensify cooperation in agricultu-

ture, both in the sphere of consulting services and in the reclamation of littoral zones, and the construction of grain silos, fodder mixture plants, dairies and the follow-up branches of the tanning industry. We want to give technical assistance especially in prospecting for raw materials, in hydrology, mapping and the health service.

It may be said with justification that Czechoslovakia as an industrially advanced country, can contribute a great deal towards the development of Jamahiriya. Long experience in industrial production makes it possible for Czechoslovakia to offer a wide range of export commodities likely to satisfy Libyan partners. This is documented by the exhibits in the Czechoslovak Pavilion at the Tripoli International Fair. All prerequisites exist, both in the political and trade policy sphere, for the development of economic and trade relations between the two countries. There are still considerable reserves and it will be the foremost task interested organizations of both countries to take advantage of them to promote cooperation in the years to come.

CSO: 4820

ROMANIA TO AID OIL EXPLOITATION

London 8 DAYS in English 14 Mar 81 p 41

[Text]

**AN AMBITIOUS** programme for the joint exploration and exploitation of Libya's oil resources was the most important result of Libyan Oil Secretary Abdussalam Zaqaar's visit to Romania.

During his visit, on 16-19 February, the secretary met Romanian Minister for Trade and Cooperation Cornel Burtica, Deputy Prime Minister Ion Patan, and Vasile Pungan, secretary of state and private counsellor to the president. Zaqaar was also received by President Nicolae Ceausescu. The programme is in effect an extension of the cooperation agreement between the two countries.

Under an agreement on trade, technological and construction cooperation signed during the visit, Romania is to provide equipment for further oil exploration in Libya and build two

refineries. Romania is also to be granted a concession for exploration in Libya, and will receive most of the product should oil be found.

The two parties also agreed on a construction programme, worth \$5bn. Romania will build factories, a hospital, 30 schools, two universities, 4,000 apartments and a motorway.

Romania is to extend its technological assistance to Libya in civil/industrial engineering and transport, and train Libyan specialists in the health service and oil industry. Currently there are 3,000 Romanian specialists in Libya, while in Romania 1,000 Libyans are being trained in industry, agriculture and health services.

In 1979 trade between the two countries totalled \$408m.

CSO: 4820

## LARGE STEEL COMPLEX UNDER DEVELOPMENT

London 8 DAYS in English 7 Mar 81 pp 42-43

(Article by Michel Swedcousins: "Misurata--Libya's City of Steel")

**(Text)** THE TOWN of Misurata is scheduled to become Libya's third city by 1990, and could well have as many as half a million inhabitants by 2000. Situated 170km to the east of Tripoli and at the other end of the 300km agricultural belt that stretches from the Tunisian border in the west to the start of the Gulf of Sirte in the east, Misurata has been little more than a minor regional market town until recently.

Since the revolution 12 years ago, however, Libya's planners have regarded it as one of the country's prime development zones. Billions of dollars have been set aside for investment both in the town and the surrounding region — an investment that may turn it into Libya's main industrial centre as well as its third city.

The core of this development is Libya's first iron and steel works. When the first stage is completed in 1985, output is planned to exceed a million tonnes a year, and this stage alone will cost \$1bn. The first of the contracts for the project, which is to be built on an open salt flat known as the Sabkha Tawurgha just south of the village of Qasr Ahmad, has already gone to a Japanese consortium of Kobe Steel and Mitsui.

The consortium won a \$800m contract at the end of January for a package involving a 0.4m tonnes per year steel bar and rod mill, 120,000 tonnes section mill, and water treatment facilities. Contracts have also been signed with two West German consortia for the project's steelmaking process, which will turn out steel slabs, blooms and billets for processing into goods

elsewhere in the complex. The Krupp engineering firm are leading the consortium, which won the \$715m contract to build the melt shop producing the slabs, while the contract for the second melt shop to produce the smaller blooms and billets has gone to a group led by the Dusseldorf firm Korf Engineering and Voest-Alpine of Austria. Voest-Alpine has also been given a letter of intent for a cold rolling mill with a capacity of 120,000 tonnes of sheet steel annually.

There have been some announcements that a second Japanese consortium, consisting of Marubeni Corporation and Kawasaki Heavy Industries as well as Hylsa de Mexico, has also won a \$430m contract for the steelwork's reduction process. But Mitsui and British Steel — who are the project tender evaluators but hope to pick up other related contracts — both state that only a letter of intent has been signed with the consortium.

The reduction process, which will have an annual output of 550,000 tonnes, was designed by the Mexicans and converts the basic iron ore into steel pellets for feeding into the hot steel rolling mills. Contracts for these rolling mills — there will probably be two — still have to be awarded. Italimpianti are in line for one of them.

The Libyan heavy industry secretariat, in charge of the project, has decided to add a massive port capable of handling 0.75m tonnes of iron ore a year. Initially the port will only receive imported ore, but is eventually to be used solely for export once the planned railway line from Misurata to

the desert iron ore mines 90km to the south is built. A railway will also link Misurata to Tripoli, and go on to the border where it will join up with the Tunisian network.

The \$280m contract for the first stage of the port, to be built south of the steelworks, was awarded last November to Sıra Turkes Fıyazı Akkaya of Istanbul. A second-stage development, which would raise throughput capacity to 1.5m tonnes, is still with the planners, and on current prices would cost a further \$230m.

Linked to the steel complex is a \$1bn 500MW power station and desalination plant. As with the reduction process, there is some confusion as to whether a contract for the power plant has been signed yet. Last month the Libyan news agency (Jana) announced that Secretary for Heavy Industry Omar Muntaser had done so, but consultants Société Générale pour l'Industrie (SGI) of Lausanne and the British firm Eshbank apparently know nothing about it.

Indeed, an SGI spokesman was astonished, saying that they had only just sent off tender specifications to Tripoli. There had been no time whatsoever for tendering, and certainly no evaluation, he added. Frankly, I don't believe it, he told *8 Days*. It still has to be decided whether the plant will be oil or gas powered, he pointed out.

Whenever the contract is awarded, there is a strong feeling that the 220kV station's output of 500MW will be far in excess of the requirements of the steel complex or the new town. The expectation is that a large proportion will be routed into the national grid. However, there are already two other massive power stations scheduled nearby, one at Homs and the other — a nuclear plant — probably near the ruined Roman city of Leptis Magna.

While steelmaking is to be the basis of the new Misurata, the authorities have other irons in the planning fire. A refinery is scheduled for the area, though few details are available, and heavy industry is not to be the only source of new jobs. Downstream activity has been mentioned, though in a rather general way, and there is little doubt that spin-offs from the steelworks will

emerge — the railways being a prime example. What is to be encouraged, though, is commercial activity.

The area's extensive old farm estates, which concentrated on orchards, are now set for reorganisation, so Misurata should see an increase in agro-industrial ventures. To speed growth in both this and other sectors, a commercial port with six general cargo berths was opened at Qasr Ahmad in 1978. Starting from scratch — there was nothing but a small fishing jetty there before — Ivan Milutinovic, the Yugoslav company which built the port, had to construct two breakwaters (one 1.8km long, the other 1.4km) as well as the usual mass of warehouses, offices and outbuildings.

The project cost the Libyan General Ports & Lights Administration some \$29m, but was always seen as only the first stage. The UK firm Rendel Palmer & Tritton, who were consultants, have since drawn up designs for a second stage in which a further nine berths (four for containers and two ro-ro berths) are to be built, while one of the original berths will be adapted for grain imports.

A slipway for dry-docking is also in the plan, and there is provision for an oil berth. It is assumed the latter will be used for bringing in refined products from Libya's other refineries along the coast, rather than for the town's proposed oil refinery.

Tenders for this second stage have already been sent out and evaluation is to start this month. As yet, however, it is not known when the contract will be awarded or what the completion date will be. As to costs, rocketing inflation has made a mockery of the \$29m spent on stage one, and \$150m might be nearer the mark for the second phase.

Whatever the costs, the construction industry sees Misurata as Libya's third port, and certainly it should do much to ease the pressure on the already overstretched facilities at Tripoli.

As for the town's development, much will depend ultimately on what happens with the steel works. Originally plans for its output varied between 5m and 6m tonnes annually, but there has had to be a drastic downward readjustment — partly because of the world steel glut, but also because

neighbouring countries' plans to start similar steelworks have robbed it of potential markets.

If there is no expansion of the complex, then there is little chance of stage two of the steel port going ahead. However, if the present glut proves to be only temporary, the Libyan planners will be keen to up the potential steel output.

All this has a bearing on the future population of Misurata. According to 1980 Libyan statistics the population of Misurata and its environs is 178,000 and planners are now talking of building an industrial city in the area to house a further 180,000. However, according to the West German company drawing up the plans for the new town, Weidleplan Consulting, this is simply a 'development figure'. A spokesman pointed out that there was no longer any intention to build a separate self-contained industrial city of such magnitude.

Instead, a series of small separate urban zones, each for around 5,000 people, is planned. Four zones, housing 20,000, are to be built about 8km from the old town of Misurata, near the new steelworks, while another four are scheduled nearer Misurata itself.

Tenders for the earthworks for both projects are expected to go out this month, and work should start on the steelworks housing zone before the end of the year. The cost of each of the two housing developments has been estimated as high as \$200m, depending on the level and quality of infrastructure required.

While the official housing plans will have to be linked to industrial targets, there is every indication that there will also be a considerable amount of housing and related construction outside the scope of any scheduled scheme. The master plan that Weidleplan Consulting are drawing up for Misurata takes little consideration of any private housing going up — which is something the authorities are actively encouraging — or of any state organisations getting involved on their own behalf in the area.

## STEEL CONTRACTS SIGNED WITH GERMAN FIRMS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 2 Mar 81 p 6

## [Text]

Libya has placed contracts believed to be worth more than \$1 billion with two West German and Austrian consortia for the construction of electro-steel works in the coastal town of Misurata. It was announced last week.

The orders follow hard on the heels of a Y 160 billion (\$770 million) deal with Kobe Steel of Japan for the construction of two rolling mills and indicate that Libya is pushing hard to reach its goal of becoming a major steel producer by the mid '80s.

Reports from Bonn said that the latest orders were among the most valuable won by West German companies in the Arab world and would go some way towards allaying the fears of German exporters of heavy plant that the capital surplus oil states were being slow to invest in industrial infrastructure.

One of the consortia, led by Krupp, has won a contract worth about DM 1.5 billion (\$710 million) for a turnkey project including construction, delivery and electrical installation of a plant plus training of Libyan workers. The construction of the plant, which will have a capacity of 650,000 tons of steel slabs a year, will be the responsibility of Thost Bau AG of Augsburg; other members of the consortium are the Austrian company Voest Alpine, Mannesmann Anlagenbau of Dusseldorf and BBC of Mannheim.

The project should be complete within five years. The steel slabs will be refined and plated elsewhere in the Misurata complex, the reports said.

The second contract was awarded to a consortium including Korf Engineering of Dusseldorf and Voest Alpine and is for an electro-steel works specialising in the production of steel pellets and blooms. Korf and Siemens - traditionally Libya's main supplier of elect-

rical goods - will undertake the electrical installation. Although no firm figures have been quoted, the combined order is believed to be worth more than DM 1 billion.

The new orders, together with those placed with Kobe Steel (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, December 29, 1980), will increase Libya's steel-producing capacity by at least 1.2 million tons a year. The current maximum output from the Misurata complex, which was started in the mid-'70s, is about half a million tons, but there are plans to increase this to 5 million tons a year by 1986.

Although Libya was until recently a relatively small steel producer, it has proven iron reserves of more than 1 billion tons, compared with 350 tons in Saudi Arabia and 60 million tons in Egypt, which is by far the biggest Arab steel producer.

At last count there were three steel works operating in Libya, one with a capacity for producing 75,000 tons of spiral welding pipes a year, another producing a maximum of 45,000 tons of welded and galvanised pipes and a third capable of turning out 3 million tons of irrigation pipes annually.

The country also has two Yugoslav-built scrap iron smelters each equipped with an electric furnace and capable of treating 35,000 tons of iron annually and a direct reduction unit with a capacity of 21,000 tons a year.

Reports from Bonn suggest that German exporters are optimistic about securing a number of related contracts still under negotiation; Uhde, the plant construction firm, recently won a DM 200 million (\$95 million) contract to design and construct a urea fertiliser unit.

## IMPORTS FROM MALTA STOPPED

London 8 DAYS in English 7 Mar 81 p 21

[Text]

LIBYA'S decision to halt Maltese imports on the pretext that it was necessary because of 'Libyan market circumstances' has resulted in angry reaction among major Maltese firms largely dependent on direct trade with Tripoli. These include nine subsidiaries of the joint Libyan Arab Maltese holding company formed five years ago with \$56m capital.

There has been only mild reaction from Malta's socialist government, which has never shown much sympathy towards the private commercial sector, being more interested in obtaining world recognition of its neutral and non-aligned status and in 'building bridges' between Europe and Africa.

Local manufacturers are very worried, however. Two firms, Medelec Switchgear and Mediterranean Power Electric, which recently won large contracts from Libya, have goods ready for shipment and now face a crisis. One manufacturer comments: 'If this ban continues for long it will affect our cash flow, our ability to employ workers and could be disastrous to the general economy.' Libya has roughly \$100m invested in manufacturing and shipbuilding projects in Malta. Moreover, it has been the island's main market in North Africa for some years, buying \$33m worth of goods a year.

Premier Mintoff and Colonel Qaddafi have agreed to refer the Medina Bank oil dispute to the International Court of Justice

but both countries accuse each other of employing delaying tactics in ratifying the agreement. Mintoff wants to resume oil drilling before any court judgement, but cannot obtain protection from any big power.

Mintoff seems confident that once the oil problem — the only dispute he has with Qaddafi — is resolved, relations between the two countries will improve and plans to increase exports to Libya from \$30m in 1979 to nearly \$60m can go ahead.

The government points out that last year it approved 40 new parastatal projects providing some 3,000 new jobs. In an effort to find alternative export outlets, talks have just been concluded with delegations from Tunisia and China, while contacts have been awarded to Italian, West German, French and Danish concerns to set up factories in Malta with EEC assistance. The Algerian premier, Ahmed Abd elghani, is due to visit Malta shortly for discussions on politics and trade cooperation.

The opposition however, considers the Libyan move a serious threat to Malta's future trade and an attempt to reassert Libyan influence in Valletta. They also stress the domestic problems plaguing the government in an election year, particularly the water shortage. Householders are suffering from low pressure and 24-hour cuts even during the rainy season, but no plans have been announced to meet the expected summer shortage.

## GOLD TRANSFERS FROM EUROPE REPORTED

Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 7 Mar 81 p 2

[Text]

**LIBYA** Transferred almost 300 million pounds in gold from the UK to Tripoli in January, taking its total shipments from the London market to 17 tonnes worth about 135 million pounds during the past three months.

The Libyan Government, whose financial operations are normally cloaked in secrecy, has emerged as one of the most enthusiastic purchasers of gold among the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

Its bullion withdrawals from London almost certainly represent official purchases being brought home.

Several other OPEC members, led by Iran and Iraq, also made such gold transfers last year.

The Libyan consignment is revealed in figures from the UK Customs and Excise. These show that Libya shipped 12.7 tonnes, valued at 93.5 million pounds, out of the total 50.9 tonnes of refined gold bullion exported from the London market last month.

The bulk of the gold was taken as usual by Switzerland, which accounted for 37.3 tonnes.

On the import side—where as a result of Bank of England restrictions no breakdown of the figures by country is given—53.9 tonnes of refined gold used in interbank transactions entered Britain last month.

The import figures for February to be published next month, will be swollen by the return to the Bank of England vaults of about

90 tonnes of Britain's gold reserves which figured in the complex financial settlement between

the U.S. and Iran last month.

Under the terms of the deal, Iran transferred to the UK ownership 50 tonnes of gold previously frozen in the New York Federal Reserve Bank.

The same amount of Britain's own gold reserves was switched to a special account set up for Iran's benefit at the Bank of England.

The result of the transaction was that 50 tonnes of the UK gold holdings were shifted from London to New York.

The gold was, however, moved back to London earlier this month because the Bank of England prefers to keep it in its own vaults.

The 50 tonnes were flown in between February 8 and 11, from the New York Assay Office (where the U.S. keeps part of its reserves) to Threadneedle Street via the giant U.S. air base at Mildenhall in Suffolk.

The metal was not moved all at once because of the security risk of placing 50 tonnes of bullion in one aircraft.

London insurers in fact rarely arrange cover for shipments of more than 10 tonnes at a time.

Mildenhall, which is the major air transport centre for the U.S. forces in Europe, is more used to handling military cargoes.

On at least one other occasion, however, it has received large gold consignments. This was in 1978, when excess U.S. gold stocks from Fort Knox had to be hurriedly flown in for sale in London as part of abortive central bank efforts to keep the gold price from rising above 35 million pound per ounce.—BR-FT Services.

CSO: 4820

## CHANGES PLANNED IN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Valletta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 14 Mar 81 p 12

[Text] The special committees for examining the educational structure have resumed their meetings at the General People's Committee for Education's Headquarters in Tripoli.

The committees are to re-examine the general and university education's structure to create a new one meeting society's need for productive forces in various fields in a manner complementing the educational system to the family and the mosque. It is also suggested to replace comprehensive secondary schools by specialised ones, stress early specialisation and concentrate on basis curricula needed for the specific nature of the specialisation. Emphasis will be given to kindergartens, and Arabic language in all stages of education.

The committee's sources referred to resolutions of the fifth students congress to realise militarising the

schools, divide the year into work and study periods, link early secondary school specialisation with its corresponding one at university level, reorganise university structure on the basis of scientific departments. The sources said that these suggestions were among the aims to be achieved.

Seven committees have already been established to carry the above tasks. These are the committees for kindergardens, compulsory education, secondary education, university education, external liaison, administration and the executive committee.

CSO: 4820

FOREIGN MINISTER RETURNS FROM TUNISIA

LD271348 Rabat MAP in English 1218 GMT 27 Mar 81

[Text] Rabat, 27 Mar (MAP)--The Moroccan minister of state in charge of foreign affairs and cooperation, Mr M'hamed Boucetta, returned here Wednesday coming from Tunisia where he had participated in the works of the Seventh Fifth Session of the Arab League Council.

In a declaration to the press, Mr Boucetta indicated that the ordinary session of the League Council was devoted to examining several questions especially the amendment of the league charter, current Arab political problems, notably the Palestine and Middle East question and the Euro-Arab dialogue.

The Moroccan head of diplomacy added that measures were taken in preparation for the next meeting of the council scheduled for August 1981.

Mr Boucetta went on saying the council had examined the Euro-Arab dialogue issue and some circumstantial crisis notably the Mauritanian allegations whereby Morocco was charged as being at the origin of the recent Nouakchott events.

The Moroccan delegation, added the minister, had to clearly explain the Moroccan position and prove that Mauritanian charges were unfounded.

Participants at the works of the council, he said, displayed great understanding towards the Moroccan position and grasped the reality of the situation, namely that Mauritania is manipulated by the enemies of Moroccan territorial integrity and that Morocco is the country being aggressed.

The Arab League approved a resolution asking the two countries to avoid worsening the tension currently prevailing in the region, added Mr Boucetta.

The Moroccan minister of state finally said the league had entrusted its secretary general with making necessary contacts in Morocco and Mauritania, and if these contacts proved vain, he would seize an extraordinary meeting of the council in view of examining the question.

CSO: 4420

## BRIEFS

**REVENUE FROM MINERALS**--Mineral exports are Morocco's most important source of revenue. As well as holding the world's largest proven reserves of phosphates, Morocco also has substantial deposits of iron, copper and lead, rare metals such as cobalt and manganese, and fuel resources in the form of shale oil, coal and uranium. Phosphate: Morocco contains about 75 percent of the world's known extractable reserves, and contributes over one-third of the world's exports. Currently it ranks third, behind the US and the Soviet Union in total output, producing 22m tonnes in 1980. Last year's 50 percent rise in the price of phosphate gave Morocco's war-scarred economy a badly needed boost, and its phosphoric acid exports covered 91 percent of the kingdom's oil imports. The state-controlled mining company Office Cherifien des Phosphates (OCP) plans to raise mining capacity from 24m tonnes at present to around 37.5m. Lead: Morocco is one of Africa's main producers. It plans to boost production of refined metal from 43,000 tonnes to 120,000 tonnes by expanding and modernising the country's foundry and its mines at Touissit, Draa-Sfar and Aouli. A new foundry is also in the offing. Copper: Morocco plans a dramatic increase in its copper exports from 12,500 tonnes to 50,000 tonnes in 1985. The deposits at Bleida in Ouarzazate province, containing an estimated 1.8m tonnes of high-grade 8 percent ore, are the largest in the Arab world. Exploitation is to be financed by a \$65m plan with the participation of several Moroccan state organisations, and Arab and international aid donors. Cobalt: The quality of the deposits at Bou Azzer in the Atlas mountains means that direct mining is economically feasible (cobalt is usually extracted as a by-product of copper and nickel refining). Tungsten, gold and antimony: There are small deposits at Figuig, Errachidia and Ouarzazate which are to be exploited under a World Bank-financed scheme. Uranium: Morocco processes about 500-600 tonnes a year of yellowcake, and has plans to double production. Coal: Production is to rise from 780,000 tonnes in 1980 to around 1.2m tonnes in 1984. Oil: There is little crude in Morocco, but the kingdom does possess massive shale oil reserves which could one day supply its entire needs. The reserves are concentrated in the central part of the country at Timhadite (20bn tonnes of shale containing around 64 litres of oil a tonne), and in the southern Tarfaya province (200bn tonnes, average content of 50 litres a tonne). [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English 21 Mar 81 pp 54-55]

**BOUCETTA SEES NETHERLANDS FOREIGN MINISTER**--The minister of state in charge of foreign affairs and cooperation, Boucetta, had talks in Marrakech this morning with Netherlands foreign minister and current president of the EEC Van Der Klaauw, who arrived in Morocco yesterday in the framework of a fact-finding tour of the Middle East. During the talks, Van Der Klaauw outlined the European initiatives to achieve a Middle East settlement. The talks were attended by the Netherlands ambassador in Rabat, the deputy director of the Middle East and Africa Department at the Netherlands Foreign Ministry and the first secretary at the Netherlands Embassy at Beirut. [Text] [LD290940 Rabat Domestic Service in Arabic 1300 GMT 28 Mar 81]

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

INTERVIEW WITH PDRY FOREIGN MINISTER

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 20 Feb 81 p 3

[Interview with Salim Muhammad, PDRY foreign minister, by Jabbarah al-Barghishi: "Steadfastness Front, Nucleus of the Arab Community's Struggle; Front Nations Define Strategy of Opposition. America Used Gulf War as Pretext to Move Its Fleets. We Call For Peninsula, Gulf and African Horn Summit to Avert Dangers of Camp David Accords."]

[Text] The truth that has thrust itself on the Arab action level was clarified at the New Delhi conference of the non-aligned nations' foreign ministers. It was evident in the natural and decisive cohesion among the Arab nations, belonging to the Steadfastness and Resistance Front. Within the conference, their role was distinguished by concentrating on principles of right, firmness of purpose and legality of the Arab struggle against Zionist occupation and the forces backing it, whether imperialist powers, or those world reactionary forces who travel in their orbit in New Delhi.

AL-BA'TH attended the non-aligned conference, and met with a number of foreign ministers. We talked with Salim Salih Muhammad, foreign minister of the Democratic Yemen, about the efforts which distinguished the acitivity of the Steadfastness and Resistance Front nations within the Arab group on the one hand, and secondly, on the level of the other conferees.

Salim Muhammad clarified the PDRY's role, in cooperation with the Arab nations of the Steadfastness front, in opposing American imperialist provocations, one of the most important of which was Saddam's war against the Iranian revolution. This has caused the nations of the region, generally, to live in a state of direct American threat to their independence and their people's aspirations.

The PDRY foreign minister, in his reply, showed special concern for the serious consequences, to the Arabs' land and fate, resulting from the traitorous Camp David accords. He underscored some of the aspects of what the Arabs have seen recently, in terms of dubious alliances and activities. They represent only one facet of the imperialist danger, aimed at subjecting the region to specific military bases spread over the territory of Egypt, Somalia and Oman.

Salim Muhammad made this position clear in the following interview:

[Question] Did the Steadfastness front states have a distinctive position during the meeting that the chiefs of the Arab delegations held, on the first day of the conference?

[Answer] The nations of the Steadfastness and Resistance Front represent the nucleus of the Arab community's battle to oppose the treacherous Camp David accords, their consequences and effects on the Arab region, and the schemes and conspiracies that the Camp David parties are carrying out, under the leadership of the United States, against the Arab people and their national and pan-Arab interests.

From this starting-point, at all international assemblies, including the present conference of non-aligned foreign ministers, we must strive to encourage the Arab position, in an attempt to continually condemn and oppose the treacherous Camp David accords, and to oust any tangible results, in order to confront, block and thwart the effects stemming from Camp David. At this conference, our efforts were concentrated on shifting the Arab position to a more progressive stage than we achieved at the Sixth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Havana, with respect to demanding the suspension of the Egyptian regime's membership in the non-aligned movement, as a result of violations of the principles and goals of non-aligned policy.

[Question] The PDRY's stance regarding the Gulf war is well known. Do you see any justification for continuing this war, while American uses it as a pretext to increase its military presence in the area?

[Answer] Since the fighting began between these two neighboring countries--Iraq and Iran--the PDRY has implored the two parties to settle the dispute between them by peaceful means. Our position stems from our belief that continuing the fighting between these two countries, in addition to its being a waste of their material and human energies and capabilities, which it was assumed would be used to resist our common enemy, imperialism and Zionism, also is a threat to the security and independence of the nations and people of this important and strategic region.

We are also aware that world imperialism, headed by American imperialism, has used this war as a pretext to increase its presence in the area. Examples are the vast war fleets that American imperialism is massing, the military bases that are being established in Oman, Somalia, Kenya and Egypt, and their attempts to revive military alliances under new names.

Therefore, we once again implore the two parties to strive to peacefully settle the dispute between them. That way, we can deny the opportunity to American imperialism and its ambitions to dominate the region, and impose its hegemony over the wealth and resources of the peoples of the region.

[Question] Do you think that what has happened between Egypt and Somalia, as well as Kenya, represents the beginning of a new alliance?

[Answer] Political and military developments, since the Camp David accords, have proved that the Camp David parties, in their policies and actions, are striving for the establishment of military and political alliances and blocs in our region, to serve imperialist interests and aggressive goals.

The Egyptian regime plays a principal role in carrying out these schemes. It represents the role of policeman for American interests in the Arab region and in Africa, aimed at plotting against Arab issues, led by the case of the Palestinian Arab people, and at aborting the African national liberation movements, and the hostility of peoples striving for liberation and to build their new future lives.

In the PDRY, we are aware of these dangers and conspiracies that confront the region. Our firm position to stand fast against these military and political alliances and blocs, and the building of military bases in the region.

On this basis, Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the central committee, chairman, Presidium, Supreme People's Council, and prime minister, has called for the holding of a summit meeting, for the nations of the Arabian Peninsula, the Arab Gulf, and the Horn of Africa, so that we can unify our efforts to avert the perils confronting our region, and so that our people can devote themselves to economic building and sharing in the just issues of other peoples.

[Question] Is there much coordination among the steadfastness nations to shift them to a more progressive stance with regard to Arab action?

[Answer] The nations of the Steadfastness and Resistance Front are bound together by unity of purpose, destiny and the common battle to confront the schemes and plots facing the Arab region. These factors increase the need to strengthen our fighting stance, which brings the Steadfastness and Resistance Front nations together, and to continually coordinate and organize among themselves, in order to bolster their positions and shift the Arab action to a more progressive stage, than it is at the present time.

The steadfastness nations have made many decisions defining their strategy and mutual actions. The steps that these nations have taken have had positive results, which serve the decisive Arab issues.

In our opinion, implementing the important decisions, which the steadfastness nations have adopted on various levels, would give their actions and coordination the necessary push. Holding their meetings on an organized basis would be a step toward achieving our mutual goals and aspirations. It would allow the front to play a prominent role in encouraging more progressive and revolutionary Arab action, to serve our Arab causes.

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PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

DEMOCRATIC YOUTH ORGANIZATION RECEIVES PRAISE FROM PREMIER

Aden SAWT AL-'UMMA in Arabic 5 Feb 81 p 3

Article: "Eight Glorious Years in the Life of ASHID"

Text Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council, and prime minister, issued a Supreme People's Council Presidium declaration granting the 14 October decoration to ASHID on the occasion of the eighth Youth Week, expressing the Yemeni Socialist Party's appreciation of and honor for the active role and effective, unremitting efforts which ASHID has made in the context of realizing and executing the duties the party has assigned to it.

Likewise, our comrade the secretary general inaugurated the activities of the eighth Youth Week at a great youth festival held Monday morning in the auditorium of the Higher School of Scientific Socialism in Khawr Mukassar, giving an important speech to the young people there:

"It is a cause of happiness for me to participate with you in this ceremony inaugurating the activities and proceedings of the eighth Youth Week, which is dedicated to celebrating the occasion of the passage of 8 years since the establishment of your combative federation, the Federation of Yemeni Socialist Youth, ASHID.

"At the beginning, it gladdens me to inform you of the decree of our party, the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council and the Council of Ministers granting the Federation of Yemeni Socialist Youth the 14 October decoration in expressing our party's appreciation of and honor for the effective, unremitting efforts which ASHID has made in the context of realizing and executing the duties assigned to it by the party. I am perhaps confident that this honor by which ASHID has been blessed, as the first social organization in the country to be granted this lofty decoration, will prompt the members of ASHID to exert further efforts and allow their creative, innovative powers to burst forth for the sake of defending the policy of the party and carrying out the duties assigned to ASHID in various fields of life, at work and production, in educational organizations, in government agencies, the armed forces, the People's Police and the State Security, where members of ASHID are present, fighting for the sake of their nation and people."

In his speech, Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad referred to ASHID's struggle in the past 8 years of its combat and said:

"The Federation of Yemeni Socialist Youth, since its founding, has tangibly proved, through its many-faceted activities and proceedings, that it is the fighting revolutionary vanguard of the youths and students of our country. However, it is necessary to point out here that ASHID could have played a bigger role in effectively contributing to the process of economic and social construction and the education of young people had all the authorities and agencies of the government and its organizations shown an understanding of the role assigned to ASHID and strengthened its status and role in the society.

The time has come for everyone to realize that strengthening the status of ASHID in our country's political and social system and consolidating its role in the society means consolidating the leadership role of the Yemeni Socialist Party among the ranks of Yemeni youth, who constitute a precious segment of our people. ASHID is the party's reserve and active auxiliary. The government's agencies and organizations must have a good understanding of this fact and help ASHID in various spheres in a manner enabling it to perform its role and carry out the duties and tasks the Yemeni Socialist Party has assigned to it. Here I would also like to point out, on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the founding of ASHID, that it is necessary to start carrying out the Youth Law which the presidium has issued and the Supreme People's Council has approved and to set out bills which will guarantee that it is applied in tangible reality."

He went on to say:

"Thousands of members have been raised and nurtured in ASHID, and their efforts of unremitting struggle and self-sacrifice have been consecrated to serving the people. Hundreds of young people who once were members of ASHID have assumed leadership positions in the party and the government. ASHID has become a major source for providing the party with new blood, ASHID has presented hundreds of members who were reared in it for membership in the Yemeni Socialist Party, and it has worthily carried out the great trust given to it by the party, on grounds that it is the reserve, active auxiliary and inexhaustible wellhead of the Yemeni Socialist Party. ASHID has given great attention to leading, caring for and guiding the Yemeni Vanguard Organization in order to rear the children of our country in a good moral manner, on grounds that they are the builders and the citizens of socialist Yemeni society."

Our brother Riyad al-'Akbari, member of the Central Committee of the party and first secretary of ASHID's Central Committee also gave a talk on this occasion in which he referred to the successes which Yemeni youth had achieved in the past 8 years through the ability of our nation's young people to honor heroic exploits in defense of the country and the battle for construction for the sake of a better future for our Yemeni people by carrying out the Yemeni programs and the plans of the Yemeni Socialist Party.

al-'Akbari told the young people of Yemen that it was necessary to consolidate their role in the process of building our new society and firmly implanting ASHID's status as the vanguard detachment of our country's youth and the reserve and active auxiliary of the party of the Yemeni working class, the Yemeni Socialist Party.

He again stressed ASHID's determination to continue educating the young with a spirit of solidarity against aggressive imperialist schemes which were aimed at destroying international detente and constituted a real threat to the interests of the peoples of the world.

After that our brother Sa'id Salih, member of the Central Committee and secretary of the Federation of Peasants of Democratic Yemen, read out the Presidium's decree granting ASHID the decoration of the 14 October revolution.

Our brother Riyad al-'Akbari received the October decoration in a magnificent atmosphere replete with enthusiasm and applause. After that, our brother al-'Akbari decorated our brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad with the 1 February decoration, the highest decoration of the Federation of Yemeni Socialist Youth, in appreciation for the efforts which our brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad is exerting in leading our Yemeni people toward liberation and social progress and his constant support of ASHID.

In addition, the Governorates of Shabwah and Lahij witnessed diverse youth activities in celebration of the eighth Youth Week.

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HIGHER SOCIALIST INSTITUTE'S ROLE IN SPREADING IDEAS LAIDED

Alen Al-THAWRI in Arabic 7 Feb 81 p 16

Article by Nasir 'Ali Nasir: "The Higher School of Scientific Socialism, 1971-1981 10 Years of Fighting To Spread the Ideas of Scientific Socialism"

Text<sup>7</sup> In a few days, the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Higher School for Scientific Socialism will be celebrated. In the 10 years that have elapsed, this school has embodied a lighthouse illuminating, through its light, the road before fighting Yemenis.

Ten years <sup>have elapsed</sup> in the life of the Higher School of Scientific Socialism, in which dozens of long, intermediate and short courses for party, social organization and government agency staffs have been organized which have graduated thousands of staff people who -- as stated in the talk by our comrade the secretary general of his inauguration of the new academic year -- "have become replete with the thinking of the party and, through the leadership positions they have occupied in the party, government agencies and mass organizations, have striven firmly to connect theory with application." Propagating and publicizing the ideas of scientific socialism is a difficult, complex task in circumstances where illiteracy among the people of our nation is widespread in the context of the customs, usage, values and morals of the old exploitative classes, whose material existence has been swept away but whose spiritual existence, on the basis of the relative exploitation by the superstructure (ideas) of the infrastructure, still remains and expresses itself through phenomena of administrative corruption (bribery, sabotage of property of society, theft and son on) as well as phenomena of ideological sabotage (sufism, the revival of old reactionary moral customs and habits, and so forth).

All this, in addition to the ideological sabotage imported from outside, with all its manifestations, shows the degree of difficulty of the task which has been assigned to the Higher School for Scientific Socialism.

At the beginning, the Higher School had to undertake a solution to the task of spreading and propagating the ideas of scientific socialism and holding short courses involving large groups of teachers. The goal in these courses was to spread the ideas of scientific socialism, that is, the study of the basic principles, laws and statements of the theory of scientific socialism, in horizontal form. It was necessary to give this matter greater attention, since at that period it was desired to arm the member of our party and government and mass organization staffs with preliminary basic knowledge of the theory of scientific socialism, the only

scientific theory which has offered a correct interpretation of the historic road to human progress.

Along with the continued organization of short course, the need for holding study courses for a period of one or two academic years became apparent; these courses played a decisive role in preparing and accrediting staffs.

The holding of these courses was accompanied by abundant scientific activity which manifested itself in the holding of numerous scientific symposia whose subjects dealt with the issues of development of the Yemeni revolution as well as issues related to the building of the new society in Democratic Yemen.

In this regard, our comrade the secretary general of our party, in inaugurating the current academic year of our school, stressed that the Yemeni Socialist Party "deeply realizes the magnitude of the efforts which have been exerted in the context of this scientific activity which the school has witnessed and has participated in guaranteeing the course of the subsequent development of our revolution and strengthening the leadership role of our party."

While we review the publicity and educational activity of the Higher School of Scientific Socialism in this brief treatment we would like to stress that the tasks assigned to the Higher School of Scientific Socialism have become complicated and diversified in conjunction with the complexity and diversification of the tasks of building the new society in our country.

In this regard, it is worthwhile for us to point out that the convening of the general founding conference of our party, the Yemeni Socialist Party, expressed a qualitative new shift in the course of the revolution's development and in the form and content of the national democratic powers in our country, which have begun a gradual transformation toward popular democratic powers. This quantitative shift in the course and power of the revolution has also meant a qualitative shift in the tasks and duties of the Higher School of Scientific Socialism, which has expressed itself through the school's entry into a new stage and a new form of development which manifested themselves in the transition from its old headquarters to the academic complex bestowed by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.

This shift, in reality, was not the expression of a mere change in location but in essence "expressed a qualitative shift in work and activity and in the type of big tasks the Higher School of Scientific Socialism is carrying out."

This move inaugurated the start of university academic work, which means:

1. Transforming the Higher School of Scientific Socialism into a university scientific pedagogical organization.
2. The gradual shift of the school into an organization concerned with scientific research.
3. A quantitative increase in the number of teachers and lecturers and increasing admissions to enrollment in the school.

This has all objectively led to complication, diversification and increases in the tasks of the work and activity of the Higher School of Scientific Socialism — tasks where, as our comrade the secretary general said, in the circumstances of our need to spread and thoroughly implant the theory of scientific socialism and qualify and recredit staffs by relying on this vital revolutionary theory and in the circumstances of our determination to bring about the party's leadership role in all fields of life, the importance of the role of the Higher School of Scientific Socialism and its branches in responding to the party's urgent need for active, aware staffs which are able to translate the documents and resolutions of the party into practical reality through the sound proper linkage of theory to application increases.

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PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

LEADER OF ANTI-ILLITERACY DRIVE DESCRIBES PROBLEMS, GOALS

Aden AL-THAWRI in Arabic 7 Feb 81 p 9

Article: "Director General of Anti-Illiteracy and Adult Education Department Talks to AL-THAWRI"

Text The Central Committee report to the General Exceptional Conference stated:

"In the past 2 years the anti-illiteracy and adult education movement has been besmirched by apathy and a spirit of listlessness which are in contradiction with the orientation of our revolution and the resolution of our previous party conferences in this regard."

The report also stated that a comprehensive anti-illiteracy and adult education campaign was to be launched as of last October.

In a meeting with Comrade Ahmed Salih al-'Isa, member of the Supreme People's Council and director general of the General Anti-Illiteracy and Adult Education Department, he was so kind as to respond to the following question presented to him by the correspondent from the newspaper AL-THAWRI:

What are the reasons for the apathy and listlessness in the anti-illiteracy movement in the past 2 years? What are the practical steps in the new campaign?

The Yemeni Socialist Party and the revolutionary government consider the issue of educating the masses and liquidating illiteracy within their ranks to be one of the important, pressing issues to which the revolution is addressing itself, on grounds that it is an issue whose goals are connected to the strategic objectives of the Yemeni revolution, with its socialist horizons. The status this issue enjoys comes as a practical affirmation of the important, prominent status which the working masses and toilers of Yemen occupy and the active role which they aspire to in the course of the escalating revolutionary process which is unfolding in our country.

Our party and government firmly believe that educating the masses and raising their political and ideological level will not just enable the masses to participate more efficiently in carrying out the revolution's political, economic and social plans and programs but will also enable them to develop their political and leadership activities so that they may be able to bear their historic responsibilities in the subsequent stages of development of the revolution.

To embody the increasing attention the party is giving to this important, vital issue, the Yemeni Socialist Party Central Committee report, approved at the party's exceptional general conference held between 11 and 14 October 1980, reviewed an evaluation of the anti-illiteracy and adult education movement as one of the issues of intellectual, cultural and social action in our country and scientifically analyzed the results of the execution of its plans and programs in the past period. The report stressed "While we have realized great successes in this area, we still are observing that the anti-illiteracy and adult education movement has in the past 2 years been besmirched by apathy and a spirit of listlessness, which conflicts with the orientation of our revolution and previous party resolutions in this regard."

Proceeding from that analysis, and emphasizing the importance and vital nature of the struggle against illiteracy, the party Central Committee report which the exceptional general conference approved renewed an appeal for the prosecution of a comprehensive anti-illiteracy and adult education campaign relying on all the resources of political, mass and educational action and requested that illiterates and students give attention to attainment of the noble goal of this vital historic task. In order to achieve the successful consummation of the comprehensive campaign, the report stressed the need to create continuous revolutionary formulas and methods to guarantee sound guidance and enthusiasm for activities and procedures which will be organized within the scope of the various plans and programs for the stages followed in this campaign.

The report gave the mass organizations and party bodies concerned, the Ministry of Education, and the media the responsibility of exerting maximum efforts to make the comprehensive campaign against illiteracy a success, proceeding, in this, from the fact that the construction of our new society cannot be achieved without eliminating the curse of illiteracy. The report called upon our masses who have been liberated from illiteracy to continue their studies in followup courses prepared for this purpose with the goal of avoiding relapses into illiteracy and developing their practical knowledge. It also called upon our masses who have not yet been liberated from illiteracy to liberate themselves from this disgrace, which is not fit for people of the 20th century.

The report asserted "Our party's efforts in the next period must be directed toward the attainment of success in this campaign against illiteracy so that the working masses and toilers will be able to participate consciously and effectively in expanding and developing revolutionary gains and exercising their role in popular surveillance and in the leadership of society."

In carrying out the directives of the exceptional general conference of the Yemeni Socialist Party, Law No Nine for the Year 1980 on the eradication of illiteracy and adult education issued on 25 October 1980, and the resolutions and recommendations of the meeting of the Higher Anti-illiteracy and Adult Education Planning Committee held on 18 August 1980, the main approaches of the campaign for a 5-year period, 1980-81 through 1984-85, were approved following a period of evaluation by the Higher Anti-illiteracy and Adult Education Planning Committee.

In the past years, following issuance of Law No 12 for the Year 1973, we have managed to liberate more than 100,000 illiterate workers, peasants, housewives and people in the military organizations in the ranks of the masses of our people. However, this does not meet our aspirations.

Through a study and evaluation of the process of execution of the anti-illiteracy and adult education plans and programs in the past period, an observation of their results, and an examination of the analytical data concerning them, it is possible to list the causes, factors and obstacles which led to the low level of execution and results in the anti-illiteracy plans.

- A. The brevity of the stage in the preparation and readying period of which the plan specified in 1973, in terms of time and tasks.
- B. The political, media and mobilization activity bearing on the anti-illiteracy and adult education movement, which was below the requisite level.
- C. The inadequacy of leadership action in the anti-illiteracy and adult education campaign (the higher planning committee), specifically in the past 2 years.
- D. Social and cultural backwardness.
- E. Termination of the application of the previous law in 1978 caused the campaign to remain lacking in a binding legal framework until the advent of Law No Nine for the Year 1980, issued on 25 October of last year, which spelled out the party, official and mass staffs' tasks and responsibilities for making the campaign a success.

#### The Comprehensive Anti-illiteracy and Adult Education Campaign (1980-81 through 1984-85)

##### 1. General objective:

The comprehensive anti-illiteracy and adult education campaign in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen is aimed at realizing the following:

- A. The total liquidation of illiteracy in the ranks of the working masses and toilers by providing them with the basic skills of reading, writing, and arithmetic and the principles of national progressive political and social culture.
- B. Planting the buttresses for continuing education so that the educational, political and cultural level of the masses may be raised and they may set off toward horizons for adult education in its general, comprehensive, ongoing sense, in a revolutionary scientific content.

##### 2. The general framework of the campaign:

The comprehensive campaign is a system possessing revolutionary goals founded on a radical, authoritarian basis; this is the tested scientific method which has been proved to be the sole effective platform which in its ultimate results will lead

to a solution of the problem of illiteracy. The general context of the comprehensive campaign will be a political mass context founded on and relying on the political and moral mobilization of the masses, the mobilization of all educated powers, the alerting of all instruments of media influence and orientation, and the application of material incentives through the use and employment of all resources and powers of political and mass action, mobilizing them in constant, escalating fashion to create high levels of vitality and growth in the various activities which the campaign requires in the various stages of its execution.

In addition, the general context of the comprehensive campaign will be a reliance on the principle of scientific planning of all plans and programs and various political, mass, technical, and administrative aspects of action; in this, reliance will be made on the principle of centralization of planning and decentralization of execution, in order to guarantee that the campaign evolves in a manner which will realize its goals and provide opportunities for creation and innovation in the execution of its plans and programs.

In addition to that, the general context of the plan also is to evaluate all the plans and programs carried out in all of its stages, and various activities and procedures which intimately respond to the attainment of the general goals within the context of these plans and programs, in order to make it possible rapidly to transcend all problems limiting the attainment of the goals to be attained.

### 3. The characteristics and bases of the campaign:

In performing the task of eradicating illiteracy, the campaign is based on the execution of five annual plans. Each of these plans has the goal of eliminating illiteracy in the ranks of a specific segment of society, mobilizing various resources, and concentrating numerous efforts to work within the context of that segment. This concentration on a specific segment during each year of the campaign will guarantee that powers are massed and directed in one direction, since it has been proved in past years, in light of the paucity of human and material resources, that it is not effective to work in a comprehensive manner. Naturally, it is necessary that the possibility of carrying out peripheral plans during any of the campaign years with the aim of eliminating illiteracy in other segments in addition to the segment which is the objective that year, not be ignored: that is connected to the circumstances and resources of each individual governorate in the republic.

One of the important bases on which the campaign relies is accurate scientific year-by-year planning and a definition of the material and human resources which each year's plan will require.

Then the creative execution of these plans, in accordance with specific schedules, careful constant surveillance of all undertakings and activities, and permanent evaluation of them, will require the training of work leaders in various work and production installations and residential areas. The party and mass organizations will play a prominent, vital role in this regard.

### 4. The campaign period and annual plans:

The campaign period is 5 years, starting in October 1980 and ending in October 1985. Annual plans will be carried out within the framework of this time ceiling each aimed at a specific segment of the society in accordance with a special schedule.

Observations:

- A. In the first year of the campaign, during the execution of the plan to liquidate illiteracy in work and production installations, preparation and readying of various accessories, instruments and requirements for the comprehensive campaign will be completed.
- B. A plan for each of the plan years will be set out sufficiently in advance during the preceding year.
- C. The anti-illiteracy and adult education committees in the governorates will set out the annual plans of the campaign.
- D. Each annual plan will evaluate all its political, mass, technical and administrative activities and procedures during and after its execution, and its results will be announced at the end of the year.
- E. The comprehensive plan will be evaluated at the end of the period specified, and its results will be announced.

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PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

SUPPLY, TRADE OFFICIALS DISCUSS IMPORT SITUATION FOR COMING YEAR

Aden 14 OCTOBER in Arabic 11 Feb 81 p 2

(Article by Fatin Muhammad: "Trade and Supply Officials Talk: 66 Million Dinars and Increase in Import Volume from Last Year to Guarantee Continuity and Diversity of Supply")

Text "The year 1981 must witness supply stability."

This is what Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council, and prime minister, has stated, and what the resolutions of the Council of Ministers have stressed regarding provision of the citizens' requirements for basic and consumer materials and commodities, in terms of quality and quantity and in a manner appropriate to demand and taste.

What are the prognoses the import program contains to this end, in carrying out the resolutions of the party and the state? To find out, we had a meeting with our brother officials in the Ministry of Trade and Supply: the undersecretary of trade and supply, the director general of foreign trade, the manager of the Supply Department and the manager of the Statistics and Planning Department.

What Is New in the Import Program

In this year's import program, it is to be observed that the volume of imports is increasing; while it amounted to 180 million dinars in 1978, it has reached 310 million dinars in 1981, that is, an increase of 72 percent in 3 years, and an increase of 66 million dinars over last year, when it came to 244 million dinars.

Our brother the undersecretary of trade and supply states that this increase is aimed at improving the supply situation in the republic by adequately providing the requirements of the market, meeting the existing shortage in some commodities, and introducing new commodities. The development projects' share of the import program has also risen, from 48 million dinars last year to 56 million dinars this year.

The Supply Program's Share of This Increase

A question was asked of our brother the manager of the supply department concerning this increase in the program. He said, "This increase in the import program has consequently been reflected in the share of the 1981 supply plan. All consumer and

food commodities enter into the program, which comes to 170 million dinars in the case of supplies while 140 million dinars are for development and production. The share of foodstuffs is just 59 million dinars and that of consumer goods 43.5 million."

#### Manner of Estimating Consumer Requirements

He went on to say, "There are three indicators on the basis of which the annual supply program is set out, based on estimates of consumer requirements. These are:

- "1. The average per capita consumption in developing countries as compared with per capita consumption in our country.
- "2. The supply programs of executive bureaus in the governorates, based on their applications.
- "3. Actual withdrawals by each individual governorate.

"Care has been given to have inhabitants' requirements conform to population density. An increase in per capita consumption rates consequently means an increase in each governorate's share."

Is there any flexibility in making transfers among the various sections in the import program, in accordance with withdrawal applications?

Our brother the undersecretary of trade and supply talked to us about flexibility among import sections by stating "Council of Ministers Decree No 10 for the Year 1981 gives the minister of trade and supply the authority to make transfers among the sections in the program, if urgent need so requires, provided that this be done between generic groups and similar materials which lie within a single group, such as electrical appliances, foodstuffs and so forth. He has also been given flexibility to make increases of 10 percent in case of need, provided that that be done in coordination with the Bank of Yemen."

#### The Private Sector and the Import Program

Our brother the director general of foreign trade pointed to the role of the private sector by saying, "The private sector contributed a share by providing the market's requirements for commodities through an import program, at limited rates. The goods it deals in are goods which the public sector does not import, such as lamps, tea-cups, spices and household applicances. The private sector's shares are allotted on the basis of what it imported last year, in accordance with the market's requirements for goods, and the goods imported by the private sector are estimated by price and not by volume; its share in the program this year comes to 14 million dinars."

#### Goods Imported by Smuggling and by Expatriates, and Alternatives to Them in the Import Program

The latest decree prohibits supplying imported goods on the market; some of these are goods which public sector organizations might not import or might be different

in terms of type from what they do import. What alternatives are there to them?

Regarding this aspect, our brother the undersecretary stated, "The goal in this decree is the increased buying power these goods have caused and the rises in their prices. This does not consequently mean of necessity that the import program should supply them.

"One matter which must be taken into account is concern to protect domestic products. Responding to them through the program consequently means facing the problem of recession in the factories."

Our brother officials in the ministry stated that the solution lies not in importing goods through the import program but in:

First, having imports complement local industries which do not fulfil market requirements.

Second, improving production in local industries by showing attention to public taste. This has been taken into consideration, since the goods provided to the market via the import program are being diversified.

Conversely, there is also an increase in allocations of some goods in the program, as happened with television sets. The 1981 program contains 1,000 color television sets in addition to refrigerators, washing machines and video equipment.

Sometimes commodities are placed on the market which are rejected by consumers. If the various bodies raise their programs, which are limited in terms of quantity and type, what is the role of the ministry in determining these categories?

Our brother the director general of foreign trade replied, "The bodies submitting the applications are the ones which determine quantity and type; that does not mean that the ministry accepts these categories as they are, but that it exercises surveillance and supervision over import permits from various bodies."

Our brother the undersecretary added in comment, "We can honestly say that the other bodies are better able to determine the type because they are more in touch with the market. Diversification is based on many circumstances, among them the effort to being subject to the monopoly of a world market."

The market faced shortages last year in many commodities;

Could one consider that remedies have been set out so that they will not be repeated this year?

Our brother the manager of the Supply Department answered by saying "In carrying out the Council of Ministers decree on providing the market's requirements, so that it will not suffer from the shortages of last year, there is an increase in the supply program's share of the import program; instead of the 188.4 million dinars of last year, it totals 230 million dinars in 1981 (calculating fuel as part of that).

Our brother the manager of the Statistics and Planning Department added, "The increase in the supply program was no less than half a kilogram sic in each commodity, because consumption is 3 percent, as compared with a population increase of 2.6 percent; the absolute percentage increase in all supply commodities since last year has come to 5 to 6 percent.

"However, there are other matters which must not be ignored, and we are trying to eliminate them as far as possible. These are shipping and storage.

#### Comment

"However, we state that there is another side to the organizations' complaints on the subjects of loading, unloading and the delay in goods. Many of these goods are kept on the docks on the excuse that warehouses are not available. The responsibility is twofold, being shared by the port and organizations and government installations, and it will be remedied only through actual coordination and sincere execution."

We are embarking on the experiment of consumer cooperatives this year; such cooperatives require various goods lest they remain mere skeletons; what preparations are included in the import program?

In the next 6 months, a preliminary complex will be opened as an experiment in the al-Mansurah area; 4 million dinars have been allocated to provide various commodities in the form of consumer and electrical goods, cloth, readymade clothing, cosmetics, perfumes and so forth.

We hope that this experiment will succeed so that it will be possible to apply it more thoroughly in various sections of the Governorate of Aden and other governorates in the republic.

#### A Final Word

A final word which we must state before we finish with this subject is the actual execution of party and state directives. As regards supply stability, basic issues must be taken into consideration, and these are:

First, the qualitative improvement and quantitative stability of local products, be they industrial or agricultural, will specifically require intensified activity on the part of the responsible bodies in the Ministries of Industry and Agriculture and direct surveillance over their execution in this regard.

Second, the proper preparation of the annual import programs which will guarantee a basic role in governing citizens' requirements for various supply and consumer goods; these will require that the Ministry of Trade and Supply, with all its various agencies, prepare necessary studies on market requirements, in terms of type and quantity, and make careful direct supervision over the execution of the programs which have been prepared so that the import programs will not just be an annual duty which must be carried out at the start of every year.

Third, guaranteeing that the supply shortages the market suffered from last year will not be repeated does not just mean increasing supply allocations but also entails the sound forecasting and planning of actual market requirements and plans for withdrawal applications to guarantee that the commodities exist in the warehouses.

## SAUDI ARABIA

### KING 'ABD AL-'AZIZ MILITARY ACADEMY REVIEWED

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 26-27 Feb 81 p 3

[Article: "Developing Capabilities of the Academy to Meet the Fast Growth of the Army; AL-MADINAH In a Comprehensive Interview With the King 'Abd al-'Aziz Military Academy Commander"]

[Text] The peak of nobility and the summit of glory...a pool of knowledge and source of light...the pride of the Saudi citizen, object of his hope and object of his hope after god...instrument of the country and bulwark of the mighty...the King 'Abd al-'Aziz Military Academy: The blessed tree which bestows it fruit and reinforces our spirited army every year with the best of men and the elite of the heroes who pledge themselves to defend their religion, god and country.

The pen is unable to describe what one sees when visiting this strong citadel, and the manifestations of glory and the heralds of pride at an exalted level which the academy has reached, being distinguished in a short period of time by the grace of god and the success granted by him, and then the determination of the nation's men and leaders.

One would be surprised and amazed at what he saw, which would fill his heart with hope and anticipation, happily delighted with what the academy has reached in standing and esteem in all of its facilities--in leadership, administration and in all affairs and in the excellence of management and liaison, organization and regulation of all sections and branches. The country is fortunate in having this institution which is truly an academy of heroes, an academy of the brave.

AL-MADINAH met with Staff Major General Sulayman 'Abdallah al-Shabili, commander of King 'Abd al-'Aziz Military Academy, who presented us with a comprehensive review of the academy's facilities, institutions, studies and the benefits which the students gain during the course of study or after graduation, as well as the various activities of the academy and its plans for the future.

#### The Study and Courses

The academy commander, Staff Major General Sulayman 'Abdallah al-Shabili, says: "The course of study at the academy is divided into three parts during the three years of study. The first year is the preparational part. The second year is the intermediate part, and the third is the final part. The course of study in the

academy is conducted in two academic sessions, with the total number of weeks of study no less than 25 weeks at an average of about 35 hours per week of study. The course of study in the academy includes two programs: The "civilian" academic program during which the students are instructed based upon their specialization in secondary school in the scientific and cultural division. Courses in the science division include physics, mathematics and chemistry. Courses in the cultural division include economy, administration and the principles of physical exercise. These are in addition to the general subjects which both divisions study which include the English language, the Arabic language, psychology, Islamic culture, general geography, geography of the kingdom and political geography. This is done according to the specialty of each division.

The second course of study is the military program. Military instruction is conducted in the academy in three wings--the tactical wing, the weapons wing and the military information wing. These include courses in signals, weapons, field engineering, unit maintenance and map reading, military administration and organization, administrative affairs, provisions and supply. These are in addition to the general military culture courses which include military health, military intelligence, instructional methods, the art of leadership, military history, military geography, and small staff duties.

#### Entrance Requirements

As for entrance requirements to the academy he said: "The applicant must be a native Saudi born and raised, must hold a public secondary school certificate of scientific institute secondary school certificate or the equivalent. He must be no older than 24 years according to personal identity or a birth certificate. He must be medically fit for military service and must be no shorter than 160 centimeters and must pass a personal interview.

#### The Testing System

He then touched upon the testing system saying: "There are two types of tests: periodic examinations, which are examinations on the year's activities given during the course of study so that the student can keep in constant contact with the subject he is studying. These examinations make up 15 percent of the overall grade for the subject.

"The second type of examinations are the final examinations. The course of study in the academy is divided into two academic sessions. Some of the subjects finish in the first academic session of the academic year when final examinations in these subjects are held. At the end of the academic year the examinations in the rest of the subjects are held. The passing grade in military subjects is 50 percent, in civilian subjects 50 percent, and 60 percent overall."

#### Academy Facilities

On the educational facilities at the academy the commander in chief of the academy said: "Included in the academy is the library, science and language workshops, study hall and educational classrooms, athletic hall, cultural activities

hall, educational aids hall, testing section, expositions for the various military sciences for engineers, signals, weapons and vehicle maintenance."

#### Student Benefits

He then touched upon the benefits which the students receive saying: "The students are issued a monthly allowance of 600 Riyals, as they are also issued all the military clothing as soon as they join the academy. These are re-issued after a set period has passed. Food is served to the students in accordance with authorized nourishment regulations, and which is monitored to ensure that it contains all the nourishment elements of good food. The students reside in groups made up of nine individuals in barracks equipped in a comfortable and healthy manner, with each barracks having a hall for reading and listening. All the students enjoy complete health care inside the academy, or through specialized hospitals outside the academy if the case calls for that."

On cultural and physical activity and summer training he said: "The students pursue various types of non-summer activity through cultural and physical activities which the academy directs with special care. There is also summer training after the final examinations which include paratrooper training, which is optional training for those who desire it. In addition to this there is a physical training course which includes firing, swimming and safety, self-defense, and driving military vehicles. There is a yearly field trip to the borders of the kingdom in which the final students participate, which gives them an opportunity to train in administration of the units.

"The students enjoy a weekly break which they spend within the city of Riyadh, in addition to holiday breaks which they spend inside the kingdom with their families. The students are also permitted a yearly vacation of almost a month and a half in addition to the spring break between academic courses."

#### Graduate Benefits

On the benefits which graduates of the academy receive, Staff Major General al-Shabili says: "The graduating student is granted a baccalaureate degree in military sciences and is appointed as an officer in the army at the rank of lieutenant with a base pay of 2235 Riyals, as well as a housing allowance of not less than three times his salary and being no less than 12000 Riyal, a living allowance of 500 Riyals, a servant allowance of 200 Riyals, and a transportation allowance of 400 Riyals. He is also granted a jump allowance of 400 Riyals monthly if he is in one of the parachute units. Officers in the special forces are granted the same extra allowances, and the graduate is entitled to both of these allowances if he works in a special forces parachute unit. In addition to this the graduate has the honor of defending his religion, king and country, as well as the opportunity for increased training by means of foreign delegations in accordance with the system followed in the army."

## Future Educational Plans

On the future education plans for the academy, the chief of staff of education, Staff Colonel Sa'd Salih al-Suwayhan says: "The academy leadership strives to support the instruction by increasing its capacity and capabilities to meet the fast progress of the kingdom in all areas, and the rapid growth which the army is seeing in its various sectors. At the forefront of the matters for whose care the academy is responsible are:

a - Procuring faculty members capable of covering the educational needs of the academy--to meet this the academy is pursuing an official plan to prepare the nation's youth for this purpose.

b - Furnishing the necessary buildings, installations and workshops which are suitably designed and capable of holding the expected future increase of students--god willing this will be accomplished through the academy's new buildings plan.

c - Studies are being conducted to install a closed-circuit television system to cover lectures for which there may not be a sufficient number of faculty members, or when interest calls for the presenting of a lecture or guidance, or for certain matters for all the students at one time.

d - When the army achieves self-sufficiency in officers, hopefully within the next ten years, the course of study in the academy will be for a period of four years instead of three, as the other year will be a year for specialists so that the officer will be able to begin work directly after his graduation from the academy at an immediately better level and with more exemplary ability. I must not let it escape me to point out that the instruction at this academy enjoys the concern of all officials, headed by His Royal Excellence the minister of Defense and Aviation, the Amir Sultan bin 'Abd al-'Aziz. I hope that I have explained some of the important aspects of this vital facility of the King 'Abd al-'Aziz Military Academy, and I thank you for giving me this opportunity.

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'MODERN CULTURE' MAGAZINE REVIEWED

Beirut AL-NIDA' in Arabic 5 Feb 81 p 8

[Article: "First Issue of the Saudi Magazine 'MODERN CULTURE,'" Deals With Writing and Poetry; Concentrates on the Role of Repressive Authority and its Reflections in Saudi Literature"]

[Text] The first issue of the magazine, MODERN CULTURE, TOWARD NATIONAL FREEDOM AND DEMOCRATIC SPEECH, has been published. This periodical is published by a group of writers in Saudi Arabia, "under secret conditions, of which the difficulties and dangers no one can know, except those who live with them," as the introduction stated. The issue is currently being secretly distributed in Saudi Arabia.

In the introduction to the first edition, regarding the goals and mission of this magazine, it said that the idea of publishing the magazine was dictated by circumstances of need, objective and subjective. The first is represented by everything relating to the nation, its progress, prosperity and progressive development into the ranks of the civilized community. The second is represented by the feelings of Saudi writers and intellectuals, that they should be able to practice their intellectual, cultural and instructional role in complete freedom, in terms of spreading modern national culture among the ranks of the people, and elevating purposeful speech to the social and intellectual horizon. The magazine is to be "a truthful mirror, reflecting the concerns of the social situation and the aspirations of the future."

Among the topics, included in the magazine's first issue was "Culture and Freedom." This article deals with the question of freedom in the Arab Nation, and the shades of repression in Saudi Arabia. "The barbaric Saudi regime sinks its talons into the necks of writers and intellectuals, sometimes holding lures, other times in savage pursuit, and a third time by pitting some writers against others, in order to make them tear themselves to pieces with their own talons. This has resulted in:

- a. Lack of cultural trends
- b. Lack of critical methodology

c. Reiteration of self-concerns

d. Return of Sufism symbolism."

The issue also reveals the repressive Saudi authorities' role on the cultural level, in "Authority and its Reflections on Modern Local Culture." The issue's fiction includes "Death of the Muezzin" and "Toward Liberation, Visualizing a National Culture." The film, "Death of a Princess," which alarms the authorities, is a film which "condemns the situation existing in illegal Islam. It exposes many of the obsolete family traditions, and reveals some of the shortcomings and tabus. It is in a purely Islamic context, expressing the Islamic point of view in all of these matters. Thus, the childish media hubbub that the Saudi government pursued, with respect to the film being shown, expresses its fears about showing some of the life of shortcomings and senseless rules, which the authorities practise, when someone meddles in the sanctity of the royal family, its supremacy and its secret and public scandals."

This issue's cover contains poetry of Dr Ghazi al-Qusaybi, and his ideas: "Al-Qusaybi refutes the value of poetry, and its ties with the social situation."

In view of the importance of the subject "Authority and its Reflections in Modern Local Culture," and its exposing the role of the repressive Saudi authorities on the cultural level, AL-NIDA' is reprinting it:

#### **Authority and Its Reflections in Modern Local Culture**

Authority, in its general concept, is represented by a superior design, possessing many ways and means of control and influence, through its own power and its many institutions, perspectives and symbols from which benefit it derived. Therefore, its role, context and direction are expressed through the media, including press, radio and television, and cultural institutions, such as educational institutions, cultural centers, literary clubs, and "popular" cultural organizations, through forums and cultural festivals, and through whatever conferences and forums they are invited to or participate in, both at home and abroad. In short, they use all educational, cultural and social institutions for the purpose of getting their ideas across, and to firmly plant their roots in the consciousness of man, in whatever position he occupies.

The Saudi authorities, by their class structure, their reactionary thinking, and their regressive tribal form, together with the economic role they represent, serving the interests of world imperialism, and joining with it in many colonialist goals, try through their various structures, to dominate all cultural channels and social consciousness. That becomes clear on all political, economic, social and cultural levels. We cannot here study the reflections of the repressive Saudi regime on all these various, principal levels; we will only look at this role on the literary level.

#### **Literary Environment**

The nation boasts many writers, who represent principal trends, which can be defined approximately as follows:

1. Men of authority movement, represented by several older and young writers, whose presence, legitimacy and activities derive from the legality of authority. They express its aspirations, circulate its ideas and its repressive, regressive practices. This movement is a sycophantic manifestation which scales the heights of literature at the expense of the other movements, deriving benefit from material and media capabilities, which the authorities' apparatus and its mouthpieces make available to them.

Perhaps we should note the ebbing of this tide and its withdrawal into itself. It only appears at mercenary functions, ceremonial occasions, or in order to travel abroad to represent the ugly, literary face of authority. One of the most prominent representatives of this parasitic movement in the poet Ahmad al-Ghazawi, poet to successive kings, who on various occasions, are represented by other notables, such as poet 'Abdullah Ibn Khumays. Among the younger ones, two poets are prominent, Mu'aydh al-Bakhitan and 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Ashmawi, both competing with time to attain al-Ghazawi's standing. Among essayists, Muhammad Husayn Zaydan sits at the top of a list of panegyrists, charlatans and regressive people, using his assets and memories gained in the service of King 'Abd al-'Aziz and his retinue. Naturally, the list is long and includes a great many writers, both young and old. Juhayr al-Musa'ad is considered the most prominent young female writer, well known for her flattery and for raising distorted, regressive and impudent ideas on all levels.

2. The reform and neo-opportunistic reform movement: The reform movement appeared as a natural result of the regression in which the country lives, inherited from long centuries of ignorance, and intensified by the Saudi regime, which is distinguished by sanctifying all obsolete and sycophantic values and ideas in all forms of social, economic and political life.

Several movements have appeared in opposition to the tyrannical government. They call for reforms and changes. A group of these writers have been locked up in Riyadh prison, including Muhammad Hassan 'Awad and Hamzah Shahatah. This movement expressed itself through all available media, poetry, prose and by taking many stands. Despite the stench that the reform movement had in the Western province, Riyadh and the Eastern province, it is a movement without a definitive intellectual viewpoint, or an integrated direction in which to offer the required cultural alternative. The authorities were able to choke off its pioneers and force them to write poetical praise and prosy toadiness, either to protect themselves or to ward off suspicion, which they had not been able to keep away from themselves. We find the poems of Hamzah Shahatah, Muhammad Hassan 'Awad and others, praising the glorious deeds of the authorities and wishing them success and long rule. This trend has developed in the words of many old and young writers. If Muhammad Hassan 'Awad stands to the left of this movement, then many of the young and middleaged writers are on the right of this reform movement. This is despite changing circumstances, the appearance of incompatibilities, forms of exploitation and manifestations of backwardness. However, it praises whatever power comes along and any statement whatever that the state gives to its helpless people. It praises the glorious deeds and the royal noble deeds, which bestows on this country construction projects, from which influential capitalists in offices of authority benefit. Our people, in the cities and countryside, burn in their fire and conditions of exploitation.

Turki al-Sudayri, 'Abdullah Jifri, Fahd al-'Araf al-Harithi, and Ridha Lari are considered the most prominent theoreticians for the neo-opportunistic reform movement, which has revealed its face and has begun to lead the wave with impudence and malice.

3. The opposition and provocation movement: This movement's attempt to educate our writers is very difficult. Many obstacles oppose them, despite the importance of this attempt. The revolutionary content of the opposition movement has not yet crystallized, and its basic features have not been clarified. This is because of many reasons, including the lack of availability of books, and the iron curtain that blocks books, ideas, writers and intellectuals who represent the movement of progress and freedom, whether they are local writers or writers from abroad. The repressive and tyrannical authorities had, and still have, great influence with regard to prohibiting ideas and imposing rigorous censorship over the tools and means of culture and media. They still have their influence and intimidating laws, which threaten with imprisonment and torture anyone who possesses a progressive book or magazine, or rather, they lead him away from the border to a prison cell, in the event any progressive literature is found in his possession. Of course, this repressive, fear-inspiring role has its part in narrowing the circle of our people's progressive knowledge and culture. Also the media and educational and cultural institutions play their destructive part, which appeals to ignorance, hostility to life, and burying alive every revolutionary spirit calling for progress, justice and freedom.

This role is reflected on the cultural and intelligentsia level and on our people generally. Between the people and the partisans of freedom and progress a heavy curtain hangs; religion, customs and traditions are used as a means of deceive them and keep them outside the circle of life and civilization.

When we turn to define the concept of revolutionary literature, it is defined locally by the guarantees it carries, calling for man's progress and confirming the determinism of the struggle between the citizen and his exploiters, and between the prisoner and his executioners. It strives directly to ractify for the need of have scientific, cultural awareness, which arms man with the tools to advance him to a position of making himself master of social justice, in which class distinctions dissolve, and in which possibilities of man's exploitation of man vanish, while enemies of the people are defined, and methods of authorities and their institutions are exposed. Their mistakes can be used to expose them to the people, who demand the simplest forms of democracy and freedom for every citizen.

This movement has not yet defined its forms, because of the repressive, overpowering circumstances, under which progressive intellectuals live, and because of the impossible publishing conditions, both at home and abroad. This movement must learn its ways and means of expression, within the framework of the national movement and its progressive ideas, in order to anchor its roots, position and potentialities. It is all that stands in the way of barbaric, repressive authority, which only knows detention camps and torture methods. This is its way of talking with progressive intellectuals and with everyone who dares demand his right to live in honor and freedom.

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## Cultural Organizations

1. The authorities use their cultural institutions to advance and deepen their political and ideological structures, through those responsible for cultural activities in the Saudi Association of Culture and Fine Arts, in the wornout literary clubs, and through the program of universities and cultural institutes. They concentrate on the regime's writers and their mouthpieces, including bloated cultural symbols. They also summon mercenary writers from outside the country to deliver their lectures and practise their reactionary, regressive activities, so that they become additional mouthpieces, who sing the authorities' praises and bless their cultural institutions.
2. The authorities try through the institutions concerned, and those responsible for them, to penetrate the writers' circles, of various persuasions and ages, in order to learn what ideas they hold, and by that means, to attempt to contain the greatest number of them and steer them along the line of those who keep silent or submit, or those who aspire to tame them and rob them personally and spiritually.
3. By establishing such forms of institutions, structures, and formal centers for cultural and fine arts, it places itself in the ranks of states, which use culture, education and various of the fine arts to throw dust in the eyes, and to put an artificial smile on its face, in an attempt to absorb the demand for such institutions and empty them of their needed cultural and democratic content. The authorities also, despite all this, do not give the needed financing to cultural institutions, so as to maintain their facade only. Muhammad al-Shadi, head of the cultural and fine arts association, plays a filthy and shameless role to push the level of proposed adjustments to the lowest possible limit.
4. The Saudi authorities, like other repressive regimes, know the natural role of the theater in criticizing wornout conditions and exploitative relationships. The spectators discuss it, in an attempt to raise their consciousness and participate in purposeful and candid dialogue, spurring them on to emerge from circles of fear and regression into areas of light, awareness and action. The authorities know all that. They strive to keep out theater in its backward state, isolated from society, through their magnanimity, by presenting specific and very restrictive plays, which do not go beyond authority's frame work. Or rather, they try to use these plays to suggest to those to whom it may concern to sanctify the authorities' brilliant direction, to wish them long life and good health, and not to concentrate on the many problems faced by the simple citizen in his daily life, such as housing crises, cost of living, shortages of services, and the lack of a simple means of expressing such conditions as these.  
The authorities do not permit a person to play his theatrical role, just as they do not permit him, in life, to enjoy all the other fields. The theater was strong, but now it is weakened, due to regression and repression.
5. From time to time the authorities, through their institutions, call for festivals of popular poetry and folk arts, in order that the Nabatean poets can compete in praising the family and its princes, and the folk troops can sing

songa. At this same time, the state did not permit writers to meet together in their first conference in Mecca. They did not allow forming a writers' league. They did not permit any Arab intellectual, with the slightest hint of progressive culture, to enter the country. They want to keep this country as a theater in which they can do as they please, a piece of property for their authority and obsolete ideas.

These facets of the activities of the authorities and their institutions reflect accurately the relationship between the state and the citizenry. We noted the extent of distortion, regression and reactionism in the ideas of the state and its institutions, the laughing in their beards, the shutting of mouths, the quackery, flattery and intimidation. It is the relationship of a shepherd with his flock, of warden with his prisoner. It is a relationship against all the values of freedom and justice in the history of mankind. It is a relationship against the movement of history, but we as educated persons benefit from the events of history. We know that such a relationship includes one of several aspects of the relationship of authority with the citizenry, and that such a relationship as this, hypothetically, will lead us to decisive confrontation with the authorities. Victory will be to the people's movement, no matter how long it takes.

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## DESALINIZATION PROJECTS DISCUSSED

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 9 Feb 81 p 9

[Interview with Engineer 'Isam Jamjam, deputy director of the National Water Desalination Organization in charge of technical affairs and projects, by Isma'il Tahir Muhammad: "Large Desalination Projects During the Third 5-Year Plan"]

[Text] Water desalination projects in the kingdom are a significant achievement the importance of which increases daily as inhabited areas expand and the population grows, causing the demand for water to rise.

Besides producing potable water the desalination plants in the kingdom produce electricity which is obviously of particular importance for industry. The important technical experience and extensive opportunities for training available to the Saudi youth who work in the desalination projects are the main accomplishments of the National Water Desalination Organization [NWDO].

In the following interview by AL-MADINAH with Engineer 'Isam Jamjam, deputy director of the NWDO for technical affairs and projects, we discuss many of the organization's accomplishments and ambitious projects in addition to those we have already mentioned.

### The Projects Of the Second Plan

[Question] What projects did the organization complete during the second 5-year plan?

[Answer] Before answering this question, there are several points I would like to explain. The NWDO's projects are important because water is an important element of life. "We made every living thing of water" [Koran xxi:30]. Furthermore, the organization's other product, electricity, is important for industry. In short, from what I have said, the desalination plants are clearly important. When building these plants it is necessary to know a city's water requirements and to take into consideration its anticipated future urban expansion. A study must be made to determine the most appropriate site, blueprints for the plant must be made, and finally, the project must be implemented.

The amount of time required varies from project to project, depending on its size and on our experience. I can say that the amount of time ranges from 2 to 3 years. Now that I have finished this introduction I can answer your question. Several projects which were financed in the second 5-year plan are still being implemented in the third 5-year plan. The best example of this is phase 4 of the Jiddah desalination plant which has a capacity of 50 million gallons of water and can produce 500,000 kilowatts of electricity. It was financed and contracted for during the second 5-year plan, but it is still under construction. The same is true of al-Jubayl plants 1 and 2 which have a capacity of 220 million gallons per day and will be able to produce 1,250 megawatts of electricity. Some projects were completed during the second 5-year plan. They are phases 2 and 3 of the Jiddah desalination plant, with a production capacity of 30 million gallons and 300,000 kilowatts of electricity; the Haql plant with a capacity of 120,000 gallons per day; Fursan, with the same production capacity as Haql; phase 2 of the plants of al-Wajh and Daba; and expansion of the al-Khafji plant.

#### Saudi Capabilities

[Question] Tell us about the quality of the labor force in the organization's projects.

[Answer] The NWDO has several departments. We are fortunate to have as supervisors and administrators qualified Saudi citizens capable of planning and supervising the construction of desalination plants, as well as operating and maintaining them. Certainly there are Saudi and foreign consulting firms which assist the organization's technical personnel in designing and supervising the implementation and operation of these plants. Responsibility for implementation of these plants belongs to specialized contractors inasmuch as the purpose of the NWDO's projects is to produce potable water from sea water, either from the Red Sea or the Arabian Gulf.

#### Projects Of the Third Plan

[Question] What are the organization's projects in the third 5-year plan?

[Answer] The most conspicuous of the organization's projects which were opened for bidding as part of the third 5-year plan are: construction of a desalination plant for Mecca and al-Ta'if with a production capacity of 40 million gallons a day. Its electricity generating capacity will be determined after the completion of studies to determine its potential. Construction of a desalination plant for Abha in the district of 'Asir with a production capacity of 25 million gallons a day. The electricity generating capacity will be determined by studies and by the district's needs. The contract for the study and design of these two plants has been awarded to two companies which are occupied exclusively with the design of these two projects.

There are several other projects, such as expansion of already existing plants, and construction of other plants in the kingdom's coastal area according to the needs of the cities and villages for fresh water.

Determination of the priorities for these projects to be implemented during the third 5-year plan depends entirely on the studies which will give a clear indication of the cities' and villages' water requirements, and will determine to what extent these cities' natural sources are insufficient for meeting their needs for fresh water.

#### Additional Expansions

[Question] Will the organization continue to increase the capacity of existing plants as the rate of consumption rises?

[Answer] To answer this question I must make two important things clear.

First, the production capacity of any plant, either in the kingdom or anywhere else in the world, has a limit that cannot be exceeded beyond a predetermined amount that depends on the design specifications according to which the plant was built. A specific plant's production can be increased by expanding the existing plant. This option is currently being discussed with regard to the desalination plants. Take, for example, the Jiddah desalination plant. First, there was Jiddah plant number 1, which was followed by Jiddah 2 and Jiddah 3. Now we have phase 4. What has been done is that additional expansions have been made to keep up with the demands and the completely unanticipated huge growth in the population of one of the kingdom's cities.

Second, a desalination plant's production capacity can be increased by a specific amount by using complex chemicals to treat sea water which enters the evaporation chambers.

Therefore, the organization has conducted experiments, and continues to experiment with these chemicals at its plants. At its last meeting the NWDO's executive board decided to establish a center for research and for training the personnel who will operate and maintain these plants. An invitation for bids was sent to 37 Saudi and foreign companies capable of establishing such a center. This center will be located in al-Jubayl, which was selected for the large size of its plant which is under construction.

The production capacity of this plant will be 230 million gallons a day and 1,250 megawatt hours of electricity. This plant will begin supplying the needs of the city of al-Jubayl, the industrial district in al-Jubayl and the naval base in al-Jubayl during this year. Riyadh will be supplied with water through two 60-inch diameter pipes. This phase is currently under implementation. We will begin pumping water in 2 years, in the middle of 1403 (Hijrah). This center will be fully furnished with analytical equipment for studying the effectiveness of the materials used in building the evaporation chambers. There will also be laboratories for investigating the effects of the chemicals on the lifespan of these evaporation chambers. Furthermore, there will be classes for training Saudi youth to operate and maintain these plants.

## Maintenance and Operation of the Plants

[Question] Does the organization have the qualified personnel to maintain and operate the plants?

[Answer] The NWDO's responsibilities are not limited to setting up these plants but include something more important: operations and maintenance. During the first 5-year plan we depended on the companies for operating and maintaining these plants, for obvious reasons, such as the fact that there were not enough technically qualified Saudis to meet the needs. But during the second 5-year plan the organization's board of directors made the decision to rely on qualified, trained Saudis to operate and maintain the plants. It began to rely on them with the help of some foreign experts and specialists to assist in this work. Inasmuch as the organization needs about 3,000 people this year in all areas of technical proficiency to operate and maintain all the plants that are in operation, and will need twice that number during the third 5-year plan, the NWDO clearly has a formidable task ahead of it to create the various technically competent cadres. That there is an insufficient local pool of technically qualified personnel is no secret. Furthermore, these people must be trained to perform their jobs.

Training the personnel is important inasmuch as the operation of desalinization plants is a specialized job that calls for specialized skills. In any case, technicians who come to work in the plants who have never worked in such plants before, even if they are graduates of scientific institutes, universities and the like, must undergo a period of training to become acquainted with the plant's sections, components and principles of operation, each according to his special field and the job he is to perform. The training period required will vary according to the trainee's skills and previous training. This is a brief overview of the organization's requirements for training Saudi citizens to perform their jobs in a thorough manner. In my opinion, this is one of the most important tasks performed by the NWDO. We are creating a highly qualified generation of Saudi professionals capable of serving their country in this area. The NWDO will spare no effort to improve administrative and technical performance and raise the level of training so that the plant's employees can perform their jobs at a superior level with distinction and excellence. We do this by way of implementing the directives of his excellency the chairman of the board of NWDO.

## Desalinated Water and Agriculture

[Question] Can desalinated water be used in agricultural projects? If so, in which districts would such use begin?

[Answer] From a purely practical standpoint I see no bar to using desalinated water in agricultural projects. After all, the function of these plants is to produce water. However, the manner and method of its use are outside the NWDO's scope of operation. But a more important question is whether it is economically feasible to use water produced by the desalination plants in agricultural projects. The cost of producing water in these plants currently makes such use unfeasible. At this point let us not forget to mention that the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, through the directives of His Majesty the exalted

king and His Excellency the heir apparent, has shown great interest in the NWDO's projects, and has funded them to ensure water for the citizens of the kingdom. Therefore, the NWDO urges the citizens to make the best possible use of this water, following the example of the Prophet when he said, "Do not waste water, even if you are beside a flowing river" [compare Mishkat al-Masabih, Book iii, chapter 5, section 3].

#### How Is Desalinization Carried Out?

[Question] How is desalinization accomplished?

[Answer] The knowledge of water desalinization is nothing new. It is as old as man's knowledge of evaporation and condensation. But what is new about it is the efficient utilization of components in the design and construction of these plants. To obtain pure drinking water, sea water is pumped through special tubes to cause part of the sea water to evaporate. This steam condenses on the surface of the pipes which have sea water inside. The heat of the steam is conducted through the pipe. It cools, condenses as pure water, and collects in special passages where it finally becomes the produced water. Meanwhile, the sea water has been heated to the boiling point by the steam, and passes into evaporation chambers. The unevaporated residue is discarded back into the sea through a special passage after its salinity has surpassed that of the sea water inside. Another new aspect of modern desalinization techniques is that evaporation and condensation take place in the evaporation chambers which I have just mentioned even at temperatures below the boiling point--which is 100 degrees Celsius--because these chambers are able to withstand decreased air pressure inside them. In addition, the materials which are used for those pipes, chambers, pumps and motors are able to stand up to various environmental factors for many years. The average life span of these materials is about 20 years.

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NUMAYRI ADDRESSES NATION ON REGIONAL GOVERNMENT

Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 3 Feb 81 pp 4, 5

Article: "Regional Government Does Not in Any Way Mean Regionalism: I have Given My Life, Health and Youth to the Unity of the Sudan"

Text AL-AYYAM is herewith publishing the text of the speech the president and commander gave yesterday at the celebration of the People's Assembly body honoring the president and commander on the occasion of the start of application of regional government.

In the name of God the most merciful and all-compassionate:

We have responded to him, have revealed what is grave in him, have brought him people, and, through them, have represented him by our mercy and the memory for the worshippers:

That is a saying of the truest of rulers.

We have nothing to mention but the book and the verses in it; we have only God, whose grace is holy; in the guidance of the matters of our world and hereafter, we have desired only the desire of his face; we have striven for the interests of and among the people only out of a quest for his favor, and we have considered the effort we have exerted and the holy struggle to which we have applied ourselves. If we attain what satisfies him through the people, that will win his grace and favor, and if our efforts and holy struggles fall short of our aspirations, he is all-forgiving and most merciful.

Thanks and praise be to God from times previous and for times to come. He has commanded consultation and has made the command through people to people, commanding them to perform what is commendable and prohibiting them from doing what is odious. He has caused them to be punished in the hereafter and on earth for their activities.

Praise to God and blessings to the prophet of God, whose platform has been an exemplar and whose succession is an oath of fealty. He did not summon the people to do anything except what he committed himself to and he did not prohibit the people from doing anything except what he abstained from. He was not veiled in

sanity, was not raised on high but rather was he one who stood above the people by virtue of his status. He is the master of man and the prophet of the lord of the two worlds. Thank him to God. I ask him for peace and I give him zero in gratitude for his blessings. In the name of the people of Sudan, I thank him for what we have succeeded at, and in the name of the people of Sudan, I also in the same manner so that we may express our thanks. Bless our path, with success attending to our efforts and achievement adhering to our steps. Verily we pray to his almighty glorious presence that he may bless our cause and allow us to realize our hope of being as he has ordered us to be - an aid to the weak and wealth for the needy - with his blessing for the oppressed and his triumph over the oppressor.

Great God, what we have hoped for is what is right for the people. We hope for this, strive for justice among the people and aspire toward what is proper for the people. Great God, may your assistance be with us so that you may aid us in our affairs, lest we stray from your objectives, so that we may go before the people as you have ordered, commendable in word and commendable in deed. May the truth be our path, justice our holy law, your satisfaction our objective, for you are truly the lord and truly the one who brings victory.

Great God, I put my trust in you on the day our steps were consummated, as we aspired to draw closer to what you have ordered us to be, so that affairs among people will be through consultation. It is the day on which autonomy has reached the verge of completion, in which the rulers have assumed the affairs of their regions, and in which the regions have rounded out their ministers and cabinets.

Great God, I ask you that you will be an aid to us and to them, that you will bless their steps and our steps, and that you will grant success to us and to them for the sake of proper acts.

Greetings to them in the name of the Sudanese nation and blessings in the name of our masses for the efforts requested of them, the hopes fastened upon them and their hoped-for sacrifices, which are the sacrifice of the pioneers and builders of the past and the implanting of principles.

It is sacrifice for the present and a base for the future.

In the name of God, the most merciful and all compassionate:

Brother citizens, revolutionaries, men of liberal spirit:

Brother members of the venerable body of the People's Assembly:

I greet you, brothers; greetings to your immortal revolution, the revolution of 25 May, which, with God's permission, is triumphant and victorious.

I greet you, brothers, and meet with you and meet with our Sudanese nation through you, in a pause before history, indeed a pause for history, after which history will bear witness to our generation, to the things it has performed and accomplished,

to the successes and failures it has made, to the progress it has made and to the places where its steps have faltered on the road toward the attainment of its goals.

It is a pause for history, and I personally did not set forth to rule a nation, but, through my fate, I was assigned to draw up a nation which, you know and acknowledge was on its way to perdition and fragmentation before May.

It was fragmented in geographical terms, since the south was in flames, destruction and internecine killing, and the west was in a state of neglect which had been grown over the years and over which the years had accumulated, so that it had become alienated from its nation and its nation had become alienated from it.

The east was in famine, the north was in sorrow, and the center was an abyss of limited performance, as embodied in the al-Jazirah project.

My role, in the broad scope of commanding your course of activities, assigned by your free will, was not just to make an effort to assert the unity of geographical space; rather, it was my destiny to yield my efforts and the years of my life, indeed my blood and my life, for the sake of national unity which would rise above everything that would cause dissension and would emphasize everything that would cause unity.

In the vast expanse of your revolution, in loyalty to its goals and in commitment to its principles, I raised the slogan of national unity, raised it and struggled on its behalf -- indeed raised it and fought under its banner, and indeed I will still raise it as long as I live and indeed will fight on its behalf until victory or until I fall before it.

Your revolution, the revolution of 25 May, was not a burst of reform which exploded in order that its manifestations would be beset by corruption; rather, it burst forth through the will of the people and its base, which was in solidarity with its armed forces, in order to extirpate the roots of all corruption, indeed the source of all corruption;

In order to extirpate the roots of factionalism, so that sovereignty would belong to no one but God alone;

In order to extirpate the roots of party struggle, so that sovereignty would belong to no one but the people alone, without discrimination due to patronage, self-aggrandizement through nepotism, or inherited tutelage;

In order to extirpate the struggles of ideas, the ideas which have become obsolete through time and have become frozen with the glory of the ancient past without managing to have a vision of the present with its variables or the future with its aspirations, or the ideas which go beyond our actual state, our heritage and our genuine nature and whose thinking seeks inspiration from the land of others besides us, choosing to be the source and the seed of experiments which do not suit us because they do not arise from us.

This revolution burst forth not /illegible/ to rid ourselves of manifestations of corruption but to put an end to the tools and bases of all types of corruption.

This revolution burst forth in order to end factionalism and party politics as manifestations of the symptoms of tribalism and racism.

When the revolution called out "come to national unity," it was calling upon the citizens to stress their adherence to a nation and to the Sudanese people to stress their affiliation with a nation -- the great democratic Sudanese nation.

The day the revolution burst forth it did not burst forth for Ja'far Numayri, or as a result of Ja'far Numayri. It burst forth with the will of the millions who had lived through the repression and lack of dimension, the repression of fighting among brothers, the repression of struggle among brethren, the repression of narrow affiliation and limited adherences, the repression of people who had lived their lives, their whole lives, in the delusion that they alone were the masters and others who had lived their lives in the delusion, and in the notion of others, that they were slaves.

This revolution burst forth, indeed this revolution made a gamble, as it chose its goals, and chose the means for attaining these goals.

This revolution began its course by surging into the countryside, toward the noble heroes of the people of the Sudanese nation, who, throughout our modern history, were collections of people without a voice, groups without rights, millions computed in the balance of power on behalf of a given faction or on behalf of a given party.

Your revolution was a voice for people who had no voice, justice for those who had no rights, the tongue of people who had no tongues with which to complain of the oppression of the years.

Your revolution surged into the countryside, into the heart of the countryside, the desert, the forests and the wilderness.

Your revolution, with its leadership, moved into areas which the hand of development had not touched all the time it has been on earth. Your revolution surged to the naked people in their forests and caves, your revolution surged to the thirsty people in the deserts of their vagrancy, your revolution surged to the hungry people, the sick, and the victims of an ancient neglect.

It surged out to these people, and its banners were the banner of national unity, in whose shadow all people are equal, equal in rights and equal in duties, not possessing privilege by their proximity to the towns or being ignored for their remoteness from the sites of /illegible/. The revolution surged forth to these people and returned to them under the slogan of full comprehensive national unity, adherence to the single nation, the Sudan, membership in one nation, the great Sudanese nation -- not tribal or racial affiliation, not factional or party affiliation, not geographical or regional affiliation. Rather, through the nobility

of their beliefs, in their various areas, in spite of their differences in race, they belong to the entire Sudan, and it is to the entire Sudan that your revolution has set forth, brothers, it is for them it is fighting, and it is to assert their unity and to sanctify their greater affiliation to the nation and the ~~homeland~~ that it is fighting.

The revolution surged toward these people, struggling on their behalf and struggling with them against the old legacy, the legacy of regional fragmentation, tribal fragmentation, racial fragmentation, and factional and party fragmentation.

The revolution rushed out to them, and with it surged forth the resources it could provide for modernization, progress and advancement.

The revolution did not choose, as a criterion of accomplishment, the capital and its squares, streets, parks and playgrounds. Rather, it chose the desert, in order to build roads for it; empty places, in which to challenge ruination; and chronic neglect, in which to challenge the times in order to bring them up to the latter part of the 20th century.

The communications network, television transmission, construction of hundreds of new towns, and water and electric systems in the deepest areas of the east, west, north and south, are not just a demand for justice; rather, it is also through justice that justice is returned.

The attainment of communications among sections of the single nation, the attainment of equity in development, the reduction of differences among the various areas, the provision of opportunities to contact and move about in the Sudan, to every area of the Sudan, are the attainment of an economic integration and social interaction among the members of the single nation, however much their projects may differ.

While the sites of some major development projects have been set close to permanent sources of water, these projects, through their vast areas, their revenues, and the job opportunities for hundreds of thousands of people working in them, have broadened and offered scope for all the people of the Sudan.

They are in al-Rahd and Kananah, they are in al-Suki and 'Aslayah; they are the instruments of production, the owners of production, and the people forging welfare there for everyone.

Your revolution, when it advanced along the road to development, wanted, and chose to bring development, with its revenues, to all the Sudanese and not some Sudanese as a class. It chose massive production projects, chose giant roads and worked tirelessly in order to provide energy everywhere. For the new refinery, it chose a site midway between the south and the west. For the pipeline extending from Port Sudan to Khartoum, it chose to have a branch extending to the center, passing through the east and the north. For the new highways, it made sense to link their points of origin up to a national system for the entire Sudan.

Your revolution, the day it burst forth, had aspiration, the day it advanced, your revolution, the day it fought and struggled, sacrificed and fought for the sake of the unity of the Sudan and for the sake of the development of the Sudan and to uplift the banners of self-sufficiency and justice over all its areas.

Your revolution, as it faces world inflation, the insane rise in prices and the oppressive emigration which has drained away capable people and experts on whose training sweat and money were spent.

Your revolution, facing all this, realizes, at the same time, that it is clashing with hard conditions, but nonetheless it is less able to reap the harvest of justice from the fields of its efforts.

The revolution, and the true revolutionaries, do not look upon a temporary shortage in sugar here or there as just a question of demand exceeding supply. They look upon it as a case where segments of this people have not seen sugar, and, if they have, have not experienced sugar consumption, and are striving toward it today. While our aspirations are outstripping our resources for a while, there remains the glory of this revolution. It has liberated great segments of the people of the Sudanese nation from a state of affairs in which they did not own even the right to aspire to compete and to participate in consumption.

The same is the case with regard to textiles, the case of people who have lived their lives naked, and the same is the case with schools crammed with people seeking knowledge whereas 10 years ago the people seeking knowledge in the Sudan exceeded [only] a few thousand.

Thus there came into being in North Darfur for example, 115 primary schools, 11 general secondary schools and five higher high schools, in addition to a higher industrial secondary school, a trade school, a higher industrial school for girls.

The same is the case with respect to the increase in meat prices, which does not just mean an increase in burdens on the consumer, but, at the same time, through the law of justice, means the attainment of the producer's aspirations for revenues which are in keeping with his new requirements and his new aspirations.

The same is the case with respect to the rise in oil prices, which does not just mean burdens about which we are complaining in the capital, but means an increase in revenues for producers of oil seeds so that those revenues may be in keeping with and consonant with their new lives.

The same is the case with the shortage of soap, which I know about and admit has been the result of erroneous practices. With it, also, there has been an expansion in the number of people consuming these commodities, which until recently were restricted to a few people.

Through its justice, the revolution, when it turned toward the rural areas, realized that it was paving new ways of life for them and opening new modes of production up to them, and it led, and is leading, to a reduction of their experience with discomfort and repression. This at the same time is prompting us to redouble

our efforts to double production so that the requirements of all segments of our people will be in balance with what we produce.

Brother citizens, revolutionaries, men of liberal spirit:

When the revolution chose to embark on its most glorious struggle, the struggle to embody and realize national unity, it understood that it could not confront slogans with slogans but that it had to come up against a state of affairs deeply implanted and supported by an inveterate backwardness.

The revolution realized that its great goal, the goal of embodying the slogan of national unity, the goal of building the Sudanese nation, would not just be in conflict with party politics, factionalism, tribalism and racism, but that in the first place it would conflict with the influence of all of these, the power of all of these, the insistence of all of these on preserving their positions, their gains and their dominance over the will of the masses.

The revolution, brothers, which did honor to the commanders of its vanguards the day it burst forth, did honor to the confidence of its masses the day it burst forth, committed itself to what our entire Sudanese nation had ordered the day I presented it with my own person in order to achieve the unity of the Sudan and build the Sudanese nation, and faced me with a fate before which I have the strength only to struggle, indeed fight, for the sake of attaining its goals.

Construction of a single nation, construction of a single homeland is the embodiment of the united will of the people of the Sudan throughout the Sudan.

Along this road, I have followed through with my steps, followed through the day, the day of the triumph over Communist perfidy; I refused to retain power, all power, in my hands, on grounds that the struggle of the people and their armed forces, who crushed the plot and regained their legal power, had chosen me in fact, not to say to lead their course.

On that day I refused their noble generosity and insisted on returning to the people and the nation so that it could speak its word in a free direct plebiscite. That was my armor and my strength, the day I rushed forth to stem the hemorrhaging of blood in the south, to realize peace in all the sections of it, to assert its unity with the Sudan and to assert the Sudan's unity with it.

The will of the masses, as expressed by the first plebiscite on the presidency, was an assignment to which I committed myself, in spite of the protests of some people and their concern over the promulgation of the permanent constitution of the country, which would be the decisive body reconciling the people and the authorities, would indeed be the basis of the legitimacy of the authorities.

The will of the masses, the day they approved the constitution, was a new assignment to me to struggle to embody the stipulations of the constitution, foremost among them its Article Six, which states:

"The Democratic Republic of the Sudan is administered by a system of decentralization, in accordance with the stipulation set out by law."

Article Seven of the constitution also states:

"For the sake of attaining popular participation in government and applying decentralization, the Democratic Republic of the Sudan is divided into administrative units whose number, borders and names are to be determined by law."

This was the will of the people as stated in the constitution which the people formulated and approved. This was also the will of the revolution the day it burst forth and declared that the arena of its greatest holy war would be the arena of attainment of the unity of the Sudan -- its land and inhabitants, its soil and will. Our steps followed in succession along this road, brothers, followed in spite of all that was said to me regarding the dangers of the leap, the need to procrastinate and the positive features in moving slowly; my steps followed in succession, brothers, in commitment to the constitution and its provisions, to the revolution and its goals, to the masses and their aspirations, to the great oath by which I made a pact with God and the people that I would be on the side of the unity of the Sudan or would fall as a martyr along the road towards it.

This is because of my faith that the unity of the people is the trust of the people, which they preserve and look after; they alone are able to obtain it by sacrificing spirit and blood, because unity is the will of a people, the responsibility of a people and the trusteeship of a people who are responsible for that before future generations and before history.

It was my belief, brothers, and remains such, that the unity of the Sudan, which was fragmented in the past, the will of the Sudan, which was broken up in the past, and the soil of the Sudan, which was split apart by fire, war and bloodshed, that all this was the result of the absence of popular will and the result of dominance by the domineering and trusteeship by trustees and claimants to inherited good fortune.

My belief, brothers, was and remains that the will of peoples is connected to their unity and that the unity of peoples is a protector, barrier and guarantor for this will.

It was my belief, brothers, and still is, that we words illegible of some people toward us, and that we illegible only to struggle with those who impose themselves by themselves as our custodians, and that those people who are lacking in the ability to lead and the power to sacrifice themselves for the masses, in exchange for the confidence placed in them, are people who delude the masses and lead their course along the paths of narrow party politics, rejected fanaticism, covetous partisanship and oppressive factionalism.

It was, and still is, my belief, brothers, that the unity of the Sudan is contingent upon the unity of its people, a unity molded by the faith that it belongs to one nation, one people, one heritage and one destiny.

It was my belief and so remains, brothers, that the liberation of the will of the citizen from oppression in all its forms is the way to create solidarity between that will and its source, the will of the entire nation and the will of all the Sudanese.

It was my belief, brothers, that there can be no road toward unity of will except by liberating the will from all forms of narrow affiliation, regional affiliation, racial affiliation and party, factional and ideological affiliation, all together — all of which are affiliations that fragment and do not unite, divide and do not bring together and drain away powers to serve the individual at the expense of the group, to serve the faction at the expense of the nation, to serve the party at the expense of the motherland.

It was my belief, brothers, and still is, that the road to unity, which, of necessity, passes through the need to unify will, demands that power not just belong to the people, but that the power first and last be the people.

Thus our steps have advanced, stumbled and risen again along the road to the attainment of local popular rule, steps which have been attacked by the people who aim at disparagement; it is an idea which has been opposed by people who have interests in provocation while it is at its first step, lacking in positive features, whose negative features are prominent, since the people who have real interests in it have contented themselves with reaping the fruits while those lying in wait to ambush it have reaped the errors, indeed fabricated the errors.

Local popular rule, brothers, has been a step along the road to liberating the will, where power would belong to the masses and where the masses would be in popular executive assemblies on the provincial level, on the level of the town, the district, the section, the village, the quarter and the unity, with the masses choosing and deciding, the masses holding to account and following up, and the masses planning and carrying out. Brothers, I am here and now able only to admit that local popular government, as a pilot experiment, has not met with the desired perfection, a perfection which, while we aspired to it, can be attained only through practice, practice which imposes errors and proper acts, which transcends errors and stresses the proper acts.

Since the choice belongs to the masses, at their base, evaluation, appraisal and accountability also belong to the masses at their bases, and, while they may make a poor choice once, indeed again, they will not make a poor choice every time.

The masses which have chosen are also the masses which are able to any time to review their choice in the quest for what is the most competent and suitable.

The experiment of local popular rule, which has been accompanied by a reduction in central governments and the assignment of powers and authorities at the level

of the base councils, represents the degree to which the revolution has been serious in carrying through with the commitment it made to assign power, all the power, to the people.

The voices which have been raised condemning popular rule are, its practices are the same ones which have tried to corrupt the experiment and do away with it so that matters would return to where they were, to tutelage over the masses, to dominance over the masses, rather than power for the masses.

The revolution, in terms of time, is 11 years and a few months old. Therefore, in terms of what it has resolved, in terms of the legislation it has passed, in terms of the choices it has made, indeed in terms of the commitments it has made in order to attain and embody the people's goals it has, in terms of time, only taken a life which cannot be measured by life times of people's experiences.

Eleven years, in which we have managed to put the people in the position of dominance and place the masses in the position of trusteeship over its affairs, can only be a brilliant success and good outcome for which we give thanks to God.

Brother citizens, revolutionaries, men of liberal spirit:

The revolution, the day it sided with the toiling members of this people, the day it chose to have its course led by an alliance of the forces of its working people, realized that it sided with people who do not have a loud voice, people who are preoccupied with speaking through their action, muttering through their production, arguing through their effort and self-sacrifice.

The revolution, when it sided with the forces of the alliance in order to lead the course of this nation, formulate its unity, and build its united Sudanese motherland, realized that, it had chosen people who have nothing to offer the masses except what will serve the masses and do not possess the power of party provocation, group provocation, regional provocation or factional provocation.

The forces of the alliance are the forces of production and the forces of self-sacrifice. They chose, in their places and at their proper places, to be within the masses and of the masses, the voice of consciousness, not the voice of excitement, the voice of action, not the voice of disturbance. Your revolution, the day it was pleased to have its single political organization the Sudanese Socialist Union, as a vessel encompassing the Sudanese, all the Sudanese, chose, through this option, to close the outlets of narrow affiliation, whether they were related to parties or were factional, regional or racial.

Your revolution, which committed itself to the Islamic platform as a road and path, has made it contingent upon itself to bind itself to what God has ordered and what his prophet has set down, not to factionalism, not to tribalism, not to discrimination among people by affiliation or genealogy, not to the preference of some people over others, except through piety and deeds. Your revolution took its guidance from the great platform of Islam, whose most glorious prophet says:

"No one oppresses the people more than the person who calls upon the people to be in dissension."

The most glorious of all the people also says:

"There is no one in our midst who calls for factionalism, and there is no one in our midst who has died for factionalism."

Your revolution, the day it closed its ears to everyone who was directing tendentious advice toward it or was directing advice toward it in the desire that it procrastinate before starting its first steps toward the application of regional rule, turned away from accepting the advice, out of confidence in the people and awareness of the masses, their consciousness in the Sudan and their future, a future which will be formulated only through the unity of the Sudan and will be built only through the united Sudanese nation.

It set out, brothers, along the road to the application of regional rule, in spite of all warnings, those which expressed themselves in various forms and manners in comments and analyses concerning foreseen complications in foreign papers on the part of some apprehensive friends and brothers, some people who are concerned with the steps the Sudan is taking as it moves in leaps from the pit of backwardness to the peaks of agricultural and industrial expansion and production of mineral oil, and some intellectuals.

There are calculated risks in events taking place far from the Sudan, even though their basic target is the Sudan.

I have refused, brothers, to hear, because my trust in God is limitless and my faith in the awareness of the people is my shield and my armor, as I venture forth, with them and on their account, and they have a course which connects them to the pact that the revolution has made with them, that all power will belong to the people, indeed that the people will be the power.

When I presented to the Central Committee of the Sudanese Socialist Union at its third session, which formed a higher committee and specialized committees to study it, and what was then presented to the third national conference of the Sudanese Socialist Union, which discussed it, amended it, and developed it — assigning me, as head of the Sudanese Socialist Union, to take the necessary measures to put it into being -- was a step along this road, brothers, the road of the application of regional rule.

Similarly, the president took charge of setting forth a schedule in which he committed himself to take steps to put regional government into practice, starting with the appointment of the assigned regional governors and proceeding to the amendment of the constitution, so that its stipulations could codify the legitimacy of regional rule in the country, the setting forth of the Regional Government Law and the appointment of governors in a transitional period for which the national conference set out a time frame of a maximum of 3 years and for which I selected a minimum, determining that that should not be more than 18 months, during which time the appointment of regional ministers would take place and the regional

people's assemblies would be formed, and they, along with the regional secretariat of the Sudanese Socialist Union, would take charge of choosing three candidates for the position of regional governors of whom the president would choose one.

The measures preceding these steps were integrated with the matters following them, all within the framework of the constitution and the law and the context of the powers of the president.

Brother citizens, revolutionaries, men of liberal spirit:

Although the previous stage was a preparatory stage preceding the setting forth of the Regional Government Law, it was a stage of preparation in which our brothers the assigned governors participated, each within the limits of his resources and powers although they were all equal in the desire that the great historic experiment should succeed -- not through their great accomplishments, some of which paved the way for regional government, as was the case in the Darfur region, where the first building for the regional people's assembly has been completed, but, more important than that, by enlightening the masses and mobilizing them to perform their role and contribute their powers and resources to the attainment of its goals.

Regional government, brothers, is not an advanced step toward the decentralization of government: it is a bestowal of all powers and a consecration of all powers, whose employment must not be confined to economic and social development in the region but must be devoted to the attainment of economic integration and social interaction among all regions.

The Sudan, whose area encompasses millions of <sup>square</sup> kilometers, derives its unity, as it derives its power to forge its welfare, from the economic and social integration of all its parts.

The Sudan has lived through waste and fragmentation for years and years; nonetheless, and in spite of that, it continued, until recently, to depend entirely on production from one section in it. The time has come for everyone to contribute to the welfare of all and the interests of all, in the embrace of the unity of the Sudan.

When the revolution chose a difficult beginning for its course — by which I mean development of the powers of the Sudanese people, expanding education beyond its powers — it was preparing for the day when the Sudanese nation would be able to invest all the resources of the Sudan in all parts of the Sudan.

The revolution, which has raised the slogan of integration among brothers and has benefited and drawn benefit from dozens of giant projects, will direct itself toward the attainment, indeed the embodiment and assertion, of this integration among the various regions of the Sudan.

The Sudan belongs to the Sudanese; it belongs to them in Niyala even if they were born in Halfa, it belongs to them in al-Fasher even if they were born in Suwakin, it belongs to them in al-Jazirah and the White Nile even if they were born in al-Nasir, Kabyuta or Tawrit.

Just as regional government is concentration on regional development, so is it concentration on national development: there is no competition among regions, but rather cooperation and integration, no struggles among regions but rather mutual assistance and solidarity.

The united Sudan of the Mahdi is the Sudan of united coexistence. 'Uthman Daqnah from the eastern Sudan is the man who fought and conquered for the sake of all the Sudan. The martyred 'Ali 'Abd-al-Latif was martyred in Khartoum, not Juba, for the sake of Khartoum and Juba.

Regional government does not in any case mean regionalism.

Regional government is for national unity and the unity of the motherland in the first place.

The Regional Government Law, which does not include conditions for citizenship in regions -- on grounds that that is a right given to every Sudanese -- just confines voters to geographical areas alone, specifying residence periods for them of not less than 3 months before the date of the closing of the electoral list, except in the case of nomads and quasi-nomads, striving, however, through this condition, to enable voters to get to know the people to whom they are to give their votes in order that they may form their opinions through knowledge, not impressions.

Regional government is in essence and basis national government, and there are no specifications for voters and candidates, for members of the regional people's assemblies and governors alike, except Sudanese citizenship, worthiness, and the will of the masses, who have the right through their democratic choice, to rule for or against them.

Regional government is diminutive national government; the Sudan has belonged only to all Sudanese and the regions of the Sudan have belonged only to them all.

Regional government, brothers, is a step in which I have long warned of uncalculated complications, and when I gave warning, and am warning, I know the sources of the danger, I know the areas where the danger lies, I know the motives for the danger, and before all that I know how to confront it, grapple with it and eliminate it, indeed crush it.

Regional government, brothers, is a great historic step -- indeed, it is one of the gravest steps which the Sudan has taken throughout its history; it is a step to assert unity in the shadow of plots, which I know, and whom I know to be behind them, domestically and abroad, whose goals and intentions I know, whose schemes, indeed movements, I know, whose sources of financing I know.

I know, more than that, the price demanded from them and the price demanded for them.

I know this, brothers, for certain. I have long been exposed in person, and the Sudan has been exposed in its being, to the most arrogant plots which are always clashing with it, which indeed are scheming to thwart its major movements.

I realized this, brothers, the day we established the Socialist Union. I realized this, brothers, with the establishment of the Socialist Union. I realized that, brothers, with the beginning of the headlong rush along the road to development. I realized this, brothers, the day I signed the Order for the sake of the Sudan toward an opening toward friendly and fraternal countries which responded to the Sudan's appeal for development and gave the Sudan billions of dollars.

I realized this, brothers, as I was causing the Sudan to embark, for the sake of the Sudan, on the first steps along the road to national unity, the day I signed the Addis Ababa agreement; I realized plots from the outside, the light plots from the inside, although the plots outside and inside were two sides of the same coin.

I realized it, brothers, the day I raised the slogan of national reconciliation, following the suffering of adversity with its ramifications, which you know — an adversity which the Sudan's enemies today and yesterday have tried to exploit and use for their interests to achieve their imperialist ambitions, whose effects we see today not far from the Sudan.

I realized it, brothers, as I was going through a critical stage during the state of ill health from which God cured me by his grace and bounty. I realized it, although at the time I made light of it, because I was certain and confident that Numayri was in the Sudan, and not that the Sudan was in Numayri, that I, as a person, am mortal, and that the Sudanese nation will prevail and is immortal and triumphant, with God's permission.

Regional government, brothers, is a step toward a brave onslaught against the real state of backwardness in our great country. If the choice of your revolution had been the choice between reform and appearances, your revolution would have been able to turn Khartoum into a paradise and leave the rest of the Sudan to years of neglect.

Your revolution, brothers, whose capital is going through what you witness — a deterioration of services, a collapse of roads, and a crisis in transportation and communications — is the revolution which has managed, in the heart of Africa, to build the greatest and most massive dams, build hundreds of new towns, and bring television transmission, as far as possible, to the various areas of the country.

Your revolution, brothers, which has chosen that the beginning of the fruits of its achievements will be on behalf of the Sudan and not the capital, believes that the grandeur of the capital is embodied in the fact that it is a face of a country which is growing, not the appearance of a country which is frozen.

Dozens of paved kilometers in Kassala, al-Tazirah, al-Fashir and other capitals bear witness to the sacrifices by the capital which belongs to them, just as they belong to it.

The building of the regional people's assembly which has been completed in al-Fashir is proof of the fact that we are starting with what is the most important, not on

the basis of its position in the heart or on the periphery, but rather on the basis of its position as a precious part of the united Sudan.

Regional government, brothers, while requiring awareness from the people, requires more than awareness from the people's deputies — it requires their efforts for mobilization, it requires their participation in spreading enlightenment, in fact it even requires their lives in order to check attempts to thwart it or divert it from its aims and goals.

Brother citizens, members of the venerable body of the People's Assembly:

The steps the revolution has taken so far, in consecrating democracy, do not stop at the limits of your assembly's great performance of its role of following up, holding to account and legislating — rather, through its manifestation, it is broad enough to be a model for the countries of the third world without exception, indeed the whole world one can say without vanity.

While you yourselves are the voice of the people, it is the people of the Sudan who follow up on these voices in full, not in abbreviated form, over the radio.

While you have been and are exercising your role in responsible freedom, freedom -- full freedom — is yours, no wall rises up before it, and its scope is not violated. The chamber of the assembly belongs to all the people, it belongs to the whole world, it belongs to everyone who wants to hear the voice of true democracy in the Sudan.

The presidential republic, which has been approved by the permanent constitution of the country and which has given the president broad powers which are in keeping with the real estate and circumstances of our country, is a presidential republic in which the president voluntarily and by his own choice is relinquishing all his powers and authorities in order to confer them on the masses so they can exercise them.

The presidential republic, which has been established on the basis of the direct delegation of the president by the people, so that he, by delegation from them, may take charge of exercising all powers, is the presidential republic in whose context the president proceeds to delegate again to the people so that they may choose the governors of their regions after a transitional period, which the national conference of the Socialist Union has considered should not exceed 3 years and which the president did not want to go beyond 18 months.

The permanent constitution of the country, which has made the president a representative of the popular will, the guardian of national unity, and the person responsible for the unity, safety and security of the country, is the constitution which guides me to commit myself and orders me to be commanded to preserve and protect national unity and to sacrifice my spirit and blood for it, in struggle and indeed in combat.

Brothers, while I have faced obstacles and difficulties, indeed plots, during the course, I have persevered through my conviction in God and my trust in the people.

I have been patient and forbearing. I have pardoned and shown tolerance, and I have ignored, indeed even turned a deaf ear, to warnings of danger when I could see them and almost touch them, in the course that the mind would ignore the logic and that feelings of responsibility would triumph over all personal interests and aspirations.

No matter how patient and forbearing I have been, no matter how tolerant I have been and how much I have pardoned, no matter how much I have ignored and turned a deaf ear, I, brothers, consider only that in spite of all that, instead for the sake of all that, I can only be myself, Ja'far Muhammad Nafayri, the son of this people, its servant. I am honored to be at its service and to have the opportunity to lead its course and the duty of protecting its unity.

In all this, I can only be a soldier leading his people, or even leading himself a struggle and battle against everything threatening our national unity.

This is an oath of loyalty, an oath before God and the people, loyalty to all our heroes who were martyred for the sake of the unity of the Sudan, the homogeneity of the Sudan and the glory of the Sudan.

We, brothers, are not living apart from designs, in fact the designs have come close to us, and have even infringed upon our borders; we experienced their designs once when they were remote from us, and here we are almost feeling their designs upon us close to us this time.

We know the means and ways, we know the financing and the agents, we know the smuggling and enticements, we know the purchases of the groups and the purchases of the will of men, we know the goals of the people who have designs on colonizing the Sudan in the name of unity, we know the people who are working to sabotage the Sudan under the slogan of unity.

We know the people who are residing there, we know the people who are moving and provoking from here, we know the illicit meetings between the proponents of regionalism and the proponents of national unity, we know the experience of Chad, indeed, we are living with it, and we know the conquest and how it intervened, we know the banner of unity after the conquest, and how it was raised, we know the designs and we know the passions, we know the personal interests, we know who betrayed his trust the day he bore responsibilities for it but did not proceed to carry it out, and did proceed, if only to prepare to pounce upon it.

We know the voices that are raised, the old parties that are active, the tremors of despair over the factionalism that has been eliminated; we know the suspicious alliance among forces which had not been removed until we got rid of them, and have not been faithful to a promise which we still pledge loyalty to.

We know movements from one place domestically to another, we know movements from inside the country to outside, we know the broadcasts of guidance, the appeals to provocation, the puppet papers of puppet towers which imagine in vain that the time has come to harvest their repeated conspiracies against the Sudan.

We know that we have given opportunities time and time and time again, and have given them yet again, but without success, then have given them again and they have not borne fruit, and have presented them for the last time and it was known that that was the last time, and their movement was one conspiracy for the sake of conspiracy against the unity of our ranks.

We know, brothers, that the Sudan can only be united, that the Sudan can only be unified, that the Sudan cannot accommodate old struggles, however their forms may differ and their names may differ.

The Sudan is a nation and a homeland, and the era when the Sudan was tribes, races and bands has passed.

Regional government in the Sudan is a step for asserting unity, and I will never permit it to be a prelude to dissension; I have devoted my life, my health, my efforts and the bulk of my youth to struggling for the sake of the unity of the Sudan, and I am most prepared to embark on it as a struggle and battle for the sake of the unity of the Sudan, even if that costs me my blood and my life.

Brother citizens, revolutionaries, men of liberal spirit, members of the body of the august People's Assembly:

The first steps of regional government have made a beginning which I would not say that I had anticipated, but I say that I had often warned against. By that I mean an erroneous, comprehension of regional government, to be rejected on grounds that that is a sanctification of regionalism, a door which opens the gate to fragmentation and partition, indeed further dissension and fragmentation, because the Sudan, and the regions of the Sudan, are broad enough for proliferation and diversification within the whole Sudan and within each region as well.

The central region does not depend on the people of the White and Blue Niles and the people of al-Jazirah; it is broad enough for other people, from the north, west, east and south.

The eastern region does not just open its doors to the people who are born there and live in its embrace, to the people of Port Sudan and Kassala -- it belongs to all the people of the Sudan, from the south to the east, from the north to the west.

The Darfur region is not just a closed circle belonging to a single tribe; the tribes in it are numerous, the races in it differ, and the cultures in it are diverse. It belongs to nomads, it belongs to the al-Masiriyah, to the al-Ruzayqat, to the al-Zaqawah, to the al-Fur and to the al-Ta'ayishah, to the al-Masalit and to the al-Jabbaniyah, to the Bani Halbah, to the al-Mu'aliya, to the al-Daju, to the al-Salamat, to the al-Barti, to the al-Barqi, to the people of al-Natjar, to Bani 'Amir, to Oamar, to these and to other tribes, some of which have passed over to the eastern Sudan, central Sudan, western Sudan and southern Sudan.

Regional government does not mean regionalism, regional government does not mean tribalism, and regional government cannot be a rejected narrow group or racial

affiliation -- otherwise, there would be as many regions as tribes, instead as many regions as sub-tribes, with their different names and origins in the Sudan.

Coexistence, commingling and homogeneity mean, the balance in the context of unity is the coexistence the Sudan requires within each region, with each region, for the sake of unity.

Opening the door to regionalism, in its narrow sense, means opening the door to struggle not just among regions but within regions.

Regional government, as the revolution has intended it, as the revolution has set it forth, as the constitution has enshrined it, as the law has stipulated it, and as the will of the masses, represented by the national conference on the Socialist Union, has imposed it, means conferring power on the masses to exercise their legitimate right to choose their leaders by one single criterion, which is the criterion of competence and ability, the criterion of commitment and sincerity, and the criterion of loyalty to the demands of the broad masses which, through their affiliations, are suffering from everything that causes dissension, and, through their interests and faith, are oriented toward everything that unifies.

Regional government, as the revolution has desired it and as the masses of the revolution have imposed it, has been an appeal to the masses to choose to hold to account, to choose to review, to choose to evaluate, to choose through specifications to transcend what we have rejected.

We have risen up, and will rise up, to it, presenting specifications in which there is no group affiliation or fanaticism, in which there is no forming of blocs or fragmentation, in which there are no inherited glories, affiliations of race or patronage through connections -- specifications which are in harmony with the aspirations of the masses and the will of the masses to have power employed in the service of their interests, not to have power employed on behalf of people who claim the right to exercise tutelage over them.

The orientation of the revolution and the masses of the revolution toward regional government has been an emancipation from previous conditions and not a regression to previous conditions, not a regression to local administration, not a regression to rule by big families, not a regression to tribal oppression, and not a regression to racist and racialist notions. The orientation of the revolution and the masses of the revolution toward regional government is an expansion of the base of participation in power, to keep power from being confined to Khartoum, so that it would rule and control on behalf of the masses, wherever the masses are, for it is they who know their interests best, it is they who know their suffering best, it is they who know their resources best, and it is they who are the best able to employ these resources in order to realize their ambitions.

The orientation of the revolution and the masses of the revolution toward regional government has been an appeal to the masses to choose, indeed has been an appeal to the masses to impose their will, through a legislative assembly representing them in the context of the region and through the secretariat of their political organization within the region.

The people's option has been set out, without tutelage — indeed the option is demanded of the people, free of dominance.

Thus the transitional period has been reduced from its maximum, which was 3 years, and I have insisted on its minimum of 18 months.

Thus I have outstripped time, indeed our traced time, diminishing ministries and eliminating ministeries, among them the Ministry of the Interior. In spite of what has been said and is still being said about the risks in this procedure, I nonetheless have determined to carry out the diminution and elimination. I am not placing an authority in confrontation with the authority of the people, and not imposing tutelage upon mass administration. In spite of that, brothers, what happened in Darfur has happened; here I am not taking a position of holding to account or even of censuring but I am telling you, you who are the representatives of the people and the ones who are responsible for the sanctity of the oath of fealty to them, I am telling you that in spite of everything that has happened that my confidence in the masses of al-Fashir and the masses of Darfur has not been shaken and my faith in their sincerity toward the revolution has not been jolted. I am certain that these masses, although they have yielded to excitability for a while, are still concerned with the revolution and, above that, unity, the unity of the Sudan and the unity of the Sudanese nation. We, brothers, are not living in isolation from the world. What has gone on around us is not disconnected to objectives which have us as their target. Our progress along the road to development, along the road to democracy, along the road to national unity, are danger signals to people who have designs on us and to people who realize, indeed believe, that every step along the road to the progress of the Sudan, the stability of the Sudan and the unity of the Sudan is a blow directed against their designs to dominate the Sudan.

We, with thanks to God, in spite of the temporary straits we are experiencing, in spite of an economic crisis which has been imposed upon us as a result of worldwide inflation — as it has been imposed on the whole world — in spite of all this, are almost the only country in the third world which is building.

We are building roads, building farms, and building factories, and oil is bursting forth from our land.

Brothers, in spite of all the manifestations of instability which are around us, we, brothers, are almost the only ones who have been blessed with stability; indeed, we are an oasis of stability to which victims of instability are flowing across our eastern, western and southern borders at the same time.

Stability in the Sudan, development in the Sudan and unity in the Sudan, and the Sudan's orientation toward completion of the building of real democracy, are the principle and the motive behind all the plots directed against us from abroad and also from within.

Therefore, brothers, my intention, in my decision to respond to the wish of some of you representing the Darfur region in the National People's Assembly, was to aid

this to the previous cases in which the president responded to the People's Assembly, to add this to previous ones the day I hold this meeting accepted and reviewed the resolutions of your venerable assembly when they required review. I also had the intention, brothers, that I and you would have, or that I would have for your sake, the good grace to take the initiative of standing up to the winds of conspiracy against the Sudan, both those which originate events and those which exploit events in order to achieve their ends.

Regional government is aimed at unity and it will never be at the expense of the masses.

Regional government is aimed at the Sudanese nation, and it will never be at the expense of the unity of the Sudanese nation.

Regional government is aimed at development, change, and growth and will never be a prelude for the obstruction of the course of construction.

Brother citizens, revolutionaries, men of liberal spirit:

This is the road to regional government, the road which has the objective of the unity of the Sudan, to emphasize it, as it has chosen the unity of the Sudan, to crystallize it, as it is gradually, along the road to achieve its objectives, moving away from selection by appointment toward selection by the election of its governors, in a period not to exceed 18 months, through a base which is the masses, first and last, the masses in the regional secretariat of the Sudanese Socialist Union and the regional people's assembly, where they will have the option and where determining whom they will choose will be their duty first and last.

It is along this road that we are proceeding, and for the sake of this road that our steps are accelerating. Indeed, I am preceding you along this road, the road of handing over powers, all powers, to the masses, which is the revolution's fealty to its pledge, one pledge the revolutionaries have made and one pledge the men of liberal spirit have made.

Brother citizens, revolutionaries, men of liberal spirit:

Members of the body of the venerable People's Assembly:

My hand is in yours, we are fighting together, indeed we are struggling together for the sake of the Sudan and its unity, for the sake of the Sudan and its welfare, for the sake of the Sudan and its perseverance in the face of all dangers, so that its independence may be reaffirmed through its perseverance, and so that it may build its welfare and its future generations through the will of its citizens.

Brother citizens, revolutionaries, men of liberal spirit:

We are in need most of all, at the end of this talk, of the verses of God, of the messages sent down from heaven which we will read out, in order to reflect upon their meaning, which we will read out, in order to ponder their import, which we will read out, in quest of certitudes, for the words of God have been only certitudes for his worshippers, the trusting and devout;

In the name of God the most merciful and all compassionate:

"With mercy of God, be lenient with them; if you are rough and hard-hearted, they will scatter from around you; pardon them, forgive them, and consult with them on matters, and once you have made a decision, put your trust in God; God loves those who are trusting."

In the name of God the most merciful and all compassionate:

"Be pious: dissension will not strike the people who have been tyrannized by you, and know especially that God's retribution is severe; remember, since you are few, the downtrodden on earth /sic/, you are afraid that the people will snatch you away; your shelter and your homes are through his support and your sustenance comes from the good things; perhaps you will be thankful, you who believe -- do not betray God and the prophet and do not betray your trust; you are aware."

That is saying of almighty God.

Victory to the Sudan and unity to the Sudan:

May peace and God's blessings be upon you.

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## KINANAH REFINERY BEGINS OPERATIONS

London 8 DAYS in English 7 Mar 81 pp 56 55

[Article by Nigel Ash and Helene Rogers: "Kinanah: Now Open for Business"]

## [Text]

SUDAN opened the third largest and most modern sugar refinery in the world on 2 March. The country hopes to gain from the profitable sugar export business, as well as satisfy the Sudanese demand for sugar, which at around 40,000 tonnes a month costs the country \$1m a day.

The Sudanese £350m (\$700m) Kenana sugar estates at Kosti, 240km south of Khartoum on the East Bank of the White Nile, have been created from former scrubland where small seasonal sorghum crops were raised. It is hoped that when fully operational, the Kenana factory will crush and process 17,000 tonnes of sugar a day from its estates during the season giving an output of between 300,000 and 350,000 tonnes of refined sugar a year.

Creating a new sugar industry from nothing has been a monumental task. The cane is produced on 197,530 hectares of 'blue cotton soil' — land enriched by the waters of the White Nile which are brought to it by a 29km canal. Four pumping stations raise the water over 40m before they enter the estate's system of mini-canals at the rate of half a million gallons a minute.

8 Days correspondent Helen Rogers reports that it was only when she flew over the new sugar plantation that she realised the immensity of the project. 'The sheer size of Kenana can best be appreciated from the air,' she says. 'Hectare after hectare of sugar plantation lay below us, the canals snaking away in all directions. All around the edges of the sugar estates, the dull scrub serves as a reminder of what was there before. The green of the estates almost seems unreal, as

if someone had painted a bright green patchwork quilt in so much unproductive emptiness.'

The Kenana project began in 1971 when, after several years of negotiations, the British multinational Lonrho was given the go-ahead for a feasibility study by Sudanese President Jaafar Numeiri. Lonrho were to consider three possible sites for the project, one by the Blue Nile near Sennar, the other two close to the White Nile south of the town of Kosti, the regional centre.

After careful work, Lonrho decided on Kosti because of its good soil, the existence of a mainline railway within reasonable distance, the availability of electrical power supply at Rabak, nearly 27km to the northwest, and of nearby cement sand and gravel deposits.

In February 1975, a 'Founder's Agreement' was signed giving the Kenana project such economic incentives as exemption from customs duties and taxation for ten years. The major shareholders in the project are the Sudanese government which holds 40 per cent, the government of Kuwait with 23 per cent, the Arab Investment Company, 17 per cent, Lonrho with 5.5 per cent and Gulf Fisheries and the Japanese Nissho-Iwai with 2.5 per cent each.

The canal system irrigating the sprawling sugar estates was designed with the use of a computer. Apart from the mechanically pumped water in the main supply canal, irrigation relies on gravity. The blue cotton soil is clay-like and largely impermeable, and therefore the canals do not have to be

lined: the sides are shaped to a slope of one in three and when compacted are leakproof. Manually controlled weirs enable the flow of water to be regulated from a system of primary canals. Field irrigation is designed to last for a period of 12-18 hours a day while the main pumping stations which bring in water from the White Nile operate continuously.

The factory is divided into two units each capable of and running independently. Together, they have the capacity to grind up to 8,500 tonnes of cane a day 24 hours. Kenana's 14 mills are divided into two groups of seven. The plantation also has its own 45MW power plant which will supply power to the national grid when the factory is not functioning.

Kenana is to have a workforce of 15,000 accommodated on the site in a specially built township. The plantation has two secondary and two primary schools, and a clinic which caters to the locals as well as the workers who come from various parts of Sudan.

The estates are run by four separately managed farms, each again divided into four sections of about 1,000 feddans. These are managed individually, and it is hoped that this arrangement will allow for a close working relationship between employees.

Kenana scheme, as well as being the most recent, is the most ambitious.

By 1985 the Sudanese sugar industry is expected to provide 60,000 jobs. But the authoritative magazine *Sudanow* reported last October that increases in local sugar consumption and low productivity from the new sugar plantations had produced much disappointment. The consumption problem has been worsened by the half-million refugees in Sudan from Uganda and Eritrea. In 1979 the country had to import over 150,000 tonnes of sugar at a cost of \$f20.48m (\$41m). 'Although Sudan's self-sufficiency in sugar production has been predicted for years current rates of production suggest that the date has become very much a moveable feast' and foster a sense of individual responsibility.

However, though the Sudanese economy is pinning its hopes on Kenana, it is officially admitted in Khartoum that the five sugar production schemes formerly established in the country have so far proved disappointing. These five schemes are the El Geneid in Gezira and Khartoum provinces, the New Halla in Kassala province, the Dutch-built Sennar scheme on the Blue Nile, the Assalaya in the Kordofan region and the Melut. The

CSO: 4820

MASSIVE THREATS FROM ISRAEL, AMERICA, AL-SADAT, HUSAYN DESCRIBED

Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 3 Mar 81 pp 1, 11

Article: "Full Coordination among the Agents of America and Israel against Syria"

Text With integrated coordination, in accordance with the roles which have been sketched out, American and Zionist circles are putting their agents in the region into action against Syria as part of an onslaught whose goal is to escalate the plot against this fighting country and masses, on grounds that they are the force and the base of perseverance, in order to alleviate their resolute stand against the parties to the plot and to divert them from the plots being hatched against the central cause of the Arab struggle, the Palestine cause, with the objective of liquidating it on behalf of Israel and its aggressive expansionist policy.

It was clear that the activity of King Husayn's conspiratorial regime, and its involvement in the sabotage activites which the gang of Moslem Brothers is carrying out against our people and their institutions, which are concentrated in striking out against our domestic front, represent a link in a comprehensive conspiratorial scheme, so that if the domestic conspiracy fails and the gangs of murderers and saboteurs collapse under the feet of our people and their adherence to their nationalism, models and principles, they will shift to the process of escalating the foreign conspiracy, unleashing evils and calumny against this country. The Jordanian regime has been readied for this conspiratorial technique, now that Syria has waved the sword of Arab rights in its face, warning and giving notice that no attempt at conspiracy can get by and that infringing the Palestine cause, the focus of our struggle and the central cause of our party and the masses of our people will absolutely not be permitted of anyone.

The attacks by the Jordanian regime, with the deceptions, lies and vilifications they embrace, have underlined to the Arab citizen the real nature of the suspect role which this regime is playing in the Zionist imperialist design. The campaign of public Arab support for Syria on the part of our masses and the popular, political and trade union organizations and bodies inside Jordan and throughout the great nation have driven home the point that Syria is stronger than they imagine and that its position is a mass Arab position which the agents and their masters' schemes have no power to infringe upon.

At a time when the Arab masses have been sneering at the claims and allegations of King Husayn's regime, and exposing the campaign of deception it is waging,

al-Sadat's regime went out yesterday, on orders from Washington and Tel Aviv, to declare that Syria is also striving to sweep away his regime. This is how the forces of Zionism and imperialism renew themselves in order to support their regimes.

Syria is a danger to Israel. This is what the leaders of the Zionist enemy declare, asserting in their statements that the danger threatening Israel's existence is the danger coming from the north, from Syria.

Syria is a danger to King Husayn's regime, which has repeated the same statement as Israel has, to the effect that the danger threatening the regime is coming from the north, from Syria.

al-Sadat's regime is repeating what it declared previously, namely that the danger to its regime is also coming from the north, from Syria.

The movement of national forces in Jordan is occurring as a result of the actions of Syria.

The movement of the noble nationalist workers, lawyers, journalists, officers and soldiers in Egypt is occurring through the actions of Syria; therefore Syria is the danger.

We tell these agents that Syria's position, which is attracting the masses of our people in Jordan and Egypt, is indeed the danger which is threatening them. It is indeed the powerful barrier, because it is the barrier of the masses before the conspiracy and before its agents.

It is neither strange nor coincidental that al-Sadat, a week after Mudar Badran, should have discovered, that he is the object of an attempt by Syria aimed at eliminating him. It is neither strange nor coincidental that al-Sadat's regime should have said that Syria's attempt is aimed at government personalities dealing with Israel and that the newspaper MAYU should have stated, in the words of officials in al-Sadat's regime, that it is not the first attempt the Syrians and Palestinians have made against the Egyptian regime, but that it would be followed by an attempt to strike out at the Israeli embassy in Cairo.

The people who have emerged from Cairo shouting and repeating "Tell the traitor in al-'Abidin Palestine will remain Arab" are the same people who are preparing to rise up against the symbols of puppetry in Amman.

It is to be observed that the goal which al-Sadat's regime possesses this time, in joining King Husayn's regime in the hostile attack against Syria, is to stir up a deception campaign to reduce the volume of the popular uprising which is spreading over Egypt against al-Sadat's regime and his treason and to give the impression that the revolution by our Arab people in national patriotic Egypt is taking place as a result of foreign action. This campaign is also aimed at begging for imperialist and Zionist support for the two puppet regimes in Cairo and Amman. The common denominator which links the two is the fact that they are the agents of Camp David and the executors of the Pentagon and American and Zionist intelligence schemes against our Arab people in Egypt and Jordan.

In another area, international news agencies have commented critically on the role of King Husayn's regime in the American-Israeli scheme. These agencies have given us evidence material published by TIME magazine on 21-28 February 1977 and the newspaper HERALD TRIBUNE on 19, 22 and 25 February 1977 regarding the payments King Husayn received from American intelligence. The HERALD TRIBUNE said that King Husayn received big payments in the millions of dollars from American intelligence since 1957, when King Husayn turned to Washington with the transfer of influence from British to American hands, that the role King Husayn is performing in the American scheme is well drawn out, and that King Husayn is fully prepared for this role.

The agencies linked this open coordination between the regimes of al-Sadat and King Husayn with coordination with a third party, the regime of Saddam Husayn, which is allied with King Husayn and the role he is playing.

JAMAHIRIYAH NEWS AGENCY has stated that the Egyptian regime is shipping arms to Iraq through the Jordanian port of al-'Aqabah. The agency mentioned the name of the officer to whom the task has been assigned, Col 'Abd-al-Mu'ti Sa'id Mahmud, who arrived with a ship flying the flag of a foreign country and bringing arms and equipment.

11887

CSO: 4802

SYRIA

BA'TH PARTY OFFICIAL RECEIVES PFLD DELEGATION

JN011810 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1615 CMT 1 Apr 81

[Text] Comrade 'Abdallah al-Ahmar, Ba'th Party assistant secretary general, received at noon today the PFLD delegation led by Comrade 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qadi, chairman of the PFLD Central Executive Committee.

The delegation head submitted a report on the tribulations of the Omani people under the Qabus regime, which has allied itself with U.S. imperialism and reaction as evidenced by the establishment of U.S. bases in Oman and the development of relations with traitor al-Sadat's regime and agent King Husayn.

Comrade al-Ahmar explained the Ba'th Party's stand on the agent regime of Sultan Qabus and the role Syria is playing to confront agents, imperialism, Zionism and reaction. Comrade al-Ahmar also reiterated the support of the party and its revolution for the Omani people and their struggle against the U.S. bases and the regime of Qabus, who has betrayed the Arab nation.

The delegation members expressed appreciation for Syria's steadfastness in the face of the Zionist-reactionary aggression and the reactionary conspiracy. They also stressed that they will stand together in the struggle to foil the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary scheme against the Arab nation.

The second session of talks was held this morning between the Ba'th Party and the PFLD delegations. The two sides completed the exchange of viewpoints on developments in the Arab region in light of the escalated imperialist-Zionist-reactionary onslaught against the Arab homeland.

CSO: 4802

NEW REFINERY OPENS IN BANIYAS, MEETS DOMESTIC DEMAND

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 3 Mar 81 p 3

Article: "For the First Time in the History of the Country, the Baniyas Refinery Operates with a National Staff"

Text As a result of numerous continuous meetings among the management of the Baniyas refinery, its technical staff and all the people working in it, and their zeal to operate it in the optimum manner, and as a result of a rise in the level of training and qualification of the people working in the refinery, the refinery, with its completed units, has been operated and started up by Syrian Arab staffs for the first time. This is to be considered a distinctive development which Syrian Arab workers have achieved and you can see the unremitting feelings of joy and optimism on their faces and see their high spirit of morale dominating work relations at this time.

In addition, the management and technical staff of the refinery are earnestly working to continue the job and avoid shutting the refinery down for any reason. In this particular period the harmony, cooperation and full coordination between the refinery management and the Rumanian party may clearly be observed. That may be ascribed to the fact that the refinery management is striving to have the mentality of its pioneer, the General Department and the Refinery Operating Department, dominant between the two parties, and to realize the economic return for whose sake the refinery was built.

In addition, the Baniyas refinery managed to process 1.72 million tons of oil in 1980 and supplied:

22 tons sic of liquid butane gas.

375 tons of heavy fuel oil.

946 tons of light fuel oil.

360 tons of naphtha.

It is now supplying the domestic market with:

135 tons of liquid butane gas.

1,370 tons of heavy fuel oil.

In addition to the naphtha and light fuel oil destined for export, the refinery also produces five different types of asphalt, three of which are now being produced in the Syrian Arab Republic for the first time.

As a result of the current level of the refinery's liquid butane gas production, it will be possible to cover the deficit which the domestic market is suffering from in gas, save large amounts of foreign currency, spare such difficulties in providing it as unloading it from ships and transporting it, and so forth.

When Dr Khalid Fattah was asked about the profits which the refinery project is realizing for the government treasury, he replied, "In view of the lack of stability in prices, we feel that we are giving the government treasury a high income; it is certain that this figure will rise when the remainder of the units are put into operation, the refinery is delivered to us in full in the near future and other oil products are produced.

#### Overcoming the Pollution Problem

"As regards the matter of the refinery's contribution to pollution, which the newspaper previously brought up, it is worth pointing out that when the refinery is operating with all its units, the rate of exhaust emitted by it will automatically decline, contrary to what the citizens imagine, which is that the exhaust will increase when the refinery is operating at full capacity, because when it is at full capacity the noxious emissions will be absorbed by some units.

"Until full operation takes place, management is reducing the surplus gases by 70 percent by treating them with water and burning them in the furnaces.

"The refinery management has also been corresponding with numerous foreign specialized companies in order to use their expertise in reducing air pollution. Regarding pollution of the sea, the refinery management is now studying the bids presented to it to establish a unit to treat the polluted water before it goes into the sea. Construction will start on this project in the second half of the current year and its cost is estimated at about 25 million Syrian pounds."

#### Training Domestic Experts

In the course of talking about the immensity of the project, Dr Khalid Fattah pointed out, "Because we deal with modern technology, including, for example, the construction of technical units operating in the country for the first time, our country does not have a background of technical experience in this field and it will be necessary at the outset to seek the recourse of foreign technical assistance to cover some specialized fields. Domestic engineers will be sent abroad to follow courses of specialization for special periods, and domestic staffs will be trained in practice under the supervision of foreign experts. This method has the effect of giving domestic staffs great expertise in less time.

#### The Residential Community

"The General Industrial Projects Execution Company has started the process of leveling the soil at the site of the residential community for refinery workers. The

project territory lies on the al-Qatmus road 3 kilometers from the refinery, and it will contain 500 residential units for the leadership and technical staff. The project will be completed in 3 years and will cost about 55 million Syrian pounds.

#### The Main Importance of the Refinery

"It is worth pointing out that, after the great Euphrates Dam, the Baniyas refinery is considered to be one of the most important achievements of the 8 March revolution and also one of the most important achievements of the blessed Corrective Step -- in the economic field, of course. It is also considered the first refinery in the Middle East, since its refining capacity will total 6 million tons per year. It is worth pointing out that total capital of 1.5 billion Syrian pounds has been allotted to the refinery project in general.

#### Workers Pledge Optimum Operation of the Refinery

"All the workers in the Baniyas refinery have pledged optimum operation of the refinery, in accordance with the directives of the comrade secretary general of the party, the fighting commander Hafiz al-Assad, and the resolutions of the seventh regional conference of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party."

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CSO: 4802

SYRIA

BRIEFS

AL-SA'IQAH OFFICIAL MEETS SOMALI DELEGATION--Damascus-- Comrade 'Isam al-Qadi, Ba'ath Party national command member and al-Sa'Iqah secretary general, has received a Somali Salvation Front delegation led by front Secretary General ('Abdallah Yusruf). Both sides discussed the struggle the front is waging against the ruling regime of Siad Barre in Somalia which has permitted the United States to establish military bases in Somalia to strike at liberation movements in Africa. The two sides also reviewed the situation in the Horn of Africa and U.S. attempts to strike at the people's trend, which is hostile to colonialism and neocolonialism. Comrade al-Qadi spoke about the political developments in the Arab area. He said that the U.S. scheme aims at weakening the steadfastness of Arab Syria and that of the Palestinian resistance and at dealing blows to Arab and African liberation movements in an attempt to control the area's resources. [Text] [JN020705 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 2115 GMT 1 Apr 81]

CSO: 4802

TUNISIA

BRIEFS

HIGH TECHNOLOGY--Tunisia hopes to develop high technology industries with increased foreign investment. The recent appointment of Moncef ben Abdallah as head of the Agency for the Promotion of Investments (API), set up in 1972, indicates that new efforts will be made to attract foreign investors to Tunisia. The API is seeking to adapt the current legislation in order to attract more investors. It wants to divide the national territory into five specific areas, and depending on the priorities in these sectors, industrialists would benefit from tax exemptions on profits from 3-7 years and also win substantial subsidies. The Agency also intends to favour investment in high technology industrial sectors such as the petrochemical, food, mechanical, pharmaceutica' and textile industries. Other benefits will be granted to exporting industries set up in Tunisia, on condition that at least half their capital is controlled by Tunisia. The aim is to encourage foreign industrialists to transfer their technologies to Tunisia by involving them in the country's industrial policy. The biggest move has been made in the car industry sector, with an invitation to foreign manufacturers to redeploy their industrial capacities in Tunisia. The French company Peugeot is already out to reach an agreement with the Tunisian Car Industry Company (STIA). [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English 21 Mar 81 pp 38-39]

TALKS WITH ITALIAN PREMIER--Yesterday in the late morning, Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali had a 1-hour talk with his Italian opposite number Arnaldo Forlani in Rome. "This friendly meeting has given us an excellent opportunity to discuss various aspects of Tunisian-Italian cooperation and study likely ways to develop it further to the advantage of both countries," the prime minister stated at the end of the meeting. Mr Mzali added that he had discussed with the Italian prime minister the situation in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the world. "I was very pleased to ascertain," Mr Mzali continued, "that Prime Minister Fornali is in favor of strengthening his country's cooperation with Tunisia and I hope that thanks to him a new impetus will be given to this cooperation and, consequently, to friendship between the two countries." Let us add that Mr Mohamed Mzali returned to Tunis from Rome yesterday at 2000 hours. [Excerpts] [LD311151 Tunis L'ACTION in French 26 Mar 81 p 4]

IN PARTING SOVIET AMBASSADOR--President Bourguiba today received the French ambassador to Tunisia. He also received the Soviet ambassador, Boris Kolokolov, who called on the president to bid him farewell at the end of his tour of duty in Tunisia. Mrs Bourguiba received the wife of the Soviet ambassador who called on her to say goodbye. [LD241128 Tunis Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 22 Mar 81]

WESTERN SAHARA

BRIEFS

ATTACK ON INVADING FORCES--Saharan fighters have just launched a fresh attack at (Umm Ghurayb), between Guelta Zemmour and Buc Raa. Saharan minister of information explains: [Begin recording] This attack is part of the offensive which liberated Guelta Zemmour. During the liberation of Guelta Zemmour, 310 Moroccans were killed, and much material--trucks and jeeps--captured. Reinforcements sent from Bou Craa were unable to arrive because they were ambushed at (Umm Ghurayb). These forces were attacked on 26 and 27 March, again on 28 March, and once more on 30 March. Many soldiers were killed and a large amount of arms destroyed. [End recording] [Summary] [LD011734 Algiers Domestic Service in French 1300 GMT 1 Apr 81]

CSO: 4400

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

BUREAU OF SUPPLY DEEPLY INVOLVED IN SETTING, MONITORING FOOD PRICES

San'a' AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 9 Feb 81 p 5

[Interview with the director general of the Bureau fo Supply and Trade by 'Abd-al-Wahhab Muhammad al-Ruhani, date and place not given]

[Text] Supply in our country, and in any country proceeding along the course of building a genuine economic base, is to be considered the vital nerve of life and a fundamental starting place for building a quiet and serene social life that will give the people means of livelihood that will give a person a comfortable life under a free, democratic course pursuing a policy based on a patriotic thrust arising from a genuine understanding of how to serve the vital interests of the members of the social order. This is so that we may also ensure a member of the society a logical harmony between his daily income in a living standard within the society in conformity with the ambitious development plans charted by the state and the government which are fundamentally aimed at moving the country toward peace and prosperity.

Under the aegis of the free, democratic thrust in the light of which our wise leadership is proceeding and which centers around the desires and needs of the people, the leadership is striving to create this society of which we are speaking and which all sectors of society yearn to create, particularly having fought vicious battles against obsolete legacies which starved the people and spread ignorance and disease.

One thing certain is that our revolution emerged only on the basis of a revolutionary fountainhead deeply rooted among its various sectors. I have been able to lay out the systems designed to rebuild the people and homeland of Yemen but one can say that this legitimate ambition will not be realized unless there is cooperation from top to bottom based on a genuine understanding of the concerns and problems which still stand in our way and which are still very thorny.

As the populace as a whole senses, our leadership is taking firm and powerful steps to overcome all difficulties and to eliminate all obstacles facing the ambitious developmental thrust of our country through development plans designed to set in motion the developmental course and to proceed toward the wellbeing and intereses of this society, as our leadership has proven to us in our first 5-year plan and will prove to us in coming 5-year plans which will certainly

involve improvement of all aspects of life in our country. We consider the most important and significant of these aspects to be the supply machinery which is closely and directly linked with the interests and essential needs of the people.

The proximity of this aspect of service to the citizen means a great deal when we spotlight the active and important role played by the Ministry of Supply and Trade as represented in its operational branches in various areas of the republic working to satisfy the desires of the public and to provide the essential commodities which must be available in the local market.

Accordingly, so that we might produce some facts and dot some i's for people who are wondering about some obscure or ambiguous points which require the supply machinery to clarify, I went to the Bureau of Supply and Trade in San'a' to do this.

There, while I was thinking first about collecting some information about this service machinery to give me a well-rounded picture to enable me to raise important questions, before I got this done, I came face to face with the director general of the Bureau of Supply and Trade, Brother 'Ali Ahmad al-Sayyaghi, with whom I have an interview as follows:

#### The Local Market and How Its Problems Are Studied

[Question] It is a fact that foodstuffs are constantly increasing but citizens also complain of the negative role played by wholesale and retail and wholesale merchants toward the poor citizen who is a victim in the face of the greed of those who generally control the local foodstuffs market.

[Answer] In explaining the positive role played by the Bureau of Supply in stopping these negative aspects, the director general of the Bureau of Supply and Trade in San'a' says:

The Supply Bureau is always striving to eliminate such abnormal manifestations in cooperation with sincerely patriotic elements, working to achieve this goal sought by citizens. Accordingly, the bureau has taken serious steps and has formed committees comprising active elements from wholesale, import and retail merchants, middlemen, grocers, butchers and qat venders. As the result of the formation of these committees, weekly meetings are held during which there is discussion of commodity prices and the availability of essential commodities in the local market. In light of this, we naturally study the problems of the market from every angle, principally establishing prices in a manner as to ensure that reasonable prices are set for wholesale merchants and then in turn, retail merchants, while insuring for us that no opportunities are afforded to those who let themselves be seduced into making a living at the expense of citizens and stealing his money illegally.

This is accomplished first by getting precise information on the original cost of goods to be priced and then determining the legal profit after ascertaining the overall climate of the market. On the basis of this, as is known, we distribute labels and put them on every commodity to show their legal price as set by these committees formed for that purpose.

I believe that through this, we certainly ensure that the citizen encounters no trickery or pricegouging while also ensuring that the wholesale and retail merchants make a reasonable profit. One can also say that we cannot confirm how long this system will stay in effect unless citizens firmly support it and cooperate with us in searching out and eliminating cheats.

#### Local Products Not Subject to Price Fixing

With regard to policy toward local products, Brother 'Ali Ahmad al-Sayyahi says that the Bureau of Supply pursues an approach of encouraging local production of fruit and vegetables and, therefore, one can say that they are practically not subject to price fixing. He says that the reason for this is that there are middlemen involved in handling receipts from various areas of the republic who go to the market and gauge the activity or stagnation there and, accordingly, set the appropriate price which is naturally approved and is effective for a week only. I should not forget to add that this role of the middlemen is based on payment of a sum not to exceed 10 percent of each commodity defined by the Bureau of Supply and the role of the bureau is only to monitor implementation of this established price for a given period.

#### Importation Must Be Guided

The director general returned to the problems of the local market, saying: the main problem is the lack of specialists who can be assigned to study things and, usually, the result of the lack of this important aspect is that supply is greater than demand, causing bankruptcy among the wholesalers. In our opinion, this is to be considered the major problem facing our local markets.

Therefore, importation must be guided through skilled specialists and by engaging in the necessary research so that we can eliminate this dilemma facing the market. I reiterate and stress that there must be guidance because its absence generally causes consumer goods to be sold below the price authorized by the bureau, causing the citizens to lose confidence in this price setting while the role of the bureau is growing in the eyes of the citizens, consequently causing a lack of confidence in the big role played by the bureau in serving the citizen and his interests.

[Question] Arising from the director general's emphasis on guiding importation, I asked him about the bureau's role in consideration of forming this local committee?

[Answer] We submitted a request to the ministry urging the establishment of a mechanism to engage in market research so that it could perform that task of evaluating the needs of citizens. We made this request contingent upon making the proper study and giving special attention and, God willing, we hope that the minister and officials in the ministry in general will be understanding of such essential needs.

#### Prosecutor's Office for Apprehending Violators

[Question] How are wholesalers, retailers and craftsmen who commit violations apprehended?

[Answer] The bureau has a prosecutor's office and its own special prosecutor. The prosecutor general and which falls in the category of special prosecutor. Procedure are followed in it in light of the ministry's law on penalties and the prosecutor's penal code. This law sets the fines that are imposed on violators commensurate with the nature of the violation. In the case of a violation, the fine is doubled and, in the event of a repeat violation, the prosecutor's penal code provides that the offender will be banned from holding in his possession, any licenses granted him will be withdrawn and a sentence passed against him by the appropriate penal court.

The deputy prosecutor of the Bureau of Fair's ministry pleads the case in those courts so that the case will end in issuance of a verdict.

Consumers' Union -- How and Why?

In commenting on the numerous violations and the need to eradicate them and check the rampant greed in market circles and in explaining the solutions that ought to help solve the problems of the market and wipe out the monopolies that arise from corrupt hearts, 'Ali Ahmad al-Sayyahi went on to say:

We would be heartily pleased were citizens who were understanding of their issues as consumers to establish a society or union to protect consumers from the greed of merchants. 'Ali al-Sayyagh expressed optimism that this society or union would be, in addition to the bureau, a strong force for striking a blow at exploiters in the market and eradicating those who are drawn into abusing citizens whenever and wherever they want, and he is confident that when such a society or union is available, it, in conjunction with the bureau, will find radical solutions to the problems suffered by us all, citizens, merchants and the bureau.

[Question] I remember that a short time ago the Ministry of Supply disseminated a notice barring the import of canned goods, such as mangoes for example. However the citizens have not felt that the notice has been implemented. As the executive party, what is your response?

[Answer] The fact is that the ministry issues all its instructions and we, in turn, do everything we can to carry them out. We monitor effective implementation when the other quarters concerned cooperate with us. The annoying thing is that the importation of some foodstuffs and simple requirements is a distressing drain on the national economy and weakens the role of the development movement in the country. At this point I can give the reader some tragic-comic staggering statistics on the importation of some foodstuffs. For example, in 1979 it cost 280 million riyals to import canned fruits and mango juice.

The fact is that such a figure is really distressing and is caused by the lack of sound prioritization of our needs and of advance projections of the cost. It would have been far better had we been able to use some other approach to ensure benefitting our national economy. My dear reader, let me give you some staggering figures which, had we given proper thought, we could have used to construct plants for such commodities or set up farms that would meet our needs at a time needed by our national economy.

The cost of rice for the same year, 1979, was 41 million riyals while the cost of sauce was 49 million riyals.

Dairy products (shunjam) cost 3.5 million riyals.

Processing cost 2,714,000,000 riyals in the same year.

Why, for example, don't we use all or a part of these millions to buy a plant or two as long as we have available some of the primary materials needed for processing?

[Could we buy a local plant for tomato juice were attention paid to the establishment of a number of farms for canning and meeting the needs of the market? Could we avoid some, if only part, of the funds spent to buy (qishr), which in 1979 cost 2,714,000,000 riyals, and put this toward setting up coffee farms and encouraging its production by various means?

[Answer] Yes, we could do all this. However, our hope in the future is that we can benefit and learn from the lessons of the past to help the national economy.

[Question] I don't want to mislead the reader since we have many issues involved in supply and it will take a long time to research them. However, at this point I would like to get back to this get together, asking the director general of the Bureau of Supply and Trade the following question: How are import licenses granted and to what extent do you encourage pan-Arab as opposed to foreign imports?

[Answer] I think that you are aware that the Bureau of Supply and the Ministry of Economy both have a hand in granting import licenses. The bureau has been given the task only with regard to foodstuffs and cement after the Ministry of Economy took over part of the jurisdiction over supply in this important aspect which is in urgent need of great vigilance and concern over a flow into the luxury goods market. We, for example, handle granting licenses for the importation of foodstuffs and, consequently, set the price and monitor the market activity to the extent possible. At this point, I am sorry to say that the Ministry of Economy handles the other part of importation and granting licenses at a time when there is no overseer over the importers of luxury goods, no price setting and no monitoring.

#### Conditions for a License

In referring to the conditions that must be met by a person seeking a license, 'Ali Ahmad al-Sayyaghi went on to say: Naturally, we are very anxious when granting licenses to avoid complications that might ensue. Therefore, there are prerequisites that must be applied to the holder of a license which can be summed up as follows:

Obtaining a certificate of membership in the Chamber of Commerce.

His capitalization must be no less than 100,000 riyals.

He must have a municipal license.

This is in addition to other prerequisites such as confirmation as to whether he is suitable to engage in this work, a personal identity card, etc. These last two are fundamental prerequisites applicable only to import and wholesale licenses because there are four types of license: a free craftsman and professional license, a retail merchant license, a wholesale license and an import license. Each of these licenses has its own prerequisites.

#### Pan-Arab Importation Provides 50 Percent of Fruit

The director general of the Bureau of Supply turned to the second part of the question, replying: With regard to the nature of the importation, the Ministry of Supply intentionally encourages importation from various Arab countries as an effort to encourage and rally around national industries. For example, 50 percent of the fruit comes here from purely Arab sources; tangerines and oranges, for example, come from Jordan, Morocco and Somalia.

We import meat and some cereals from Sudan, Somalia and Saudi Arabia supply us with bananas while apples arrive from Lebanon and dates from Iraq.

#### Manufacturing Technology Is The Reason

Brother al-Sayyaghi goes on to say: We would hope that all requirements of our local market would be imported from Arab sources. However, there are complicating factors which cause us to deal with foreign companies and which can be summed up as follows:

**Marketing:** There may be Arab products which, however, are deficient in the marketing factor while we think that there is a desire for a move toward sufficient opportunity to confirm the soundness of the commodity and whether it meets the needs of our market or not.

The second point is manufacture technology in the advanced foreign countries, something which provides the necessary facilities and sufficient periods of time to verify whether the market has a rising demand or the reverse.

For these two reasons, one can say that foreign imports exceed pan-Arab imports.

[Question] The price must be written on every commodity after it is manufactured, just like other countries of the world. I wanted to ask, for instance, why doesn't the price appear on every commodity just as has been written "Especially for the Arab Republic of Yemen," which has been seen in our local market?

[Answer] Such an essential task cannot be done for one reason, that is, the instability of the international market, some which makes it impossible for our suppliers to obtain facilities to have this done by the manufacturing companies.

It has been possible to establish prices for basic commodities, such as wheat, flour, sugar, rice, etc., for only a period of 3 months.

### Anticipated Price Setting for Types of Qat

[Question] At the end of this interview with the director general of the Bureau of Supply in San'a, 'Ali Ahmad al-Sayyahhi, we still had before us the problem of qat and qat addicts and what they cause in the way of chaos and disturbances in public places which cause many annoyances for market traffic and also obstruct passersby in public places. The ugliest thing this causes is defacing the appearance of the capital and its streets when crowds of citizens and also qat vendors come and form disorganized lines and crowds to buy and sell qat.

In order to avoid these disgraceful scenes, the quarters concerned in fact issued orders to bar the continued sale of qat in the center and streets of the capital but such directives have been ignored by the buyers and sellers of qat and this has set the dream back to square one. I therefore wanted to end my interview with the director general of the Bureau of Supply on the subject of qat and its problems.

[Answer] The director explained the general approaches by which such manifestations can be eliminated, saying:

The Bureau of Supply submitted a general plan setting forth the problems of qat and the harm caused by its sellers and explaining the solutions. In this plan of ours, we went so far as to lay down a method to ensure the imposition of specific prices on various types of qat. That was and will be done by co-ordinating things with the Bureau of Taxes and the municipality.

### New Markets for Qat

This plan also included a definition for markets for types of qat and the formation of committees at the entrances to the capital which, in addition to representatives of the Bureau of Supply and the Bureau of Taxes, would include representatives of the qat farmers and sellers. One of the tasks of these committees would be to evaluate the proper price for the qat for purposes of taxation and consumption.

In accordance with that plan, price monitors at the specified qat market would set the price and monitor compliance.

Through this plan, which has been submitted to the province for approval, we will be able to protect the citizen from the so-called "profiteers". In addition, the plan proposed four markets for these various types of qat, set forth in brief as follows:

1. The Naqm Market which would be allocated for the following types of qat: al-Suti, al-Hashishi, al-Khawalani and the like.
2. The al-Hasbah Market which would be earmarked for al-Suti, al-Hajjaji, al-Khamari and similar types of qat.
3. The al-Safiyah Market which is located on the ta'izz road and which would be set aside for al-Aba, al-Rada'i and al-Ta'izzi qat.

4. The al-Sahab Market which faces the Saw II Hotel on which would be earmarked for al-Dala'i, al-'Asari and al-Haddi qat.

There is great hope that the plan will work . . . and achieves the objectives for which it will be implemented, God willing.

At the conclusion of the interview, I thanked the director general and said goodbye, expressing my hope that coming years will see us having accomplished much of what we want in all our areas of development with the area of supply naturally in the forefront by virtue of its great importance in affecting the complexion of the tranquil life of the average Yemeni who is working to earn his humble daily bread.

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